# US 2026/0277591 A1 · Techniques and system for updating resources stored in firmware

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- Number: US 2026/0277591 A1
- Document ID: US20260277591A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/670,281
- Filed: 2026-05-07
- Published: 2026-09-17
- Earliest claimed: 2023-11-09
- Assignees: Absolute Software Corporation
- Applicants: Absolute Software Corporation
- Inventors: Eugene KHORUZHENKO; Nicholas B. VAN SOMEREN; Jeffrey Michael BUSH; Stephen David DUNN
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260277591A1

## CPC

- G06F 8/65: Updates (security arrangements therefor G06F21/57)
- G06F 8/654: using techniques specially adapted for alterable solid state memories, e.g. for EEPROM or flash memories
- G06F 9/4401: Bootstrapping (security arrangements therefor G06F21/57)
- G06F 21/572: {Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]}
- H04L 9/0891: {Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

The disclosure relates to a device, comprising a processor; and memory connected to the processor. The memory comprising instructions that when executed by the processor cause the device to receive from a server, a secure message and storing the secure message in secure memory. The secure message contains binary for updating firmware. The device during a driver execution environment (DXE), checks the secure memory for the secure message and if present, copies the binary into an ACPI table. OS boot continues and the binary which has been copied to the ACPI table is executed. This has a similar effect as if the binary was updated directly in the firmware yet does not require the actual costly update of the firmware.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An electronic device, comprising:
a processor; and
memory connected to the processor;
the memory comprising instructions that when executed by the processor cause the device to:
receive from a server, a secure message and storing the secure message in secure memory, the secure message being binary for updating firmware;
the device during a driver execution environment (DXE), checking the secure memory for said secure message and if present, copies the binary into an ACPI table;
OS boot continues and the binary which has been copied to the ACPI table is executed effectively updating the firmware.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1 wherein the binary represents a compressed form of an application that resides on the firmware of the device.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1, 2)

The device of claim 1 or claim 2 wherein the binary represents a compressed form of a service that resides on the firmware of the device.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1, 2, 3)

The device of any one of claims claim 1 to 3 wherein the binary is saved in a locked and hidden manner.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1, 2, 3, 4)

The device of any one of claims claim 1 to 4 wherein the binary is saved in the DXE modifiable only variable.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)

The device of any one of claims claim 1 to 5 wherein after the binary is saved in the DXE modifiable only variable, the device reboots; and
on reboot the DXE driver passes DXE binary in the modifiable only variable to the OS.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The device of claim 6, wherein the DXE driver creates a second UEFI variable with the binary.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The device of claim 7 wherein the DXE driver checks the UEFI variables for the presence of the binary.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)

The device of any one of claims claim 1 to 8 wherein a registry is further updated with the binary.

### Claim 10

An electronic device, comprising:
a processor; and
memory connected to the processor;
the memory comprising instructions that when executed by the processor cause the device to:
receive from a server, a signed server key, while the device is booted;
reboot a first time;
verify the signed server key during a DXE (driver execution environment) phase of firmware in the device during a boot process of the device;
send a nonce to the server while the device is booted, the nonce being encrypted using the signed server key;
receive, while the device is booted, a secure message from the server that includes a first portion with the binary for updating firmware and a second portion that is based on a hash of the nonce;
reboot a second time;
verify the secure message during the DXE phase of the firmware during another boot process of the device; and
copies the binary into an ACPI table.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The device of claim 10 wherein the binary represents a compressed form of an application that resides on the firmware of the device.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10, 11)

The device of claim 10 or claim 11 wherein the binary represents a compressed form of a service that resides on the firmware of the device.

### Claim 13 (depends on 10, 11, 12)

The device of any one of claims claim 10 to 12 wherein the binary is saved in a locked and hidden manner.

### Claim 14 (depends on 10, 11, 12, 13)

The device of any one of claims claim 10 to 13 wherein the binary is saved in the DXE modifiable only variable.

### Claim 15 (depends on 10, 11, 12, 13, 14)

The device of any one of claims claim 10 to 14 wherein after the binary is saved in the DXE modifiable only variable, the device reboots; and
on reboot the DXE driver passes DXE binary in the modifiable only variable to the OS.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The device of claim 15, wherein the DXE driver creates a second UEFI variable with the binary.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The device of claim 16 wherein the DXE driver checks the UEFI variables for the presence of the binary.

### Claim 18 (depends on 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17)

The device of any one of claims claim 10 to 17 wherein the registry is further updated with the binary.

### Claim 19

A method for securely updating firmware of a device comprising the steps of:
receiving from a server, a signed server key, while the device is booted;
rebooting the device a first time;
verifying the signed server key during a DXE (driver execution environment) phase of firmware in the device during a boot process of the device;
sending a nonce to the server while the device is booted, the nonce being encrypted using the signed server key;
receiving, while the device is booted, a secure message from the server that includes a first portion with binary and a second portion that is based on a hash of the nonce;
rebooting the device a second time;
verifying the secure message during the DXE phase of the firmware during another boot process of the device; and
copies the binary into an ACPI table.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The method of claim 19 wherein before the step of copying the binary into the ACPI table, saving the binary in a DXE modifiable only variable; and after verifying the secure message, the DXE driver passes DXE binary in the modifiable only variable to the OS.

### Claim 21 (depends on 20)

The method of claim 20 wherein after booting the DXE driver checks the UEFI variables for the presence of the binary.
