# US 2026/0254612 A1 · Encrypted Integrity Verification with Zero-Bandwidth Plaintext CRC for UALink Crypto Engines

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- Number: US 2026/0254612 A1
- Document ID: US20260254612A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/649,212
- Filed: 2026-04-16
- Published: 2026-08-27
- Earliest claimed: 2025-05-25
- Assignees: UnifabriX Ltd.
- Applicants: UnifabriX Ltd.
- Inventors: Ronen Aharon Hyatt; Gaya Opal Hyatt; Ethan Sharon Hyatt; Gil Thieberger
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260254612A1

## CPC

- H04L 49/201: Multicast operation; Broadcast operation
- G06F 9/5016: {the resource being the memory}
- G06F 9/5022: {Mechanisms to release resources}
- G06F 9/505: {considering the load}
- G06F 9/5055: {considering software capabilities, i.e. software resources associated or available to the machine}
- G06F 9/5077: {Logical partitioning of resources; Management or configuration of virtualized resources (specific details on emulation or internal functioning of virtual machines G06F9/455)}
- G06F 9/544: {Buffers; Shared memory; Pipes}
- G06F 13/36: for access to common bus or bus system
- G06F 13/4022: {using switching circuits, e.g. switching matrix, connection or expansion network (G06F13/4009 takes precedence)}
- G06F 13/4027: {using bus bridges (G06F13/4022 takes precedence)}
- G06F 13/42: Bus transfer protocol, e.g. handshake; Synchronisation
- G06F 13/4221: {being an input/output bus, e.g. ISA bus, EISA bus, PCI bus, SCSI bus}
- G06F 13/4282: {on a serial bus, e.g. I2C bus, SPI bus (on daisy chain buses G06F13/4247)}
- G06F 21/575: {Secure boot}
- H04L 9/002: {Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms (network architectures or network communication protocols for protection against malicious traffic H04L63/1441)}
- H04L 9/0618: {Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation}
- H04L 9/0631: {Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms}
- H04L 9/065: {Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3}
- H04L 9/0816: {Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use}
- H04L 9/0819: {Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) (network architectures or network communication protocols for key distribution in a packet data network H04L63/062)}
- H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key}
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/0866: {involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/32: including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system {or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials}
- H04L 9/3242: {involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC}
- H04L 9/40: Network security protocols
- H04L 41/0213: Standardised network management protocols, e.g. simple network management protocol [SNMP]
- H04L 41/046: comprising network management agents or mobile agents therefor
- H04L 41/0654: using network fault recovery (ring fault isolation or reconfiguration in loop networks without recovery actions by a network management system H04L12/437)
- H04L 41/0659: by isolating or reconfiguring faulty entities
- H04L 41/0661: {by reconfiguring faulty entities}
- H04L 41/0663: Performing the actions predefined by failover planning, e.g. switching to standby network elements
- H04L 41/0668: by dynamic selection of recovery network elements, e.g. replacement by the most appropriate element after failure
- H04L 41/0695: the faulty arrangement being the maintenance, administration or management system
- H04L 41/0806: for initial configuration or provisioning, e.g. plug-and-play
- H04L 41/0813: characterised by the conditions triggering a change of settings
- H04L 41/0816: the condition being an adaptation, e.g. in response to network events
- H04L 41/0893: Assignment of logical groups to network elements
- H04L 41/0894: Policy-based network configuration management
- H04L 41/0895: Configuration of virtualised networks or elements, e.g. virtualised network function or OpenFlow elements
- H04L 41/0897: by horizontal or vertical scaling of resources, or by migrating entities, e.g. virtual resources or entities
- H04L 41/12: Discovery or management of network topologies
- H04L 41/142: using statistical or mathematical methods
- H04L 41/145: {involving simulating, designing, planning or modelling of a network}
- H04L 41/147: for predicting network behaviour
- H04L 41/149: for prediction of maintenance
- H04L 41/16: using machine learning or artificial intelligence
- H04L 41/40: using virtualisation of network functions or resources, e.g. SDN or NFV entities
- H04L 43/024: by adaptive sampling
- H04L 43/04: Processing captured monitoring data, e.g. for logfile generation
- H04L 43/06: Generation of reports
- H04L 43/062: related to network traffic
- H04L 43/065: related to network devices
- H04L 43/08: Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters
- H04L 43/0811: by checking connectivity
- H04L 43/0817: by checking functioning
- H04L 43/0823: Errors, e.g. transmission errors
- H04L 43/0829: Packet loss
- H04L 43/0847: {Transmission error}
- H04L 43/0864: Round trip delays
- H04L 43/0876: Network utilisation, e.g. volume of load or congestion level
- H04L 43/0882: Utilisation of link capacity
- H04L 43/0888: Throughput
- H04L 43/10: Active monitoring, e.g. heartbeat, ping or trace-route
- H04L 43/12: Network monitoring probes
- H04L 43/16: Threshold monitoring
- H04L 45/16: Multipoint routing
- H04L 45/54: {Organization of routing tables}
- H04L 47/34: ensuring sequence integrity, e.g. using sequence numbers
- H04L 49/111: Switch interfaces, e.g. port details
- H04L 49/112: Switch control, e.g. arbitration
- H04L 49/20: Support for services
- H04L 49/254: {Centralised controller, i.e. arbitration or scheduling}
- H04L 49/70: {Virtual switches}
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 63/0435: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06)}
- H04L 63/0485: {Networking architectures for enhanced packet encryption processing, e.g. offloading of IPsec packet processing or efficient security association look-up}
- H04L 63/123: {received data contents, e.g. message integrity}
- H04L 69/04: Protocols for data compression, e.g. ROHC
- H04L 69/24: Negotiation of communication capabilities
- H04L 69/324: in the data link layer [OSI layer 2], e.g. HDLC
- G06F 2213/40: Bus coupling
- H04L 45/02: Topology update or discovery
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Implementations for verifying integrity of encryption engines in a UALink-based network. A device comprising a port encryption engine calculates a CRC value over plaintext content of a message before encryption, encrypts the CRC value using a portion of an encryption keystream that follows the portion used for message encryption, producing an encrypted CRC, and computes an authentication tag over the encrypted content and the encrypted CRC. The encrypted CRC does not increase bandwidth consumed by the message. At a receiving device, a CRC is independently recalculated from decrypted content, encrypted using a corresponding keystream portion, and compared via authentication tag verification. A fault in either the encryption engine or a decryption engine at the receiving device causes an authentication tag mismatch, enabling detection of internal crypto engine faults without additional protocol overhead. Implementations may apply to accelerators, switches, integrated circuits, and active cables in the UALink-based network.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A device for an Ultra Accelerator Link (UALink)-based network, the device comprising:
a UALink-based port;
a CRC generator configured to calculate a CRC value over plaintext content of a message before encryption;
a port encryption engine coupled to the UALink-based port, the port encryption engine configured to: encrypt the plaintext content using a first portion of an encryption keystream, encrypt the CRC value using a second portion of the encryption keystream, producing an encrypted CRC, and compute an authentication tag over encrypted content of the message and the encrypted CRC; and
wherein the encrypted CRC does not increase bandwidth consumed by the message on the UALink-based network.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein the CRC value is calculated using polynomial 1EDC 6F41h with a seed value of FFFF_FFFFh, and finalized by taking a one's complement of an accumulated 32-bit value.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein the second portion of the encryption keystream comprises keystream bits generated for a counter block following a last counter block used to encrypt the plaintext content, wherein the encrypted CRC is cryptographically bound to a same nonce and key as the encrypted content.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein the port encryption engine implements authenticated encryption using AES-GCM with 256-bit keys, and the encryption keystream comprises an AES keystream.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein the encrypted CRC is generated for each of: read requests, write requests, read responses, atomic operations, and vendor-defined commands, with a position of the CRC value within the encryption keystream determined by a message type of the message.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein the CRC generator is optionally enabled, configurable per the UALink-based port.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein a mismatch of the authentication tag at a receiving device indicates at least one of: a single-bit error in a data path of the port encryption engine, a multi-bit error in a decryption engine data path at the receiving device, a stuck-at fault in round logic, or a soft error in keystream generation circuitry; and wherein upon detecting the mismatch, the receiving device logs a hardware error record and transitions an affected port to an error state without tearing down a security session on other ports of the receiving device.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein the CRC value is calculated across all bytes of plaintext messages that are part of a given authentication tag scope.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein when a switch in the UALink-based network performs in-network data reduction on decrypted collective data from a plurality of accelerators, the switch recalculates a new CRC value over a reduced result before re-encryption by a switch port encryption engine, enabling end-to-end crypto engine verification across the switch.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein when a data beat of the message has a data error indicator, the CRC generator excludes the data beat from the CRC calculation, and the port encryption engine excludes the data beat from encryption and from the authentication tag computation.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The device of claim 1, wherein the device is configured to perform a self-test of the port encryption engine by processing a known plaintext and a known key through the CRC generator and the port encryption engine, and comparing a resulting authentication tag against a predetermined expected value, the self-test being performed at least one of: during device initialization or periodically during operation.

### Claim 12

A method for verifying encryption integrity in an Ultra Accelerator Link (UALink)-based network, comprising:
calculating, at a device comprising a port encryption engine and a UALink-based port, a CRC value over plaintext content of a message before encryption;
encrypting, by the port encryption engine, the plaintext content using a first portion of an encryption keystream;
encrypting, by the port encryption engine, the CRC value using a second portion of the encryption keystream that follows the first portion, producing an encrypted CRC;
computing an authentication tag over encrypted content of the message and the encrypted CRC; and
transmitting the encrypted content, the encrypted CRC, and the authentication tag via the UALink-based port, wherein the encrypted CRC does not consume additional bandwidth beyond that consumed by the encrypted content and the authentication tag.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the CRC value is calculated using polynomial 1EDC 6F41h with a seed value of FFFF_FFFFh, and finalized by taking a one's complement of an accumulated 32-bit value.

### Claim 14 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the second portion of the encryption keystream comprises keystream bits generated for a counter block following a last counter block used to encrypt the plaintext content, wherein the encrypted CRC is cryptographically bound to a same nonce and key as the encrypted content.

### Claim 15 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein when a switch in the UALink-based network performs in-network data reduction on decrypted collective data, the switch recalculates a new CRC value over a reduced result before re-encryption, enabling end-to-end crypto engine verification across the switch.

### Claim 16 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein when a data beat of the message has a data error indicator, the CRC calculation excludes the data beat, and the port encryption engine excludes the data beat from encryption and from the authentication tag computation.

### Claim 17 (depends on 12)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the method of claim 12.

### Claim 18 (depends on 12)

One or more integrated circuits configured to perform the method of claim 12, wherein the one or more integrated circuits comprise at least one of: (i) a general-purpose processing unit, comprising or connected to communication interfaces, configured to perform the method via software and/or firmware execution, (ii) circuitry comprising firmware and/or hardware logic integrated into an electronic device, wherein the circuitry utilizes operations that benefit from hardware acceleration and/or specialized processing capabilities not typically provided by a general-purpose processing unit, or (iii) one or more chiplets within one or more integrated circuit packages.

### Claim 19

An interconnect system for an Ultra Accelerator Link (UALink)-based network, comprising:
a transmitting device comprising a first port encryption engine, a CRC generator, and a first UALink-based port;
a receiving device comprising a second port encryption engine, a CRC verifier, and a second UALink-based port;
the transmitting device coupled to the receiving device via a UALink-based link;
wherein at the transmitting device, a CRC is calculated on plaintext content of a message, encrypted using a portion of an encryption keystream, and included in authentication tag computation;
and at the receiving device, a CRC is independently recalculated from decrypted content of the message, encrypted using a corresponding portion of a decryption keystream, and compared with the received encrypted CRC as part of authentication tag verification;
wherein a fault in either the first port encryption engine or the second port encryption engine causes an authentication tag mismatch.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The system of claim 19, wherein upon detecting the authentication tag mismatch, the receiving device logs a hardware error record and transitions an affected port to an error state without tearing down a security session on other ports of the receiving device.
