# US 9,660,807 B2 · System and method for verifying changes to UEFI authenticated variables

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- Number: US 9,660,807 B2
- Document ID: US9660807B2
- Status: Granted
- Kind: B2
- Application number: 14/492,916
- Filed: 2014-09-22
- Published: 2015-03-26
- Granted: 2017-05-23
- Earliest claimed: 2013-09-20
- Assignees: Insyde Software Corp.
- Applicants: Insyde Software Corp.
- Inventors: Timothy Andrew Lewis
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US9660807B2

## CPC

- H04L 9/0891: {Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying}
- G06F 21/44: Program or device authentication
- G06F 21/572: {Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]}
- H04L 9/3226: {using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083)}
- H04L 9/3236: {using cryptographic hash functions}
- H04L 9/3297: {involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A mechanism for certifying that an operating system-based application has authorization to change a UEFI authenticated variable held in the system firmware is discussed. Embodiments of the present invention receive with the system firmware a request from an operating system-based application to change a UEFI authenticated variable. The request includes an authentication descriptor header with a timestamp and pre-determined GUID. The request also includes a hash calculated using a password known to the firmware. The system firmware certifies that the caller has authorization to change an authenticated variable by first verifying the information in the header and then creating a new hash using the password. The new hash is compared to the received hash and must match in order for the system firmware to allow the alteration of the UEFI authenticated variable. In one embodiment, the password is the system firmware password.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computing device-implemented method for trusting an operating system application attempting to change a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) authenticated variable comprising:
receiving, with an operating system application, a user-supplied password;
using the user-supplied password to create a hash of configuration data for a request to alter a UEFI authenticated variable;
clearing, the user-supplied password from a memory of the computing device following the creating of the hash of configuration data for the request;
receiving with system firmware the request to alter the UEFI authenticated variable from the operating system application, the request accompanied by the hash of configuration data and the configuration data;
examining the request with the system firmware, the examining verifying that a portion of an authentication header is set to a pre-determined Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) and that the request contains a timestamp value later than a current timestamp value associated with the UEFI authenticated variable for which alteration is requested, the pre-determined GUID indicating that the operating system application request used a password-based mechanism for authentication;
calculating with the firmware a new hash of the configuration data contained in the request based on a password known to the firmware;
comparing the new hash to the hash contained in the request; and
allowing alteration of the UEFI authenticated variable in event of a match between the new hash and the hash contained in the request.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein the user-supplied password and the password know to the firmware is a system firmware password.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein the calculating of the new hash is also based on a name of the UEFI authenticated variable.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein the calculating of the new hash is also based on the GUID pointed to by a VendorGuid parameter of SetVariable( ).

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein the calculating of the new hash is also based on a structure of the time stamp.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein the password used to generate the new hash is selected by the firmware based on a UEFI authenticated variable name contained in the request.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein a plurality of new hashes are created based on a plurality of passwords and compared to the hash contained in the request.

### Claim 8

A non-transitory medium holding computer-executable instructions for trusting an operating system application attempting to change a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) authenticated variable, the instructions when executed causing at least one computing device to:
receive, with an operating system application, a user-supplied password;
use the user-supplied password to create a hash of configuration data for a request to alter a UEFI authenticated variable;
clear, the user-supplied password from a memory of the at least one computing device following the creating of the hash of configuration data for the request;
receive with system firmware the request to alter the UEFI authenticated variable from the operating system application, the request accompanied by the hash of configuration data and the configuration data;
examine the request with the system firmware, the examining varifying that a portion of an authentication header is set to a pre-determined Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) and the request contains a timestamp value later than a current timestamp value associated with the UEFI authenticated variable for which alteration is requested, the pre-determined GUID indicating that the operating system application request used a password-based mechanism for authentication;
calculate with the firmware a new hash of the configuration data contained in the request based on a password known to the firmware;
compare the new hash to the hash contained in the request; and
allow alteration of the UEFI authenticated variable in event of a match between the new hash and the hash contained in the request.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The medium of claim 8 wherein the user-supplied password and the password known to the firmware is a system firmware password.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The medium of claim 8 wherein the calculating of the new hash is also based on a name of the UEFI authenticated variable.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The medium of claim 8 wherein the calculating of the new hash is also based on the GUID pointed to by a vendorGuid parameter of SetVariable( ).

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The medium of claim 8 wherein the calculating of the new hash is also based on a structure of the time stamp.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The medium of claim 8 wherein the password used to generate the new hash is selected by the firmware based on a UEFI authenticated variable name contained in the request.

### Claim 14 (depends on 8)

The medium of claim 8 wherein a plurality of new hashes are created based on a plurality of passwords and compared to the hash contained in the request.

### Claim 15

A computing device, comprising:
a processor;
an operating system;
an operating system-based application executed while the computing device is under control of the operating system, the operating system application configured to:
receive a user-supplied password;
use the user-supplied password to create a hash of configuration data for a request to alter a UEFI authenticated variable;
clear, the user-supplied password from a memory of the at least one computing device following the creating of the hash of configuration data for the request;
system firmware held in Read Only Memory, the system firmware configured to:
receive the request to alter the UEFI authentication variable from the operating system-based application, the request accompanied by the hash of configuration data and the configuration data;
examine the request, the examining verifying that a portion of an authentication header is set to a pre-determined Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) and the request contains a timestamp value later than a current timestamp value associated with the UEFI authenticated variable for which alteration is requested, the pre-determined GUID indicating that the operating system application request used a password-based mechanism for authentication;
calculate a new hash of the configuration data contained in the request based on a password known to the system firmware;
compare the new hash to the hash contained in the request; and
allow alteration of the UEFI authenticated variable in event of a match between the new hash and the hash contained in the request.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The computing device of claim 15 wherein the user-supplied password and the password know to the system firmware is a system firmware password.

### Claim 17 (depends on 15)

The computing device of claim 15 wherein the password used to generate the new hash is selected by the firmware based on a UEFI authenticated variable name contained in the request.

### Claim 18 (depends on 15)

The computing device of claim 15 wherein a plurality of passwords are stored in the ROM and a plurality of new hashes are created based on the plurality of passwords and compared to the hash contained in the request.
