Using electrically programmable fuses to hide architecture, prevent reverse engineering, and make a device inoperable
AssigneeInternational Business Machines Corporation
InventorsAnthony R. Bonaccio, Karl R. Erickson, John A. Fifield, Chandrasekharan Kothandaraman, Phil C. Paone, William R. Tonti
Life of this patent
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Abstract
Techniques and systems whereby operation of and/or access to particular features of an electronic device may be controlled after the device has left the control of the manufacturer are provided. The operation and/or access may be provided based on values stored in non-volatile storage elements, such as electrically programmable fused (eFUSES).
Claims17
A method for preventing unauthorized access to selected internal components of an integrated circuit device, comprising blowing at least one electrically programmable fuse in the integrated circuit device, wherein the electrically programmable fuse is configured to control externally generated communication between a communication interface of the integrated circuit device and the selected internal components of the integrated circuit device, and wherein blowing the electrically programmable fuse further comprises determining if a first unauthorized access attempt on the selected internal components has occurred, and blowing a first electrically programmable fuse associated with a first tamper bit if the first unauthorized access attempt is determined.
A method for preventing copying of proprietary information from an integrated circuit device, comprising:
- determining if a first unauthorized access attempt to secure information on the integrated circuit device has occurred;
- setting a first tamper bit if the first unauthorized access attempt is determined;
- modifying a first device parameter in accordance with the first tamper bit;
- determining if a second unauthorized access attempt to secure information in the integrated circuit device has occurred;
- blowing a second tamper bit if the second unauthorized access attempt is determined;
- and
- modifying a second device parameter that is different from the first device parameter in accordance with the second tamper bit.
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.