Combined countermeasure against side-channel analysis (sca)

Abstract

Systems and methods described herein provide for a processing unit that generates side-channel countermeasures to protect sensitive information. The processing unit can include two circuits, a primary circuit and a countermeasure circuit that each process the same input but each circuit can be configured by respective randomized clock signals and respective secrets or secret keys. The secret key used by the countermeasure circuit, can be a different secret than the secret used by the first circuit, but it can be based on the secret used by the first circuit. The output of the cryptographic algorithm of the first circuit can have an associated side-channel leakage or emission (power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, sound, vibration, temperature variation, etc.). The countermeasure circuit's side-channel leakage can obscure the first circuit's side-channel leakage or make it difficult to interpret the side-channel leakage of the first circuit.

Dependencies are inferred from the claim text.