# US 7,613,924 B2 · Encrypted and other keys in public and private battery memories > Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt - Number: US 7,613,924 B2 - Document ID: US7613924B2 - Status: Granted - Kind: B2 - Application number: 11/074,611 - Filed: 2005-03-08 - Published: 2006-09-14 - Granted: 2009-11-03 - Earliest claimed: 2005-03-08 - Assignees: Texas Instruments Incorporated - Inventors: Narendar Shankar; Erdal Paksoy; Todd Vanyo - Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US7613924B2 ## CPC - G06F 21/71: to assure secure computing or processing of information - G06F 21/70: Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer - G06F 21/72: in cryptographic circuits - G06F 21/78: to assure secure storage of data (address-based protection against unauthorised use of memory G06F12/14; record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings G06K19/00) - H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key} - H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms - H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response} - H04L 63/08: {for authentication of entities (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32)} - G06F 21/81: by operating on the power supply, e.g. enabling or disabling power-on, sleep or resume operations - G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N) - H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M) ## Abstract Systems and methods for providing a battery module 110 with secure identity information and authentication of the identity of the battery 110 by a host 120. In one embodiment, the system for providing a battery module with secure identity information includes: (1) a tamper resistant processing environment 200 located within the battery module 110 and (2) a key generator configured to generate a key based on an identity of the battery module 110 and cause the key to be stored within the tamper resistant processing environment 200. ## Claims ### Claim 1 A battery module, comprising: a public non-volatile memory containing an encrypted identity key to be decrypted by a root key in a host; a tamper resistant processing environment including private non-volatile memory containing another identity key; a challenge receiver operable within said battery module and configured to receive a challenge from said host; and a response generator operable within said battery module and configured to generate a response to the challenge based on the other identity key stored within the tamper resistant processing environment of said battery module. ### Claim 2 (depends on 1) The system as recited in claim 1 wherein said challenge is at least pseudorandom. ### Claim 3 (depends on 1) The system as recited in claim 1 wherein said response is formed by combining said challenge with said key using a message check algorithm. ### Claim 4 (depends on 3) The system as recited in claim 3 wherein said message integrity check algorithm employs a cyclic redundancy check. ### Claim 5 (depends on 3) The system as recited in claim 3 wherein said message integrity check algorithm employs a secure hash algorithm. ### Claim 6 A method of operating a battery module, comprising: placing an encrypted identity key in a public non-volatile memory; transmitting the encrypted identity key from the battery module for decrypting the encrypted identity key by a root key contained in a host; placing another identity key in private non-volatile memory in a tamper resistant processing environment; receiving a challenge from said host; and generating a response based on the other identity key stored within the tamper resistant processing environment. ### Claim 7 (depends on 6) The method as recited in claim 6 wherein said challenge is at least pseudorandom. ### Claim 8 (depends on 6) The method as recited in claim 6 wherein said response is formed by combining said challenge with an identity of said battery module using a message check algorithm. ### Claim 9 (depends on 8) The system as recited in claim 8 wherein said message integrity check algorithm employs a cyclic redundancy check. ### Claim 10 (depends on 8) The system as recited in claim 8 wherein said message integrity check algorithm employs a secure hash algorithm. ### Claim 11 (depends on 1) The battery module of claim 1 in which the tamper resistant processing environment includes processor circuitry and private random access memory. ### Claim 12 (depends on 1) The battery module of claim 1 including a system on a chip that includes an interface to the host, the public non-volatile memory, and public random access memory coupled to the tamper resistant processing environment, and in which the tamper resistant processing environment includes processor circuitry, the private non-volatile memory, and private random access memory. ### Claim 13 (depends on 6) The battery module of claim 6 in which the tamper resistant processing environment includes processor circuitry and private random access memory. ### Claim 14 (depends on 6) The battery module of claim 6 including a system on a chip that includes an interface to the host, the public non-volatile memory, and public random access memory coupled to the tamper resistant processing environment, and in which the tamper resistant processing environment includes processor circuitry, the private non-volatile memory, and private random access memory.