Method and apparatus for preventing oligopoly collusion

A method of compensating a manager who exercises administrative control over operations of a primary firm for the purpose of reducing the degree to which prices exceed marginal costs in an industry, reducing incentives for industry collusion between the primary firm and a set of comparison firms in said industry, or reducing incentives for coordinated special interest industry lobbying, said set of comparison firms including at least one firm, wherein a brand-name commodity is to be produced by said primary firm, said primary firm having the manager who exercises administrative control over said primary firm's operations during a sampling period, comprising the steps of:

• a) assigning a level of quality to said brand-name commodity;
• b) inducing said primary firm to supply said brand-name commodity at said level of quality;
• c) choosing an absolute performance standard;
• d) determining a performance measure for said primary firm with respect to said chosen absolute performance measure for said sampling period;
• e) determining a performance measure for each of said comparison firms for said sampling period, said performance measure for each of said comparison firms forming a set of comparison firm absolute performance measures;
• f) determining a performance comparison base based on said set of comparison firm absolute performance measures;
• g) determining a relative performance measure for said primary firm by comparing said primary firm performance measure and said performance comparison base and further determining a relative performance measure for each firm of the set of comparison firms in the industry wherein a sum of the relative performance measures for the primary firm and the set of comparison firms in the industry is equal to a fixed value;
• h) determining the managerial compensation amount derived from said relative performance measure according to a monotonic managerial compensation amount transformation;
• and,
• i) transferring to said manager, compensation having a value related to said managerial compensation amount.

A method for reducing the degree to which prices exceed marginal costs in an industry and for reducing incentives for industry collusion between a primary firm and a set of comparison firms in said industry, said set of comparison firms including at least one firm, wherein a brand-name commodity is to be produced by said primary firm, said primary firm having a manager who exercises administrative control over said primary firm's operations during a sampling period, comprising the steps of:

• a) assigning a level of quality to said brand-name commodity;
• b) inducing said primary firm to supply said brand-name commodity at said level of quality by:
• 1) monitoring the quality of said brand-name commodity supplied by said primary firm;
• and
• 2) fining said primary firm if the quality of said brand-name commodity supplied by said primary firm falls below said level of quality assigned to said brand name, the amount of the fine being greater than an amount of reduction of cost of supply of said brand-name commodity by said firm resulting from the reduction of quality below said level of quality;
• c) choosing a performance standard;
• d) determining a performance measure for said primary firm with respect to said chosen performance measure for said sampling period;
• e) determining a performance measure for each of said comparison firms for said sampling period, said performance measure for each of said comparison firms forming a set of comparison firms forming a set of comparison firm performance measures;
• f) determining a weighted performance comparison base based on said set of comparison firm performance measures;
• g) determining a relative performance measure for said primary firm by comparing said primary firm performance measure and said weighted performance comparison base;
• h) determining a managerial compensation amount derived from said relative performance measure according to a monotonic managerial compensation amount transformation;
• and,
• i) transferring to said manager compensation having a value related to said managerial compensation amount.

A method for reducing the degree to which prices exceed marginal costs in an industry and for reducing incentives for industry collusion between a primary firm and a set of comparison firms in said industry, said set of comparison firms including at least one firm, wherein a brand-name commodity is to be produced by said primary firm, said primary firm having a manager who exercises administrative control over said primary firm's operations during a sampling period, comprising the steps of:

• a) assigning a level of quality to said brand-name commodity;
• b) inducing said primary firm to supply said brand-name commodity at said level of quality by:
• 1) monitoring the quality of said brand-name commodity supplied by said primary firm under said brand name;
• and
• 2) altering the absolute performance measure of said primary firm if the quality of said commodity supplied by said primary firm falls below said level of quality assigned to said brand name, the negative value of said alteration exceeding an amount of reduction of cost of supply of said brand-name commodity by said firm resulting from the reduction of quality below said level of quality;
• c) choosing a performance standard;
• d) determining a performance measure for said primary firm with respect to said chosen performance measure for said sampling period;
• e) determining a performance measure for each of said comparison firms for said sampling period, said performance measure for each of said comparison firms forming a set of comparison firm performance measures;
• f) determining a weighted performance comparison base based on said set of comparison firm performance measures;
• g) determining a relative performance measure for said primary firm by comparing said primary firm performance measure and said weighted performance comparison base;
• h) determining a managerial compensation amount derived from said relative performance measure according to a monotonic managerial compensation amount transformation;
• and,
• i) transferring to said manager, compensation having a value related to said managerial compensation amount.

A method for reducing the degree to which prices exceed marginal costs in an industry and for reducing incentives for industry collusion between a primary firm and a set of comparison firms in said industry, said set of comparison firms including at least one firm, wherein a brand-name commodity is to be produced by said primary firm, said primary firm having a manager who exercises administrative control over said primary firm's operations during a sampling period, comprising the steps of:

• a) assigning a level of quality to said brand-name commodity;
• b) inducing said primary firm to supply said brand-name commodity at said level of quality by:
• 1) monitoring the quality of said brand-name commodity supplied by said primary firm;
• and
• 2) fining said manager if the quality of said brand-name commodity supplied by said primary firm falls below said level of quality assigned to said brand name, the amount of the fine being greater than an increase in managerial compensation which would otherwise result from a reduction in the cost of supply of said brand-name commodity by said firm resulting from the reduction of quality below said level of quality;
• c) choosing a performance standard;
• d) determining a performance measure for said primary firm with respect to said chosen performance measure for said sampling period;
• e) determining a performance measure for each of said comparison firms for said sampling period, said performance measure for each of said comparison firms forming a set of comparison firm performance measures;
• f) determining a weighted performance comparison base based on said set of comparison firm performance measures;
• g) determining a relative performance measure for said primary firm by comparing said primary firm performance measure and said weighted performance comparison base;
• h) determining a managerial compensation amount derived from said relative performance measure according to a monotonic managerial compensation amount transformation;
• and,
• i) transferring to said manager, compensation having a value related to said managerial compensation amount.

A method for reducing the degree to which prices exceed marginal costs in an industry and for reducing incentives for industry collusion between a primary firm and a set of comparison firms in said industry, said set of comparison firms including at least one firm, wherein a brand-name commodity is to be produced by said primary firm and the set of comparison firms, said primary firm having a manager who exercises administrative control over said primary firm's operations during a sampling period, the method comprising the steps of:

• a) choosing a performance standard from a set of performance standards;
• b) measuring a performance of said primary firm with respect to said chosen performance standard for said sampling period;
• c) measuring a performance of each of said comparison firms with respect to said chosen performance standard for said sampling period, said measurement of performance for each of said comparison firms forming a set of comparison firm performance measures;
• d) determining a performance comparison base based on said set of comparison firm performance measures;
• e) comparing said measurement of performance of said primary firm with said performance comparison base;
• f) determining a relative performance measure for said primary firm based on said comparison of said primary firm measurement of performance and said performance comparison base;
• g) determining a managerial compensation amount derived from said relative performance measure according to a monotonic managerial compensation amount transformation;
• h) transferring compensation to said manager, said transferred compensation having a value related to said managerial compensation amount;
• i) assigning a level of quality to said brand-name commodity;
• j) instituting an auctioning scheme to determine a market price of said brand-name commodity and inducing the primary firm and the set of comparison firms to supply said brand-name commodity at said market price;
• k) monitoring the level of quality of said brand-name commodity;
• and
• l) inducing said primary firm to supply said brand-name commodity at said level of quality by fining such manager if the quality of said commodity supplied by said primary firm falls below a level of quality assigned to the commodity, the amount of the fine being greater than an increase in managerial compensation which would otherwise result from a reduction in cost of supply of the commodity by said firm resulting from the reduction of quality below the level of quality assigned to the commodity.

A method of compensating a manager who exercises administrative control over operations of a primary firm for the purpose of reducing the degree to which prices exceed marginal costs in an industry, for reducing incentives for industry collusion between the primary firm and a set of comparison firms in said industry, or reducing incentives for coordinated special interest industry lobbying, said set of comparison firms including at least one firm, each comparison firm of said set of comparison firms having a respective manager who exercises administrative control over said comparison firm, said primary firm and said set of comparison firms forming a joint set of firms, at least one firm in said joint set of firms being privately owned wherein privately owned means not wholly government owned, the method comprising the steps of:

• a) choosing an absolute performance standard from a set of absolute performance standards;
• b) measuring a performance of said primary firm with respect to said chosen absolute performance standard for said sampling period;
• c) measuring an absolute performance of each firm of said set of comparison firms with respect to said chosen performance standard for said sampling period, said measurement of performance for each of said comparison firms forming a set of comparison firm absolute performance measures;
• d) determining a performance comparison base based on said set of comparison firm performance measures by calculating a weighted average of said set of comparison firm absolute performance measures;
• e) comparing said measurement of absolute performance of said primary firm with said performance comparison base;
• f) determining a relative performance measure for said primary firm based on said comparison of said primary firm measurement of absolute performance and said performance comparison base;
• g) determining a managerial compensation amount derived from said relative performance measure according to a monotonic managerial compensation amount transformation;
• h) transferring compensation to said manager, said transferred compensation having a value related to said managerial compensation amount;
• and
• i) repeating steps (a) through (h) with respect to each comparison firm of said set of comparison firms as if each of said comparison firms, in turn, was the primary firm and wherein the relative performance measures of the primary firm and the set of comparison firms defines substantially a zero sum game, wherein a monotonic managerial compensation amount transformation may be different for each manager of the joint set of firms.