System for authenticating physical objects

Abstract

A system for authenticating physical objects in which the authentication key cannot be determined by reverse engineering the software or hardware of a controlling microprocessor. Two highly secure integrated circuits (ChipA and ChipT), both containing the same secret authentication key, are used. ChipA is attached to the physical object to be authenticated. ChipT is attached to the authenticating product. ChipA and ChipT are compared using a secure protocol that utilizes secure authentication circuitry implemented in ChipA and ChipT. The secure protocol is mediated by a system that may be insecure. This has the advantage that the computing devices and software of the authenticating product are not required to be secure. Reverse engineering the authenticating product will not reveal the secret authentication key. This allows standardized highly secure authentication chips to be used, without requiring security to be implemented in a wide range of product specific microcontrollers.

Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.