US 2026/0246557 A1Published application

Covert transmission method against active and passive cooperative attacks in cognitive radio network

AssigneeChina Three Gorges University

InventorsShouzhi XU, Rui CHEN, Binbin TIAN, Mei YU, Tian WU, Jia ZHU, Huan ZHOU, Xiaojun LIU, Yang LI, Bibo XIAO, Kai MA, Liang ZHAO, Ke WANG, Liping FAN

Life of this patent

Estimating the term…

patentgrep

Loading patent…

Abstract

This application provides a covert transmission method against active and passive cooperative attacks in a cognitive radio network. This method uses a joint design of noise uncertainty and power uncertainty to combat powerful collusion eavesdroppers. Then, the error detection probability of collusion eavesdroppers in the network and the covert transmission performance of legitimate users are analyzed. Finally, the numerical results show that the proposed scheme can guarantee the covert performance of the system, and can also resist the active and passive cooperative attacks of the collusive eavesdropper.

A covert transmission method against active and passive cooperative attacks in a cognitive radio network, comprising the following steps:

S1, constructing a CRN system comprising an authorized network and a secondary network, wherein the authorized network consists of an authorized transmitter and an authorized receiver, the secondary network consists of a secondary transmitter, a secondary receiver and K eavesdropping nodes, K eavesdropping nodes implement active and passive cooperative attacks on eavesdropping nodes with a best channel gain, and actively send artificial noise to interfere with a communication between the secondary transmitter and the secondary receiver, the remaining eavesdropping nodes perform passive eavesdropping and share AN random seeds to eliminate an influence of artificial noise on their own detection;
S2, after the secondary transmitter judges that a spectrum of the authorized transmitter is idle through energy detection, transmitting a hidden signal to the secondary receiver, wherein a received signal at the secondary receiver satisfies:
y
S
⁢
R
[
t
]
=
P
S
⁢
T
⁢
x
T
[
t
]
+
P
j
⁢
x
E
[
t
]
+
n
S
⁢
R
[
t
]
;
where PST is a transmit power of the secondary transmitter, xE[t] is an artificial noise signal, Pj is a power of Evej, nSR[t] is an SR Gaussian noise and nSR~N(0,NSR);
S3, distributing the transmit power PST of the secondary transmitter evenly on
[
0
,
P
max
S
⁢
T
]
for power uncertainty, combined with a distribution of noise at the eavesdropping node on
[
N
e
ρ
,
ρ
⁢
N
e
]
,
Ne is a nominal noise power, and ρ is a noise uncertainty parameter;
taking “a minimum error detection probability ξmin≥1−ε of the eavesdropping node, ε is any small positive number” as a covert constraint, numerically searching for an optimal transmission power
P
max
S
⁢
T
to maximize a covert rate of the secondary receiver:
R
S
⁢
R
=
(
1
-
μ
)
⁢
T
⁢
log
2
(
1
+
γ
S
⁢
R
)
⁢
(
1
-
P
f
S
⁢
T
)
;
where
γ
S
⁢
R
=
P
S
⁢
T
⁢
❘
"\[LeftBracketingBar]"
h
T
⁢
R
❘
"\[RightBracketingBar]"
2
P
j
⁢
❘
"\[LeftBracketingBar]"
h
E
j
⁢
R
❘
"\[RightBracketingBar]"
2
+
N
S
⁢
R
is a signal-to-noise ratio;
μ is a spectrum sensing time, T is a transmission period, and
P
f
S
⁢
T
is a false alarm probability, hTR and hEjR denote channel gains from the secondary transmitter and Evej to the secondary receiver, which are expressed as
h
T
⁢
R
∼
𝒩
⁡
(
0
,
σ
h
T
⁢
R
2
)
⁢
and
⁢
h
E
j
⁢
R
∼
𝒩
⁡
(
0
,
σ
h
E
j
⁢
R
2
)
,
respectively.

187 more elements

Facts

Application

19/642,723Filed 9 Apr 2026

Priority

CN 202511425221.830 Sep 2025

Published

20 Aug 2026

Term ends

Not estimatedThe source records don’t support an estimate.

Classification8 codes

H04K 1/02
Secret communication: by adding a second signal to make the desired signal unintelligible
H04K 3/827
Related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection: using characteristics of target signal or of transmission , e.g. using direct…
H04L 63/1475
Countermeasures against malicious traffic: passive attacks, e.g. eavesdropping or listening without modification of the traffic monitored
H04W 12/102
Integrity: route integrity, e.g. using trusted paths

Abstract

Claims10