Static analysis of computer software applications

A method comprising:

• a computer invocating one of a plurality of factory methods at least two times, comprising a first invocation and a second invocation;
• the computer performing the first invocation using an untrusted argument;
• the computer performing the second invocation without using an untrusted argument wherein if a static security analysis were performed using a data-flow propagation graph from the first invocation and the second invocation without using the modified set of object abstractions, a false positive report of a security vulnerability would result assuming that by default the statistic security analysis conservatively views two instances as being one for a same abstract object, wherein said method avoids the false positive report by modeling the factory method by applying a further level of abstraction, as opposed to modeling the factory method as a single abstract object;
• responsive to the first and the second invocating, the computer applying a first level of abstraction to model a plurality of run-time objects of a computer software application to produce a set of object abstractions of the run-time objects for the one factory method;
• the computer producing a first data-flow propagation graph using the set of object abstractions;
• the computer identifying a data-flow bottleneck at control locations within the first data-flow propagation graph;
• the computer determining whether the data-flow bottleneck is traceable to an abstraction of run-time objects;
• the computer applying a second level of abstraction to model any of the said run-time objects which are identified as created or returned by factory methods and having in the set of object abstractions a corresponding object abstraction that is traceable to the data-flow bottleneck, based on corresponding allocation sites and call sites that call factory methods encompassing the corresponding allocation sites, where applying the second level of abstraction decomposes the corresponding object abstraction into a plurality of object abstractions, thereby producing a modified set of object abstractions
• wherein use of the first and second levels of abstractions avoids a false-positive report of a security vulnerability from being generated by a static data-flow analysis of the computer software application;
• and
• the computer performing static data-flow analysis of the computer software application using the modified set of object abstractions to replace the data-flow propagation graph with a modified data flow propagation graph.

A method comprising:

• a computer applying a first level of abstraction to model a plurality of run-time objects of a computer software application to produce a set of object abstractions of the run-time objects;
• the computer producing a first data-flow propagation graph using the set of object abstractions;
• the computer identifying a data-flow bottleneck at control locations within the first data-flow propagation graph;
• the computer applying a second level of abstraction to model any of the said run-time objects which are identified as created or returned by factory methods and having in the set of object abstractions a corresponding object abstraction that is traceable to the data-flow bottleneck, based on corresponding allocation sites and call sites that call factory methods encompassing the corresponding allocation sites, where applying the second level of abstraction decomposes the corresponding object abstraction into a plurality of object abstractions, thereby producing a modified set of object abstractions;
• the computer determining whether the data-flow bottleneck is traceable to an abstraction of run-time objects;
• the computer applying a second level of abstraction to model any of the run-time objects of which abstractions which are identified as created or returned by factory methods and having in the set of object abstractions a corresponding object abstraction that is traceable to the data-flow bottleneck, based on corresponding allocation sites and call sites that call factory methods encompassing the corresponding allocation sites, where applying the second level of abstraction decomposes the corresponding object abstraction into a plurality of object abstractions, thereby producing a modified set of object abstractions;
• the computer performing static data-flow analysis of the computer software application using the modified set of object abstractions to produce a second data-flow propagation graph, wherein the first data-flow propagation graph is replaced by the second data-flow propagation graph;
• the computer invocating one of the factory methods at least two times, comprising a first invocation and a second invocation;
• the computer performing the first invocation using an untrusted argument;
• the computer performing the second invocation without using an untrusted argument, wherein if a static security analysis were performed using a data-flow propagation graph from the first invocation and the second invocation without using the modified set of object abstractions, a false positive report of a security vulnerability would result assuming that by default the statistic security analysis conservatively views two instances as being one for a same abstract object, wherein said method avoids the false positive report by modeling the factory method by applying a further level of abstraction, as opposed to modeling the factory method as a single abstract object.