Non-deterministic public key encrypton system

Encryption apparatus for a public key encryption system in which a private key (D) is selected which comprises a plurality of binary numbers D.sub.1 to n and a public key (E) is exponentiated using the private key by, for each of the said numbers D.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator from a given initial state after a number of clock pulses or state transitions equal to the corresponding number given by the private key D.sub.1 to n, and providing each of the calculated binary states E.sub.1 to n as a component of the public key E, said apparatus comprising:

• means for generating a random initialisation key (R) comprising a set of binary numbers R.sub.1 to n ;
• means for calculating by exponentiation an open key Q by, for each of the said numbers R.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator from a given and known initial state after a number of clock pulses or state transitions equal to the corresponding number given by the random initialisation key R.sub.1 to n and providing each of the calculated binary states Q.sub.1 to n as a component of the open key Q;
• means for exponentiating the components of the public key E by the components of the random initialisation key R to produce generator initialisation states K.sub.1 to n by, for each of the said numbers E.sub.1 to n and R.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator that would result from applying the process used to exponentiate public key (E) a number of times equal to the corresponding binary number R.sub.1 to n ;
• a mixture generator comprising a set (n) of pseudo-random binary number generators, the outputs of which are combined to form the output of the mixture generator;
• means which load said set (n) of pseudo-random binary number generators with initial values equal to K.sub.1 to n ;
• means which clock the mixture generator to obtain a keystream serial output;
• means which receive a plaintext message and combine the output of the mixture generator with the binary plaintext message to produce an encrypted bit stream;
• means for adding the ciphertext C to the open key Q to produce a message stream, and
• means for transmitting the message stream to the message receiver.

Decryption apparatus for a public-key encryption system in which a private key (D) is selected which comprises a plurality of binary numbers D.sub.1 to n and a public key (E) is exponentiated using the private key by, for each of the said numbers D.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator from a given initial state after a number of clock pulses or state transitions equal to the corresponding number given by the private key D.sub.1 to n, and providing each of the calculated binary states E.sub.1 to n as a component of the public key E, and wherein a plaintext message is encrypted according to a process whereby the message sender

• (1) generates a random initialisation key (R) comprising a set of binary numbers R.sub.1 to n and computes by exponentiation an open key Q by for each of the said numbers R.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator from a given and known initial state after a number of clock pulses or state transitions equal to the corresponding number given by the random initialisation key R.sub.1 to n and providing each of the calculated binary states Q.sub.1 to n as a component of the open key Q;
• (2) exponentiates the components of the public key E by the components of the random initialisation key R to produce generator initialisation states K.sub.1 to n by, for each of the said numbers E.sub.1 to n and R.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator that would result from applying the process previously defined, wherein a private key is used to exponentiate a public key, a number of times equal to the corresponding binary number R.sub.1 to n ;
• (3) loads a set (n) of pseudo-random binary number generators, the outputs of which are combined to form a mixture generator, with initial values K.sub.1 to n ;
• (4) clocks the mixture generator to obtain a keystream serial output and combines this output with the binary plaintext message to produce an encrypted bit stream ciphertext C, and
• (5) transmits the encrypted bit stream together with the open key Q to the message receiver,
• said decryption apparatus comprising:
• means for extracting the open key Q from the encrypted bit stream;
• means for exponentiating the components of the open key Q by the components of the private key D to derive generator initialisation states K.sub.1 to n by, for each of the said numbers Q.sub.1 to n and D.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator that would result from applying the process defined above for deriving the open key Q a number of times equal to the corresponding binary number D.sub.1 to n ;
• a set (n) of pseudo-random binary number generators, the outputs of which are combined to form a mixture generator;
• means which load said set (n) of pseudo-random binary number generators with initial values equal to K.sub.1 to n ;
• means for clocking the mixture generator to obtain a keystream serial output;
• and means for combining this output with the received ciphertext C to produce the plaintext message P.

A public-key authentication system wherein a message sender appends signature information to a message and registers corresponding authentication information together with his name in a signature archive that is open to public inspection and wherein a message verifier obtains the message and its signature information, and the authentication information from the public signature archive and uses these to confirm whether or not the message has been sent by the sender identified by said signature information, characterised in that:

• (1) the message sender
• (a) selects a random digital signature (S) consisting of a plurality of binary numbers S.sub.1 to n ;
• (b) exponentiates a verification key V by, for each of said numbers S.sub.1 to n, by calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator from a given initial state after a number of clock pulses or state transitions equal to the corresponding number given by the random digital signature S.sub.1 to n and providing each of the calculated binary states V.sub.1 to n as a component of the verification key V;
• (c) checks said signature archive to ensure that the verification key V computed in (b) has not yet been registered and if V has previously been registered repeats steps (a) and (b);
• (d) computes a generalised cyclic redundancy check (CRC) value C by, for each one of a set (n) of pseudo-random binary number generators, computing the remainder resulting from dividing the sequence of bits comprising the message being sent by a modulus corresponding to said pseudo-random binary number generator and providing each such remainder C.sub.1 to n as a component of the generalised CRC value C;
• (e) computes the sum C+S (modulo 2) and registers this sum and the verification key V under his name in the public signature archive;
• (f) appends S to the message being sent, and
• (2) the message verifier
• (a) extracts the digital signature (S) consisting of a plurality of binary numbers S.sub.1 to n from the message;
• (b) computes a generalised cyclic redundancy check (CRC) value C by, for each of the said numbers S.sub.1 to n, computing the remainder resulting from dividing the sequence of bits comprising the received message by a modulus corresponding to a pseudo-random binary number generator and providing each such remainder C.sub.1 to n as a component of the generalised CRC value C;
• (c) computes a verification key V by, for each of said numbers S.sub.1 to n, exponentiating a given initial state of the corresponding pseudo-random binary number generator using each said number S.sub.1 to n by means of the process defined in step (1)(b);
• (d) computes the sum C+S (modulo 2);
• (e) searches the public signature archive under the name of the sender identified by said signature information of the message for authentication information matching the values C+S (modulo 2) and V computed in (c) and (d);
• (f) validates the message as authentic if the search in (e) is successful, or rejects it as spurious if the search in (e) is unsuccessful.

A public-key authentication system wherein a message authenticator selects a private key D which comprises a plurality of binary numbers D.sub.1 to n and exponentiates a public key E using the private key by, for each of the said numbers D.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator from a given initial state after a number of clock pulses or state transitions equal to the corresponding number given by the private key D.sub.1 to n and providing each of the calculated binary states E.sub.1 to n as a component of the public key E, and makes E available for public inspection, and wherein a message sender registers unique authentication information with said message authenticator and appends signature information to a message, and wherein a message verifier obtains the message, calculates a generalised CRC value for the message, submits the message signature information, the generalised CRC value and the sender's name or other identifying information to the message authenticator, and wherein said message authenticator uses said generalised CRC value, said message signature information and said registered authentication information to confirm whether or not the message has been sent by the sender identified by said authentication information, characterised in that:

• (1) the message sender
• (a) selects an authentication password (P) consisting of a plurality of binary numbers;
• (b) requests said signature authenticator to register the authentication password P to correspond to his name or other identifying information and to confirm that P has not yet been registered by anyone and if informed that P has previously been registered repeats step (a);
• (c) computes a generalised cyclic redundancy check (CRC) value C.sub.M by, for each one of a set (n) of pseudo-random binary number generators, computing the remainder resulting from dividing the sequence of bits comprising the message being sent by a modulus corresponding to said pseudo-random binary number generator and providing each such remainder C.sub.1 to n to as a component of the generalised CRC value C.sub.M ;
• (d) computes intermediate signature information by appending the generalised CRC value C.sub.M to the authentication password P;
• (e) computes message signature information S.sub.P,M by encrypting the intermediate signature information computed in step (d) using the signature authenticator's public key E by
• (i) selecting a random initialisation key (R) comprising a set of binary numbers R.sub.1 to n and exponentiating the initial state using each number by, for each of the said numbers R.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of pseudo-random binary number generator from a given initial state after a number of clock pulses or state transitions given by the random initialisation key R.sub.1 to n and providing each of the calculated binary states Q.sub.1 to n to produce an open key Q,
• (ii) exponentiating the components of the signature authenticator's public key E by the components of the random initialisation key R to produce generator initialisation states K.sub.1 to n by, for each of the said numbers E.sub.1 to n and R.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator that would result from applying the process previously defined, wherein a private key is used to exponentiate a public key, a number of times equal to the corresponding binary number R.sub.1 to n,
• (iii) loading a set (n) of pseudo-random binary number generators, the outputs of which are combined to form a mixture generator, with initial values K.sub.1 to n,
• (iv) clocking the mixture generator to obtain a keystream serial output and combining this output with said intermediate signature information to produce encrypted intermediate signature information,
• (v) appending said encrypted intermediate signature information to said open key Q to produce message signature information S.sub.P,M,
• (f) appending the said message signature information S.sub.P,M to the message and also appending his name or other identifying information to the message,
• (2) the message verifier
• (a) extracts the message signature information (S.sub.P,M) and the sender's name or other identifying information from the message;
• (b) computes a generalised CRC value C'.sub.M for the message by means of the process defined in step (1)(c);
• (c) submits the said message signature information and the sender's name or other identifying information and the said generalised CRC value C'.sub.M to the signature authenticator and requests said signature authenticator to compare the authentication password P and generalised CRC value C.sub.M encrypted within the message signature information S.sub.P,M with C'.sub.M and the sender's name or other identifying information, and
• (3) the message authenticator
• (a) decrypts the message signature information S.sub.P,M using its private key D by
• (i) extracting the open key Q from the message signature information,
• (ii) exponentiating the open key Q by the private key D to derive generator initialisation states K.sub.1 to n by, for each of the said numbers Q.sub.1 to n and D.sub.1 to n, calculating the state of a pseudo-random binary number generator that would result from applying the process defined in step (1)(e)(i) a number of times equal to the corresponding binary number D.sub.1 to n,
• (iii) loading a second set (n) of pseudo-random binary number generators, the outputs of which are combined to form a mixture generator, with the generator initialisation states K.sub.1 to n,
• (iv) clocking the mixture generator to obtain a keystream serial output and combining this output with the message signature information to thereby recover the intermediate signature information P and C computed in step (1)(d);
• (b) compares the value of P contained in said intermediate signature information with the authentication password registered as corresponding to the name or other identifying information submitted in step (2)(c);
• (c) compares the value of C.sub.M contained in said intermediate signature information with the value of C'.sub.M submitted in step (2)(c);
• (d) confirms to the message verifier that the message is authentic if both of the comparisons in steps (c) and (d) are successful, or rejects it as spurious if either comparison fails.

A method for generating random numbers comprising the steps of:

• (1) manipulating an electronic pointer device whose state at any time t can be described as a point X.sub.t represented by a plurality of coordinates (X.sub.t1, X.sub.t2, . . . X.sub.tn);
• (2) measuring the points X.sub.t describing the states of said input device at a plurality of time instants t=1, 2, . . . , n;
• (3) selecting a subset of the points thus measured corresponding to a subset of said time instants;
• (4) computing a numerical function of the coordinates of all the points thus selected;
• (5) producing the desired random numbers as the plurality of binary digits which represent the value of the numerical function thus computed.

A method of combining a serial keystream output with binary information P, comprising a succession of parts P.sub.1, . . . , P.sub.N in which each part P.sub.i represents a number of bytes n.sub.i, to produce an encrypted bit stream C comprising a succession of parts C.sub.i, said method comprising the steps of, for each successive part P.sub.i :

• (1) generating a pseudorandom permutation T of the bytes 1, . . . , n.sub.i using a plurality of bytes of the serial keystream output;
• (2) permuting the relative positions of the bytes n.sub.i within the part P.sub.i according to the permutation T to form an intermediate part I.sub.i ;
• (3) forming the i-th part C.sub.i of the encrypted bit stream by for each byte B of the intermediate part I.sub.i ;
• (a) generating one or more bytes of the serial keystream output;
• and
• (b) replacing the byte B with a quantity that depends upon the byte B and the said generated byte or bytes of the serial keystream output.

A method of combining a serial keystream output with an encrypted bit stream C comprising a succession of parts C.sub.1, . . . , C.sub.N, in which each part C.sub.i consists of a number of bytes n.sub.i, to recover binary information P containing by a succession of parts P.sub.i, said method comprising the steps of for each successive part C.sub.i :

• (1) generating a pseudorandom permutation T of the numbers 1, . . . n.sub.i using a plurality of bytes of the serial keystream output;
• (2) forming an intermediate part I.sub.i by for each byte B of the part C.sub.i
• (a) generating one or more bytes of the serial keystream output;
• and
• (b) replacing the byte B with a quantity that depends upon the byte B and the said generated byte or bytes of the serial keystream output;
• and
• (3) permuting the relative positions of the bytes within the intermediate part I.sub.i according to the permutation T to form the i-th part P.sub.i of said binary information.

A mixture generator suitable for use in a public key encryption system comprising:

• a set (n) of maximal period linear shift registers,
• means for selecting the output from one of n-1 of said generators to provide the output of the mixture generator,
• decoding means for decoding the outputs of a plurality m of the last stages of the nth generator,
• said decoder output controlling said selecting means to determine its selection of the particular generator output to use.

A mixture generator suitable for use in a public key encryption system comprising:

• a set (n) of multiplicative congruential generators,
• means for selecting the output from one of n-1 of said generators to provide the output of the mixture generator,
• decoding means for decoding the outputs of a plurality m of the last stages of the nth generator,
• said decoder output controlling said selecting means to determine its selection of the particular generator output to use.