Secure communications using pre-shared keys
AssigneeInfineon Technologies AG
InventorsAlexander Zeh, Kenneth William Tindell
Life of this patent
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Abstract
The described techniques address issues to achieve key agreement without the need to exchange separate key agreement messages and, consequently, meets the stringent starting time requirements for real-time control systems. This is achieved using a group-wide key counter, with each node storing the latest value of this counter that was observed via the last received secured message. This counter value increases monotonically, and nodes maintain synchronization by transmitting this counter value (or a representation of the counter value) in each secured message.
Claims29
A transmitting node in a system of interconnected nodes configured to communicate over a bus according to a multi-drop scheme, the transmitting node comprising:
- processing circuitry configured to:
- derive, from a shared secret and a counter value, a temporary session key in accordance with a cryptographic function, the counter value and the shared secret being stored in non-volatile memory;
- and
- generate a secured message using the temporary session key, the secured message comprising a plurality of fields, with a first one of the plurality of fields comprising a representation of the counter value;
- and
- communication circuitry configured to transmit the secured message to the bus.
A receiving node in a system of interconnected nodes, the system of interconnected nodes communicating over a bus according to a multi-drop scheme, the receiving node comprising:
- communication circuitry configured to receive a secured message via the bus, the secured message comprising a plurality of fields, with a first one of the plurality of fields comprising a representation of a first counter value that was used to derive a first temporary session key for generating the secured message in accordance with a cryptographic function prior to the secured message being received;
- and
- processing circuitry configured to:
- compute the first counter value from the representation of the first counter value contained in the secured message;
- determine a validity of the first counter value based upon (i) whether the computed first counter value matches a second counter value that is stored in a non-volatile memory of the receiving node, and/or (ii) whether the secured message is verified based upon a second temporary session key, which is derived from a shared secret stored in the non-volatile memory and the computed first counter value;
- and
- accept or reject the secured message based upon the determined validity of the first counter value.
A computer implemented method for transmitting a secured message via a transmitting node in a system of interconnected nodes configured to communicate over a bus, the method comprising:
- generating, from a shared secret and a counter value, a temporary session key in accordance with a cryptographic function, the counter value and the shared secret being stored in non-volatile memory of the transmitting node;
- generating the secured message using the temporary session key, the secured message comprising a plurality of fields, with a first one of the plurality of fields comprising a representation of the counter value;
- and
- transmitting the secured message to the bus.
A computer implemented method for receiving a secured message via a receiving node in a system of interconnected nodes configured to communicate over a bus, the method comprising:
- receiving a secured message via the bus, the secured message comprising a plurality of fields, with a first one of the plurality of fields comprising a representation of a first counter value that was used to derive a first temporary session key for generating the secured message in accordance with a cryptographic function prior to the secured message being received;
- computing the first counter value from the representation of the first counter value contained in the secured message;
- determining a validity of the first counter value based upon (i) whether the computed first counter value matches a second counter value that is stored in a non-volatile memory of the receiving node, and/or (ii) whether the secured message is verified based upon a second temporary session key, which is derived from a shared secret stored in the non-volatile memory and the computed first counter value;
- and
- accepting or rejecting the secured message based upon the determined validity of the first counter value.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.