US 8,898,737 B2Granted

Authentication method for stateless address allocation in IPv6 networks

AssigneeKing Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals

InventorsZubair Ahmed Baig, Suli Charles Adeniye

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Abstract

The authentication method for stateless address allocation in IPv6 networks provides a P2P trust-verification approach for identifying a rogue node. Alternatively, the authentication method provides an information hiding scheme to avoid being plagued by rogue nodes. In both cases, the authentication method is embodied in a computer software product having machine readable code.

Claims1

Dependent claims

A computer software product, comprising a non-transitory medium readable by a processor, the non-transitory medium having stored thereon a set of instructions for performing an authentication method for stateless address allocation during a stateless address auto-configuration (SLAAC) sequence in IPv6 networks, the set of instructions including:

(a) a first sequence of instructions which, when executed by the processor, causes said processor to, in a given IPv6 node i belonging to an IPv6 network, derive a trust factor α from a number of network advertisement messages received from k neighbors of the given node i, when a network solicitation message is sent, the trust factor α being dependent on a window of time based on size of the network, number of hops, and approximate round-trip delay, where αε{0, 1};
(b) a second sequence of instructions which, when executed by the processor, causes said processor to maintain a parameter list in each of the nodes i in the IPv6 network, the parameter list including a list ki of the neighbors, a threshold θ on the minimum number of neighbor responses needed for node address verification, a trust value Ti→je between node pair {i,j} during a given time epoch e, a total number of nodes N in the network, a number y of legitimate nodes in the network, an expected number of rogue nodes N−y, the trust factor α, and an optimal time window length τ;
(c) a third sequence of instructions which, when executed by the processor, causes said processor to compute the optimal time window length, the optimal time window length computation being characterized by the relation:
τ
=
1
y
·
(
N
-
y
)
·
T
i
->
j
e
using the parameters maintained in the parameter list;
(d) a fourth sequence of instructions which, when executed by the processor, causes said processor to compute a decision factor based on the parameter list and characterized by the relation:
G
i
->
j
=
α
·
T
i
->
j
e
+
α
(
N
-
y
)
·
τ
,
the decision factor Gi→j indicating whether a requesting node can trust a NA response coming from a node j in the network;
and
wherein when Gi→j>θ, the node i trusts the node j, thereby accepting the node j as authentic, but when Gi→j≦θ, the node i does not trust the node j, the non-trust determination causing said processor to form a new link-local address and send another network solicitation message.

43 more elements

Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.

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Abstract

(a) a first sequence of instructions which, when executed by the processor, causes said processor to, in a given IPv6 node i belonging to an IPv6 network, derive a trust factor α from a number of network advertisement messages received from k neighbors of the given node i, when a network solicitation message is sent, the trust factor α being dependent on a window of time based on size of the network, number of hops, and approximate round-trip delay, where αε{0, 1};
(b) a second sequence of instructions which, when executed by the processor, causes said processor to maintain a parameter list in each of the nodes i in the IPv6 network, the parameter list including a list ki of the neighbors, a threshold θ on the minimum number of neighbor responses needed for node address verification, a trust value Ti→je between node pair {i,j} during a given time epoch e, a total number of nodes N in the network, a number y of legitimate nodes in the network, an expected number of rogue nodes N−y, the trust factor α, and an optimal time window length τ;
(c) a third sequence of instructions which, when executed by the processor, causes said processor to compute the optimal time window length, the optimal time window length computation being characterized by the relation:
τ
=
1
y
·
(
N
-
y
)
·
T
i
->
j
e
using the parameters maintained in the parameter list;
(d) a fourth sequence of instructions which, when executed by the processor, causes said processor to compute a decision factor based on the parameter list and characterized by the relation:
G
i
->
j
=
α
·
T
i
->
j
e
+
α
(
N
-
y
)
·
τ
,
the decision factor Gi→j indicating whether a requesting node can trust a NA response coming from a node j in the network;
and
wherein when Gi→j>θ, the node i trusts the node j, thereby accepting the node j as authentic, but when Gi→j≦θ, the node i does not trust the node j, the non-trust determination causing said processor to form a new link-local address and send another network solicitation message.

43 more elements