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AssigneeMicrosoft Corporation
InventorsPaul England, Marcus Peinado, Daniel R. Simon, Josh D. Benaloh
Estimating the term…
Manifest-based trusted agent management in a trusted operating system environment includes receiving a request to execute a process is received and setting up a virtual memory space for the process. Additionally, a manifest corresponding to the process is accessed, and which of a plurality of binaries can be executed in the virtual memory space is limited based on indicators, of the binaries, that are included in the manifest.
One or more computer storage media having stored thereon a plurality of instructions to implement a trusted core of a computing device that, when executed by one or more processors of the computing device, causes the one or more processors to:
A method implemented by a trusted core of a computing device, the method comprising:
A computing device comprising:
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.
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From the US filing history. Foreign family members aren’t listed.
During program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow: by adding security routines or objects to programs
During program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g.…
Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems: certifying or…
Computing and data processing
Term ended 28 Dec 2021 (estimated)
This invention relates to trusted environments generally, and more particularly to manifest-based trusted agent management in a trusted operating system environment.
Having people be able to trust computers has become an increasingly important goal. This trust generally focuses on the ability to trust the computer to use the information it stores or receives correctly. Exactly what this trust entails can vary based on the circumstances. For example, multimedia content providers would like to be able to trust computers to not improperly copy their content. By way of another example, users would like to be able to trust their computers to forward confidential financial information (e.g., bank account numbers) only to appropriate destinations (e.g., allow the information to be passed to their bank, but nowhere else). Unfortunately, given the generally open nature of most computers, a wide range of applications can be run on most current computers without the user's knowledge, and these applications can compromise this trust (e.g., forward the user's financial information to some other destination for malicious use).
To address these trust issues, different mechanisms have been proposed (and new mechanisms are being developed) that allow a computer or portions thereof to be trusted. Generally, these mechanisms entail some sort of authentication procedure where the computer can authenticate or certify that at least a portion of it (e.g., certain areas of memory, certain applications, etc.) are at least as trustworthy as they present themselves to be (e.g., that the computer or application actually is what it claims to be). In other words, these mechanisms prevent a malicious application from impersonating another application (or allowing a computer to impersonate another computer). Once such a mechanism can be established, the user or others (e.g., content providers) can make a judgment as to whether or not to accept a particular platform and application as trustworthy (e.g., a multimedia content provider may accept a particular application as being trustworthy, once the computer can certify to the content provider's satisfaction that the particular application is the application it claims to be).
FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary trusted operating system environment.
FIG. 2 illustrates one exemplary architecture that can be implemented on a client computing device.
FIG. 3 illustrates another exemplary architecture that can be used with the invention.
As used herein, code being “trusted” refers to code that is immutable in nature and immutable in identity. Code that is trusted is immune to being tampered with by other parts (e.g. code) of the computer and it can be reliably and unambiguously identified. In other words, any other entity or component asking “who is this code” can be told “this is code xyz”, and can be assured both that the code is indeed code xyz (rather than some imposter) and that code xyz is unadulterated. Trust does not deal with any quality or usefulness aspects of the code—only immutability of nature and immutability of identity.
Additionally, the execution environment of the trusted code effects the overall security. The execution environment includes the machine or machine class on which the code is executing.
General Operating Environment