Using cryptographic blinding for efficient use of montgomery multiplication
AssigneeCryptography Research, Inc.
InventorMichael TUNSTALL
Life of this patent
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Abstract
Aspects of the present disclosure involves receiving an input message, generating a first random value that is used to blind the input message input message to prevent a side-channel analysis (SCA) attack, computing a second random value using the first random value and a factor used to compute the Montgomery form of a blinded input message without performing an explicit Montgomery conversion of the input message, and computing a signature using Montgomery multiplication, of the first random value and the second random value, wherein the signature is resistant to the SCA attack.
Claims20
A computer-implemented method comprising:
- receiving an input message at a processor executing a cryptographic algorithm;
- generating, by the processor, a first random value that is used to blind the input message to prevent a side-channel analysis (SCA) attack;
- computing, by the processor, a second random value, using the first random value and a factor used to create a Montgomery form of the blinded input message without performing a Montgomery conversion of the input message;
- and
- computing, by the processor, a signature by performing Montgomery multiplications using the first random value and the second random value, wherein the signature is a countermeasure against the SCA attack.
A public-key cryptography system comprising:
- an external memory;
- and
- a processor, executing a cryptography algorithm and being operatively coupled with the external memory, to:
- receive an input message;
- generate, a first random value that is used to blind the input message to prevent a side-channel analysis (SCA) attack;
- compute a second random value, using the first random value and a factor used to create a Montgomery form of the blinded input message without performing a Montgomery conversion of the input message;
- and
- compute a signature by performing Montgomery multiplications using the first random value and the second random value, wherein the signature is a countermeasure against the SCA attack.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.