Time-to-live and latency randomization to defeat timing-based relayed dns infiltration
AssigneePalo Alto Networks, Inc.
InventorsRuian Duan, Daiping Liu, Shu Wang, Fan Fei
Life of this patent
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AssigneePalo Alto Networks, Inc.
InventorsRuian Duan, Daiping Liu, Shu Wang, Fan Fei
Estimating the term…
Defenses against covert timing-based DNS tunneling attacks have been created that inject noise into the covert timing channel to corrupt potential data infiltration or potential data exfiltration without disrupting legitimate DNS communications. After filtering out trustworthy domains, time intervals between DNS queries per domain are observed and a minimum time interval determined per domain. During in-line network traffic monitoring, time after each DNS request per domain is measured for lapse of the minimum time interval. After each determination that the minimum time interval for a domain has expired since a DNS query for the domain has been transmitted, a DNS query for the domain is non-deterministically injected. For potential data infiltration using the covert timing channel, values of the time-to-live (TTL) indicated in DNS responses are randomized with a ceiling of the TTL specified in the DNS record.
A method comprising:
A non-transitory, machine-readable medium having program code stored thereon, the program code comprising instructions to:
An apparatus comprising:
Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.