Systems and methods for inertial measurement unit aided detection and exclusion against spoofing attacks

A non-transitory computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions stored thereon which, when executed by one or more processors coupled to an IMU and a GNSS receiver, cause the one or more processors to:

• acquire, from the IMU, a series of dynamic measurements of a vehicle and, from received GNSS signals, GNSS position data of the vehicle, the dynamic measurements and GNSS position data corresponding to a time period, wherein the GNSS position data comprises satellite ephemeris data and range data;
• calculate navigation reckoning based on the series of dynamic measurements;
• determine at least one line of sight (LOS) range based on the navigation reckoning and the satellite ephemeris data, wherein the at least one LOS range is determined between one satellite of one or more satellites and the vehicle;
• compare each of the at least one LOS range with the GNSS range data to acquire at least one error differential value;
• compare the at least one error differential value to a threshold value, wherein the threshold value is indicative of GNSS spoofing with respect to a respective satellite of the one or more satellites;
• eliminate one or more spoofed GNSS satellites whose error differential value is beyond the threshold value;
• verify range data corresponding to non-spoofed GNSS satellites with an autonomous integrity algorithm,
• if the range data are not verified, then adjust the threshold value, and reset related GNSS satellite tracking channels in the GNSS receiver.

A method executed by one or more processors coupled to an IMU and a GNSS receiver, comprising:

• acquiring, from the IMU, a series of dynamic measurements of a vehicle and, from GNSS signals received at the GNSS receiver, GNSS position data of the vehicle, the dynamic measurements and GNSS position data corresponding to a time period, wherein the GNSS position data comprises satellite ephemeris data and range data;
• calculating navigation reckoning based on the series of dynamic measurements;
• determining at least one line of sight (LOS) range based on the navigation reckoning and the satellite ephemeris data, wherein the at least one LOS range is determined between one satellite of one or more satellites and the vehicle;
• comparing each of the at least one LOS range with the GNSS range data to acquire at least one error differential value;
• comparing the at least one error differential value to a threshold value, wherein the threshold value is indicative of GNSS spoofing with respect to a respective satellite of the one or more satellites;
• eliminating one or more spoofed GNSS satellites whose error differential value is beyond the threshold value;
• verifying range data corresponding to non-spoofed GNSS satellites with an autonomous integrity algorithm,
• determining that at least one range is not verified, and
• adjusting the threshold value and resetting related GNSS satellite tracking channels in the GNSS receiver.