Technologies for trusted I/O for multiple co-existing trusted execution environments under ISA control

One or more non-transitory, machine readable storage media comprising a plurality of instructions that in response to being executed cause a computing device to:

• generate, by a trusted execution environment of the computing device, a request to program a cryptographic engine of the computing device to protect a direct memory access (DMA) channel, wherein to program the cryptographic engine of the computing device to protect the DMA channel comprises to invoke, by the trusted execution environment, a first processor instruction to generate wrapped programming information indicative of the trusted execution environment;
• verify a signed manifest of the computing device in response to generating the request to program the cryptographic engine, wherein the signed manifest is indicative of one or more trusted execution environments permitted to program DMA channels;
• determine, in response to verifying the signed manifest, whether the trusted execution environment is permitted to program the DMA channel based on the signed manifest, wherein to determine whether the trusted execution environment is permitted to program the DMA channel based on the signed manifest further comprises to determine the trusted execution environment based on the wrapped programming information;
• and
• program the DMA channel with respect to the cryptographic engine in response to determining that the trusted execution environment is permitted to program the DMA channel.

A computing device for secure cryptographic engine programming, the computing device comprising:

• a configuration module to generate, by a trusted execution environment, a request to program a cryptographic engine of the computing device with respect to a direct memory access (DMA) channel, wherein to generate the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises to:
• (i) invoke, by the trusted execution environment, a first processor instruction to generate wrapped programming information, wherein the wrapped programming information is indicative of the trusted execution environment and (ii) invoke, by untrusted software of the computing device, a second processor instruction with the wrapped programming information;
• and
• an ownership verification module to:
• (i) determine whether the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises a request to program the DMA channel out of secure, (ii) determine whether the trusted execution environment matches a recorded trusted execution environment associated with the DMA channel in response to a determination that the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises a request to program the DMA channel out of secure, to determine whether the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises a request to program the DMA channel out of secure comprises to determine, by the processor in response to invocation of the second processor instruction, whether the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises a request to program the DMA channel out of secure and (iii) allow the request to program the cryptographic engine in response to a determination that the trusted execution environment matches the recorded trusted execution environment associated with the DMA channel.

One or more non-transitory, machine readable storage media comprising a plurality of instructions that in response to being executed cause a computing device to:

• generate, by a trusted execution environment of the computing device, a request to program a cryptographic engine of the computing device with respect to a direct memory access (DMA) channel, wherein to generate the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises to:
• (i) invoke, by the trusted execution environment, a first processor instruction to generate wrapped programming information, wherein the wrapped programming information is indicative of the trusted execution environment and (ii) invoke, by untrusted software of the computing device, a second processor instruction with the wrapped programming information;
• determine whether the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises a request to program the DMA channel out of secure;
• determine whether the trusted execution environment matches a recorded trusted execution environment associated with the DMA channel in response to determining that the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises a request to program the DMA channel out of secure, wherein to determine whether the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises a request to program the DMA channel out of secure comprises to determine, by the processor in response to invocation of the second processor instruction, whether the request to program the cryptographic engine comprises a request to program the DMA channel out of secure;
• and
• allow the request to program the cryptographic engine in response to determining that the trusted execution environment matches the recorded trusted execution environment associated with the DMA channel.