# US 2026/0230303 A1 · End-to-end transport layer security

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- Number: US 2026/0230303 A1
- Document ID: US20260230303A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/576,302
- Filed: 2026-03-24
- Published: 2026-08-06
- Earliest claimed: 2023-01-19
- Assignees: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
- Applicants: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
- Inventors: Jeffrey J. Stapleton
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260230303A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0819: {Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) (network architectures or network communication protocols for key distribution in a packet data network H04L63/062)}
- H04L 9/0827: {involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths (network architectures or network communication protocols using different networks H04L63/18)}
- H04L 9/0841: {involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols}
- H04L 9/0855: {involving additional nodes, e.g. quantum relays, repeaters, intermediate nodes or remote nodes}
- H04L 9/3242: {involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

The present disclosure relates to exchanging information between a start node and an end node. Based on the information session keys for a connection comprising the start node, the end node, and at least one intermediate node are established. The session keys include a data encryption session key and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) session key. The data is encrypted using the data encryption session key at the start node. MAC is generated using the MAC session key. The encrypted data is relayed, via the at least one intermediate node, from the start node to the end node without the at least one intermediate node re-encrypting the data.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method, comprising:
exchanging, by an end node with a start node, information via a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection between the start node, at least one intermediate node, and the end node;
establishing, by the end node with the start node based on the information, a data encryption session key for the TLS connection;
receiving, by the end node via the at least one intermediate node, encrypted data from the start node without the at least one intermediate node decrypting and re-encrypting the encrypted data or receiving the data encryption session key, wherein the start node encrypts data using the data encryption session key to determine the encrypted data; and
decrypting, by the end node, the encrypted data using the data encryption session key to determine the data.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the data encryption session key is the only data encryption key for the TLS connection.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein exchanging the information with the start node comprises:
receiving, by the end node, a message from an intermediate node, which receives the message from the start node; and
sending, by the end node, a response to the message to an intermediate node, which relays the response to the start node.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein at least one of:
the message comprises a public key of the start node; or
the response comprises a public key of the end node.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein at least one of:
the message comprises an ephemeral key of the start node; or
the response comprises an ephemeral key of the end node.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein receiving, via the at least one intermediate node, the encrypted data from the start node without the at least one intermediate node decrypting and re-encrypting the encrypted data or receiving the data encryption session key comprises:
a first intermediate node of the at least one intermediate node receiving the encrypted data from the start node;
the first intermediate node sends the encrypted data to a second intermediate node of the at least one intermediate node without the first intermediate node decrypting and re-encrypting the data; and
the second intermediate node receives the encrypted data from the first intermediate node, the end node receives the encrypted data from the second intermediate node without the second intermediate node decrypting and re-encrypting the data.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the data encryption session key is established based on the information using a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement or an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the data encryption session key for the TLS connection is established based on the information using Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) key transport.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the data encryption session key for the TLS connection is established based on an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE), Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Ephemeral keys (ECDHE) key agreement, or a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the at least one intermediate node relays the encrypted data to the end node without the at least one intermediate node verifying a Message Authentication Code (MAC) associated with the encrypted data.

### Claim 11

A system comprising an end node, the end node comprising:
at least one memory; and
at least one processor configured to:
exchange, with a start node, information via a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection between the start node, at least one intermediate node, and the end node;
establish, with the start node based on the information, a data encryption session key for the TLS connection;
receive, via the at least one intermediate node, encrypted data from the start node without the at least one intermediate node decrypting and re-encrypting the encrypted data or receiving the data encryption session key, wherein the start node encrypts data using the data encryption session key to determine the encrypted data; and
decrypt the encrypted data using the data encryption session key to determine the data.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein the data encryption session key is the only data encryption key for the TLS connection.

### Claim 13 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein exchanging the information with the start node comprises:
receiving a message from an intermediate node, which receives the message from the start node; and
sending a response to the message to an intermediate node, which relays the response to the start node.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein at least one of:
the message comprises a public key of the start node; or
the response comprises a public key of the end node.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein at least one of:
the message comprises an ephemeral key of the start node; or
the response comprises an ephemeral key of the end node.

### Claim 16 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein receiving, via the at least one intermediate node, the encrypted data from the start node without the at least one intermediate node decrypting and re-encrypting the encrypted data or receiving the data encryption session key comprises:
a first intermediate node of the at least one intermediate node receiving the encrypted data from the start node;
the first intermediate node sends the encrypted data to a second intermediate node of the at least one intermediate node without the first intermediate node decrypting and re-encrypting the data; and
the second intermediate node receives the encrypted data from the first intermediate node, the end node receives the encrypted data from the second intermediate node without the second intermediate node decrypting and re-encrypting the data.

### Claim 17 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein the data encryption session key is established based on the information using a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement or an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement.

### Claim 18 (depends on 11)

The system of claim 11, wherein the data encryption session key for the TLS connection is established based on the information using Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) key transport.

### Claim 19 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the data encryption session key for the TLS connection is established based on an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE), Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Ephemeral keys (ECDHE) key agreement, or a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

### Claim 20

At least one non-transitory processor-readable medium comprising processor-readable instructions such that, when executed, causes at least one processor of an end node to:
exchange, with a start node, information via a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection between the start node, at least one intermediate node, and the end node;
establish, with the start node based on the information, a data encryption session key for the TLS connection;
receive, via the at least one intermediate node, encrypted data from the start node without the at least one intermediate node decrypting and re-encrypting the encrypted data or receiving the data encryption session key, wherein the start node encrypts data using the data encryption session key to determine the encrypted data; and
decrypt the encrypted data using the data encryption session key to determine the data.
