Library-based method for information flow integrity enforcement and robust information flow policy development

A computer implemented method for preventing security flaws in computer source code comprising:

• executing Instructions stored on a non-transitory memory, by a data processor, such that upon execution, the data processor performs operations comprising,
• implementing a security information flow library embedded in a host programming language;
• typechecking, with a host programming language typechecker algorithm, at least one security policy written in the host programming language;
• typechecking, with the host programming language typechecker algorithm, at least one untrusted module written in a restricted subset of the host programming language,
• wherein the at least one untrusted module cannot access confidential data in the host programming language;
• wherein typechecking of the at least one untrusted module enforces the at least one security policy with the security information follow library, wherein confidentiality and integrity are encoded separately into the security information flow library;
• and
• incrementally adding information flow security to an existing computer program by implementing at least one security policy to direct information flow between untrusted modules.

A computer program product for preventing security flaws in computer source code, the computer program product comprising computer-readable instructions stored on a non-transitory computer-readable medium that are executable by a computer having a processor for causing the processor to perform operations of:

• implementing a security information flow library embedded in a host programming language;
• typechecking, with a host programming language typechecker algorithm, at least one security policy written in the host programming language;
• typechecking, with the host programming language typechecker algorithm, at least one untrusted module written in a restricted subset of the host programming language;
• wherein the at least one untrusted module cannot access confidential data in the host programming language;
• wherein typechecking of the at least one untrusted module enforces the at least one security policy with the security information flow library;
• and
• wherein confidentiality and integrity are encoded separately into the security information flow library;
• and
• incrementally adding information flow security to an existing computer program by implementing at least one security policy to direct information flow between untrusted modules.