US 8,555,081 B2Granted

Cryptographic multi-shadowing with integrity verification

AssigneeVMware, Inc.

InventorsXiaoxin Chen, Carl A. Waldspurger, Pratap Subrahmanyam, Tal Garfinkel, Dan Boneh

Life of this patent

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Abstract

A virtual-machine-based system that may protect the privacy and integrity of application data, even in the event of a total operating system compromise. An application is presented with a normal view of its resources, but the operating system is presented with an encrypted view. This allows the operating system to carry out the complex task of managing an application's resources, without allowing it to read or modify them. Different views of “physical” memory are presented, depending on a context performing the access. An additional dimension of protection beyond the hierarchical protection domains implemented by traditional operating systems and processors is provided.

Claims30

Dependent claims

In a computer system comprising a virtual machine monitor (VMM) running on system hardware and supporting a virtual machine (VM), a method of controlling access to a cloaked data page stored in a system memory, the method comprising:

the VMM receiving a request for access to the cloaked data page;
the VMM determining whether the cloaked data page is plaintext or encrypted;
the VMM determining whether or not the request corresponds to a first execution context associated with the cloaked data page;
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is plaintext and that the request does correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM mapping the location of the cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of the first execution context;
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is plaintext and that the request does not correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM unmapping the cloaked data page from any mapped references to the cloaked data page not corresponding to the first execution context;
the VMM encrypting the data in the cloaked data page;
and
the VMM mapping the location of the cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of an execution context to which the request corresponds;
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is encrypted and that the request does correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM verifying the integrity of the encrypted data in the cloaked data page;
if the integrity of the encrypted data in the cloaked data page is verified, the VMM decrypting the encrypted data in the cloaked data page and storing the decrypted data;
and
the VMM mapping the location of the decrypted cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of the first execution context;
and
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is encrypted and that the request does not correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM mapping the location of the cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of the execution context to which the request corresponds.

15 more elements

A system comprising a virtual machine monitor (VMM) running on program code for performing a method of controlling access to a cloaked data page stored in a system memory, the method comprising:

the VMM receiving a request for access to the cloaked data page;
the VMM determining whether the cloaked data page is plaintext or encrypted;
the VMM determining whether or not the request corresponds to a first execution context associated with the cloaked data page;
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is plaintext and that the request does correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM mapping the location of the cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of the first execution context;
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is plaintext and that the request does not correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM unmapping the cloaked data page from any mapped references to the cloaked data page not corresponding to the first execution context;
the VMM encrypting the data in the cloaked data page;
and
the VMM mapping the location of the cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of an execution context to which the request corresponds;
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is encrypted and that the request does correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM verifying the integrity of the encrypted data in the cloaked data page;
if the integrity of the encrypted data in the cloaked data page is verified, the VMM decrypting the encrypted data in the cloaked data page and storing the decrypted data;
and
the VMM mapping the location of the decrypted cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of the first execution context;
and
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is encrypted and that the request does not correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM mapping the location of the cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of the execution context to which the request corresponds.

15 more elements

A computer program product for use with a virtual machine monitor (VMM) running on system hardware and supporting a virtual machine (VM), the computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having computer readable program code embodied thereon for performing a method of controlling access to a cloaked data page stored in a system memory, the method comprising:

the VMM receiving a request for access to the cloaked data page;
the VMM determining whether the cloaked data page is plaintext or encrypted;
the VMM determining whether or not the request corresponds to a first execution context associated with the cloaked data page;
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is plaintext and that the request does correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM mapping the location of the cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of the first execution context;
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is plaintext and that the request does not correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM unmapping the cloaked data page from any mapped references to the cloaked data page not corresponding to the first execution context;
the VMM encrypting the data in the cloaked data page;
and
the VMM mapping the location of the cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of an execution context to which the request corresponds;
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is encrypted and that the request does correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM verifying the integrity of the encrypted data in the cloaked data page;
if the integrity of the encrypted data in the cloaked data page is verified, the VMM decrypting the encrypted data in the cloaked data page and storing the decrypted data;
and
the VMM mapping the location of the decrypted cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of the first execution context;
and
if the VMM determines that the cloaked data page is encrypted and that the request does not correspond to the first execution context, then:
the VMM mapping the location of the cloaked data page into a shadow mapping of the execution context to which the request corresponds.

15 more elements

Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.

Facts

Application: 12/261,194Filed 30 Oct 2008 · us provisional application
Priority: 30 Oct 2007
Published: US 2009/0113216 A130 Apr 2009
Granted: 8 Oct 2013
Term ends: Not estimatedThe source records don’t support an estimate.

Classification21 codes

G06F 9/461
Multiprogramming arrangements: saving or restoring of program or task context
G06F 12/1036
Using associative or pseudo-associative address translation means, e.g. translation look-aside buffer [TLB]: for multiple virtual address spaces,…
G06F 9/4486
Executing subprograms: formation of subprogram jump address
G06F 9/45533
Emulation; Interpretation; Software simulation, e.g. virtualisation or emulation of application or operating system execution engines:…