Method for strengthening the implementation of ECDSA against power analysis
AssigneeCerticom Corp.
InventorRobert J. Lambert
Life of this patent
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AssigneeCerticom Corp.
InventorRobert J. Lambert
Estimating the term…
A method of inhibiting the disclosure of confidential information through power analysis attacks on processors in cryptographic systems. The method masks a cryptographic operation using a generator G. A secret value, which may be combined with the generator G to form a secret generator is generated. The secret value is divided into a plurality of parts. A random value is generated for association with the plurality of parts. Each of the plurality of parts is combined with the random value to derive a plurality of new values such that the new values when combined are equivalent to the secret value. Each of the new values is used in the cryptographic operation, thereby using the secret generator in place of the generator G in the cryptographic operation. The introduction of randomness facilitates the introduction of noise into algorithms used by cryptographic systems so as to mask the secret value and provide protection against power analysis attacks.
A computer-implemented method of masking a cryptographic operation that combines a signature component r generated using a generator G with a secret value d, said method operating on a plurality of parts split from said secret value d, wherein said plurality of parts may be combined to yield said secret value d, said method comprising a processor executing the steps of:
A computer-implemented method of computing a digital signature on a message m, said signature being computed by a signer having a private key d and a public key dG, where G is a generator of a cryptographic group, said method comprising a processor executing the steps of:
A computer-implemented method of computing a public key corresponding to a private key k in a cryptosystem, wherein the cryptosystem uses a generator G, said method comprising a processor of the cryptosystem executing the steps of:
A computer-implemented method of computing an ECDSA signature on a message m, said method being performed by a signer having a private key d and a public key dG, where G is a generator, said signature comprising an ephemeral public key r obtained from an ephemeral masked private key k and a signature component s derived from said message, m, said ephemeral private key k, and said private key d, said method characterised in that the computation of said signature comprises a processor executing the steps of:
A computer-implemented method for masking a secret value k used in an elliptic curve cryptographic operation performed mod n, where n is the order of a generating point used in said cryptographic operation, said method comprising a processor executing the steps of:
A computer-implemented method for masking a secret value k used in a cryptographic operation, said method comprising a processor executing the steps of:
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.