Nuclear reactor protection systems and methods
AssigneesNuScale Power, LLC, Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC
InventorsGregory Wayne Clarkson, Rufino Ayala, Jason Pottorf
Life of this patent
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Abstract
A nuclear reactor protection system includes a plurality of functionally independent modules, each of the modules configured to receive a plurality of inputs from a nuclear reactor safety system, and logically determine a safety action based at least in part on the plurality of inputs; and one or more nuclear reactor safety actuators communicably coupled to the plurality of functionally independent modules to receive the safety action determination based at least in part on the plurality of inputs.
Claims19
A nuclear reactor protection system, comprising:
- a first logic circuit configured as a first set of hardware components that include multiple redundant circuits and a voting circuit, the first logic circuit configured to:
- receive a first set of inputs from a first set of one or more sensors for a nuclear power system;
- and
- logically derive a first safety determination based on the first set of inputs, wherein the first safety determination is made by the voting circuit based on a majority of outputs received from the multiple redundant circuits, the first safety determination associated with a transient event of a nuclear reactor or a portion thereof,
- a second logic circuit configured as a second set of hardware components different from the first set of hardware components to:
- receive a second set of inputs from a second set of one or more sensors for the nuclear power system, wherein the second set of inputs include measured parameters different from the first set of inputs;
- and
- logically derive a second safety determination based on the second set of inputs, wherein the second safety determination is associated with the transient event;
- and
- a safety actuator configured to actuate in response to the first and second safety determinations and address the transient event.
A nuclear reactor protection system, comprising:
- a first logic circuit configured as a first set of hardware components that include multiple redundant circuits and a voting circuit, the first logic circuit configured to:
- receive a first set of inputs from a first set of one or more sensors for a nuclear power system;
- and
- logically derive a first safety determination based on the first set of inputs, wherein the first safety determination is made by the voting circuit based on a majority of outputs received from the multiple redundant circuits, the first safety determination associated with a transient event of a nuclear reactor or a portion thereof;
- a second logic circuit configured as a second set of hardware components different from the first set of hardware components to:
- receive a second set of inputs from a second set of one or more sensors for the nuclear power system, wherein the second set of inputs include measured parameters separate from the first set of inputs;
- logically derive a second safety determination based on the second set of inputs, wherein the second safety determination is associated with the transient event;
- and
- a safety actuator configured to actuate in response to the first and second safety determinations and address the transient event.
A method of operating a nuclear reactor protection system, the method comprising:
- receiving a first set of inputs and a second set of inputs wherein the second set of inputs include measured parameters separate from the first set of inputs, the first and second sets of inputs from a first set of one or more sensors and a second set of one or more sensors, respectively, for a nuclear power system;
- using a first logic circuit configured as a first set of hardware components that include multiple redundant circuits and a voting circuit, logically determining a first safety determination based at least in part on the first set of inputs, wherein the first safety determination is made by the voting circuit based on a majority of outputs received from the multiple redundant circuits, the first safety determination associated with a transient event of a nuclear reactor or a portion thereof;
- using a second logic circuit configured as a second set of hardware components different from the first set of hardware components, logically determining a second safety determination based at least in part on the second set of inputs, wherein the second safety determination is associated with the transient event;
- and
- based on the first and second safety determinations, controlling actuation of a safety actuator for the nuclear power system to address the transient event.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.