US 9,003,559 B2Granted

Continuity check monitoring for microchip exploitation detection

AssigneeInternational Business Machines Corporation

InventorsGerald K. Bartley, Darryl J. Becker, Paul E. Dahlen, Philip R. Germann, Andrew B. Maki, Mark O. Maxson, Carl-Otto Nilsen

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Abstract

Apparatus, method and program product detect an attempt to tamper with a microchip by determining that an electrical path comprising one or more connections and a metal plate attached to the backside of a microchip has become disconnected or otherwise altered. A tampering attempt may also be detected in response to the presence of an electrical path that should not be present, as may result from the microchip being incorrectly reconstituted. Actual and/or deceptive paths may be automatically selected and monitored to further confound a reverse engineering attempt.

Claims18

Dependent claims

An apparatus comprising:

an electrical path configured to electrically connect a plurality of first connections, wherein the plurality of first connections are first connecting points in first circuitry of a microchip, and wherein the electrical path comprises a conductive element;
a false electrical path configured to appear to connect a plurality of second connections but not electrically connecting the plurality of second connections, wherein the plurality of second connections are second connecting points in the first circuitry of the microchip;
and
second circuitry configured to detect a disconnection of the electrical path, a connection of the false electrical path, or a combination thereof resulting from a reverse engineering process targeting the first circuitry, and to initiate an action to obstruct the reverse engineering process, wherein the second circuitry is in electrical communication with the electrical path and with the false electrical path, and wherein the second circuitry is embedded with the first circuitry.

1 more element

A method of protecting security sensitive circuitry of a microchip from undesired analysis, the method comprising:

initializing the microchip;
selecting an electrical path from among a plurality of electrical paths, wherein the electrical path is configured to electrically connect a plurality of first connections, and wherein the plurality of first connections are connecting points in first circuitry of the microchip;
selecting a false electrical path from among a plurality of false electrical paths, wherein the false electrical path is configured to appear to connect a plurality of second connections but to not electrically connect the plurality of second connections, and wherein the plurality of second connections are second connecting points in the first circuitry of the microchip;
detecting, by second circuitry, a disconnection of the electrical path, a connection of the false electrical path, or a combination thereof resulting from a reverse engineering process targeting the first circuitry, wherein the second circuitry is in electrical communication with the electrical path and with the false electrical path;
and
initiating an action to obstruct the reverse engineering process, wherein the second circuitry is embedded with the first circuitry.

3 more elements

Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.