A method for hindering detection of information unintentionally leaked from a secret held in a memory unit is described, the method including receiving a triggering event waiting for at least a first amount of time to pass after the receipt of the triggering event, the memory unit being in a non-operational state during the at least a first amount of time after the at least a first amount of time has passed, changing at least one first condition under which the memory unit operates, thereby causing the memory unit to enter an operational state, waiting for a second amount of time to pass after the changing at least one first condition, and changing, after the second amount of time, at least one second condition under which the memory unit operates, thereby causing the memory unit to enter the non-operational state, wherein access to the secret information is enabled only during the second amount of time, and detection of secret information unintentionally leaked is limited during the first amount of time. Related apparatus and methods are also described.
Drawings
Claims12
A machine-implemented method for hindering detection of secret information unintentionally leaked from a secret held in a memory unit, the method comprising:
storing the secret information in a location within the memory unit;
episodically re-deriving the secret information by performing the following:
retrieving a first key from a location in a second memory unit;
generating a second key;
performing one of:
decrypting the secret information with the first key and encrypting it with the second key;
and deobfuscating the secret information with the first key and obfuscating it again with the second key;
and
storing the second key in the second location in memory;
and
storing the re-derived secret information at the location within the memory unit,
wherein the episodic re-deriving of the secret information causes an episodic change of physical contents of the memory unit holding the secret information, thereby causing the secret information unintentionally leaked from the memory unit to vary over time causing any detector of leaked information requiring long collection times which are longer than feasible to receive an average of the leaked information, the average of the leaked information not revealing the leaked information.
9 more elements
A system for hindering detection of secret information unintentionally leaked from a secret held in a memory unit, the system comprising:
a secret information store which stores the secret information in a location within the memory unit;
an episodic secret information re-deriver, the re-deriver comprising;
a second memory location storing a first key;
a key generator which generates a second key;
a processor operative to perform one of:
decrypt the secret information with the first key and encrypt it with the second key;
and deobfuscate the secret information with the first key and obfuscate it again with the second key;
and
the second memory location then storing the second key;
and
the secret information store being operative to store the re-derived secret information at the location within the memory unit,
wherein the episodic re-deriving of the secret information causes an episodic change of physical contents of the memory unit holding the secret information, thereby causing the secret information unintentionally leaked from the memory unit to vary over time causing any detector of leaked information requiring long collection times which are longer than feasible to receive an average of the leaked information, the average of the leaked information not revealing the leaked information.
20 Dec 2030Estimated · howhide20 years from earliest known nonprovisional domestic filing plus recorded patent term adjustment. Maintenance-fee lapses, terminal disclaimers and statutory extensions have not been checked. The continuity chain may be incomplete; this is not an enforceability determination.
#The present invention will be understood and appreciated more fully from the following detailed description, taken in conjunction with the drawings in which:
#FIG. 1 is a simplified generalized graphical depiction of memory element conditions in a memory element in an integrated circuit over time, the memory element and integrated circuit incorporating a system for hindering detection of secret information leaked from a memory element constructed and operative in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;
#FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustration of a portion of an exemplary integrated circuit which operates according to the system of FIG. 1;
Detailed description4,509 words
#Integrated circuits frequently comprise memory units, the memory units comprising physical memory elements and interfaces to the physical memory elements, such as but not limited to ROM (Read Only Memory), RAM (Random Access Memory), and registers, and interfaces to the physical memory elements. The memory units may comprise stored secret information, especially when the memory units are used in secure devices. Such secret information frequently includes, but is not limited to cryptographic keys. The secret information should be neither readable by, nor leakable to an outside observer, hereinafter referred to as an attacker.
#Memory units, such as the memory units described above, are typically accessed by another circuit or another unit in a circuit whether the accessing circuit is in the same integrated circuit as the memory unit or the accessing circuit is outside the memory unit. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the term “access”, in all of its grammatical forms, such as “accessed” as used in the phrase, “memory units are typically accessed by another circuit” to mean: read data; write data; modify data; erase data; and so forth, as is well known in the art. In order to access such a memory unit, the memory unit should be in an “operational state”, that is, input signals into and output signals from the memory unit are not blocked, and the memory unit has all of the conditions specified by the manufacturer of the memory unit as required for proper operation of the memory unit, thereby allowing access to data stored in the memory unit. For example, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, voltage is supplied to the memory unit at the voltage level specified by the manufacturer of the memory unit. Additionally, some memory units such as DRAMs (Dynamic Random Access Memory) have to be input clock signals in specified amplitudes, frequencies, or rise times, etc. for operational conditions to be maintained.
#It is appreciated that, as opposed to the operational state, the memory unit may be in a non-operational state. The non-operational state is comprised to two different sub-states: a “retention state”, that is, conditions that will retain the secret information in the memory unit while making data stored in the memory unit inaccessible, either directly or indirectly; and a non-retention state, in which maintenance of the secret information in the memory unit is not guaranteed, and the secret information may be erased from the memory unit.