Spoofing detection for civilian GNSS signals
AssigneeCornell University
InventorMark L. Psiaki
Life of this patent
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Abstract
A system and method for detecting spoofing of signals by processing intermittent bursts of encrypted Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals in order to determine whether unencrypted signals are being spoofed. The system and method can allow a specially equipped GNSS receiver to detect sophisticated spoofing that cannot he detected using receiver antonomous integrity monitoring techniques. The system and method do not require changes to the signal structure of encrypted civilian GNSS signals, but instead use a short segment of an encrypted signal that is broadcast by the same GNSS spacecraft which broadcast the unencrypted signal of interest.
Claims20
A method for detecting spooling of a GNSS, signals comprising:
- receiving unencrypted GNSS signals and encrypted GNSS signals on a first frequency at user equipment;
- estimating encryption sequence features of the encrypted signals;
- encryption sequence features being estimated from estimates of pseudo-range delay and beat carrier phase obtained from the unencrypted GNSS signals, the encrypted signals, and known carrier and code phase relationship between the encrypted signal and the unencrypted signal;
- receiving the true characteristic features at the user equipment through a broadcast communications channel that includes a secure digital signature;
- computing a detection statistic based on the estimated encryption sequence features and the true encryption sequence features;
- and
- comparing the detection statistic with a pre-selected threshold to detect spoofing of the unencrypted signal.
A system for detecting spoofing of signals comprising:
- a receiver receiving encrypted and unencrypted signals, said receiver deriving an estimated segment of encryption sequence features from the received encrypted signal;
- encryption sequence features being estimated from estimates of pseudo-range delay and beat carrier phase obtained from the unencrypted signals, the encrypted signals and known carrier and code phase relationship between the encrypted signal and the unencrypted signals;
- an antenna receiving encrypted and unencrypted signals, said antenna deriving a substantially true segment of the signal characteristic features from the received encrypted signal;
- a digital signer encrypting the substantially true segment with private key encryption;
- a secure uplink and broadcast transceiver for transmitting the digitally signed substantially true segment
- a truth data receiver receiving the digitally signed substantially true segment;
- a public key decrypter verifying the digital signature of substantially true segment to authenticate it;
- a mixer mixing the decrypted substantially true segment with the estimated segment;
- an integrate-and-dump register calculating a detection statistic from the mixed segments;
- and
- a spoofing detector comparing the detection statistic with a threshold to detect spoofing of the received signal.
A method for detecting spoofing of signals comprising:
- receiving a GNSS signal having a first frequency and a second frequency, the first frequency having unencrypted signals and first frequency encrypted signals, the second frequency having unencrypted signals and second frequency encrypted signals, the first frequency encrypted signals and the second frequency encrypted signals having like encryption sequence features;
- estimating the encryption sequence features of the first frequency and the second frequency;
- encryption sequence features of respective frequencies being estimated from estimates of pseudo-range delay and beat carrier phase obtained from unencrypted signals of the respective frequencies, encrypted signals of the respective frequencies, and known carrier and code phase relationship between the encrypted signal of the respective frequencies and the unencrypted signal of the respective frequencies;
- cross-correlating the estimated encryption sequence features from the first frequency and the second frequency to determine a detection statistic;
- and
- comparing the detection statistic with a pre-selected threshold to detect spoofing of the unencrypted signals on the two frequencies.
A method for detecting spoofing of signals comprising the steps of:
- running DLL on an unencrypted signal to produce a code pseudo-range delay;
- running PLL on the unencrypted signal to produce a beat carrier phase;
- estimating encryption sequence bit/chip transition timing;
- estimating encryption sequence bit/chip values based on the estimated encrypted signal bit/chip transition timing, the baseband encrypted signal, and pre-selected known features of the encrypted signal;
- mixing the estimated encryption sequence bit/chip values with substantially true encryption sequence bits/chips to compute a detection statistic;
- deriving a spoofing threshold;
- and
- signaling spoofing of the signal if the detection statistic and the spoofing threshold indicate that spoofing has occurred.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.