Extending secure guest metadata to bind the secure guest to a hardware security module

A system for implementing a three-factor authorization in a trusted computing environment, the system comprising:

• one or more processors;
• and
• a memory operationally coupled to the one or more processors, wherein the memory stores program portions which, when executed, enable the one or more processors to perform a method comprising:
• triggering, by a hypervisor, a start of a secure guest by passing control regarding an image of the secure guest and metadata of the secure guest to a trusted firmware, wherein the secure guest is designed to access a hardware security module;
• upon a successful integrity check of the metadata of the secure guest by the trusted firmware:
• starting the secure guest using the hypervisor, and
• blocking any sensitive request from the secure guest to the hardware security module;
• submitting, by the secure guest, a request comprising a request structure including a third authorization secret and a characterization of a requested hardware security module to the trusted firmware;
• and
• binding, by the trusted firmware, each hardware security module protected key generated in the requested hardware security module in response to the request to the third authorization secret.

A computer program product, the computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having program instructions embodied therewith, the program instructions executable by a processor to cause a device to perform a method of implementing a three-factor authorization in a trusted computing environment, the method comprising:

• triggering, by a hypervisor, a start of a secure guest by passing control regarding an image of the secure guest and metadata of the secure guest to a trusted firmware, wherein the secure guest is designed to access a hardware security module;
• upon a successful integrity check of the metadata of the secure guest by the trusted firmware:
• starting the secure guest using the hypervisor, and
• blocking any sensitive request from the secure guest to the hardware security module;
• submitting, by the secure guest, a request comprising a request structure including a third authorization secret and a characterization of a requested hardware security module to the trusted firmware;
• and
• binding, by the trusted firmware, each hardware security module protected key generated in the requested hardware security module in response to the request to the third authorization secret.