Methods to detect spoofing attacks on automated driving systems

A non-transitory machine-readable medium having instructions stored therein, which when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform operations for detecting a spoofing attack against an autonomous driving vehicle (ADV), the operations comprising:

• determining a planned route from a starting location to a destination, the planned route to the destination being updatable as the ADV travels on the planned route;
• obtaining a plurality of pre-defined static objects along the planned route from a map database, the plurality of pre-defined static objects being updatable when the planned route is updated;
• detecting an update to the plurality of pre-defined static objects;
• determining that a re-routing of the planned route is associated with the spoofing attack based on a frequency of past re-routings of the planned route, and a distance of the planned route in response to detecting the update to the plurality of pre-defined static objects;
• determining a change to the destination by analyzing a new route traced by a plurality of updated pre-defined static objects;
• and
• confirming that a passenger in the ADV does not request the change to the destination to determine that the re-routing is associated with the spoofing attack;
• confirming that there is the passenger in the ADV;
• prompting the passenger in the ADV to request stopping the ADV;
• and
• sending a report that the re-routing of the planned route is associated with the spoofing attack.

A system to detect a spoofing attack against an autonomous driving vehicle (ADV), comprising:

• a memory;
• and
• a processor coupled to the memory, wherein the processor is configured to:
• determine a planned route from a starting location to a destination, the planned route to the destination being updatable as the ADV travels on the planned route;
• obtain a plurality of pre-defined static objects along the planned route from a map database, the plurality of pre-defined static objects being updatable when the planned route is updated;
• detect an update to the plurality of pre-defined static objects;
• determine that a re-routing of the planned route is associated with the spoofing attack based on a frequency of past re-routings of the planned route, and a distance of the planned route in response to detecting the update to the plurality of pre-defined static objects;
• determine a change to the destination by analyzing a new route traced by a plurality of updated pre-defined static objects;
• confirm that a passenger in the ADV does not request the change to the destination to determine that the re-routing is associated with the spoofing attack;
• confirm that there is the passenger in the ADV;
• prompt the passenger in the ADV to request stopping the ADV;
• and
• send a report that the re-routing of the planned route is associated with the spoofing attack.