# US 2026/0100839 A1 · Zero-knowledge authenticator - policy-private and obliviously updateable

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- Number: US 2026/0100839 A1
- Document ID: US20260100839A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/352,158
- Filed: 2025-10-07
- Published: 2026-04-09
- Earliest claimed: 2024-10-07
- Assignees: Mysten Labs, Inc.
- Applicants: Mysten Labs, Inc.
- Inventors: Konstantinos Chalkias; Arnab Roy; Sai Krishna Deepak Maram; Joy Wang; Aayush Yadav
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260100839A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3221: {interactive zero-knowledge proofs}
- H04L 9/0866: {involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics}
- H04L 9/0891: {Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying}
- H04L 9/3218: {using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs}
- H04L 9/40: Network security protocols
- H04L 9/50: {using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees}
- H04L 2209/42: Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

The present technology can allow a user to use a zero-knowledge authenticator (zkAt) to login to an account while preserving privacy of the authentication policy. More specifically, the present technology describes several implementations of a zkAt to enable policy-private authentication and to enable oblivious updates to authentication policies. The zkAt can be, for example, a zero-knowledge proof system where the underlying relation in the policy predicate remains private.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method of using a zero-knowledge authenticator to anonymously authenticate a user account, the method comprising:
receiving, by a verification service of a zero-knowledge authenticator, a verification request for verifying a user account, the verification request being received from an account service stored on a client device, the verification request comprising a zero-knowledge proof, a public verification key, and a message, and wherein the zero-knowledge proof is generated by a proof services of the client device based on a policy, and on a secret proving key, the message, and auxiliary data;
verifying, by the verification service of a zero-knowledge authenticator, the user account based on a public verification key, the message, and the zero-knowledge proof; and
transacting, by the account service with a third-party service, using the user account based on the verification of the user account by the verification service.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the zero-knowledge authenticator is a policy-private zero-knowledge authenticator using equivocable verification keys.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, further comprising:
generating the equivocable verification keys using a set-up algorithm to build an equivocable scheme that does not reveal information about the policy.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the zero-knowledge authenticator comprises a setup service and wherein the method further comprises:
receiving, by the setup service, a security parameter and a policy; and
generating, by the setup service, a public verification key, the secret proving key, and a secret trapdoor.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The method of claim 4, the method further comprising:
enabling a disjunctive policy update by generating, at a parameter generation service of the zero-knowledge authenticator, a set of global parameters and a set of private parameters based on the security parameter.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The method of claim 5, the method further comprising:
outputting, by the setup service, a secret update key.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, the method further comprising:
receiving, at a policy update service of the zero-knowledge authenticator, the secret proving key, the secret update key, and a disjunctive policy update; and
updating the policy, by the policy update service, by generating an updated secret proving key and an updated trapdoor.

### Claim 8 (depends on 7)

The method of claim 7, wherein the public verification key is independent of the disjunctive policy update and remains unaltered.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1 wherein the zero-knowledge proof comprises a recursive composition of proofs.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the zero-knowledge proof comprises: an inner proof corresponding to a policy predicate and an outer proof corresponding to knowledge of a valid inner proof and to a signature on an inner verification key.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, wherein the inner verification key can be changed with no change to an outer verification key, such that the verification service is unaware of the change to the inner verification key.

### Claim 12

A computing system comprising:
at least one processor; and
a memory storing instructions that, when executed by the processor, configure the computing system to:
receive a verification request for verifying a user account, the verification request being received from an account service stored on a client device, the verification request comprising a zero-knowledge proof, a public verification key, and a message, and wherein the zero-knowledge proof is generated by a proof services of the client device based on a policy, and on a secret proving key, the message, and auxiliary data;
verify, by a verification service, the user account based on a public verification key, the message, and the zero-knowledge proof; and
output, by the verification service to a client device, an indication of successful verification of the user account to allow the user account to transact with a third-party service.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The computing system of claim 12, wherein the instructions further configure the computing system to:
receive, by a setup service, a security parameter and the policy; and
generate, by the setup service, a public verification key, the secret proving key, and a secret trapdoor.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The computing system of claim 13, wherein the instructions further configure the computing system to:
enable a disjunctive policy update by generating, at a parameter generation service, a set of global parameters and a set of private parameters based on the security parameter.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The computing system of claim 14, wherein the instructions further configure the computing system to:
output, by the setup service, a secret update key.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The computing system of claim 15, wherein the instructions further configure the computing system to:
receive, at a policy update service, the secret proving key, the secret update key, and a disjunctive policy update; and
update the policy, by the policy update service, by generating an updated secret proving key and an updated trapdoor.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The computing system of claim 16, wherein the public verification key is independent of the disjunctive policy update and remains unaltered.

### Claim 18 (depends on 12)

The computing system of claim 12, wherein the instructions further configure the computing system to:
receive, from a proof service of the client device, an inner proof corresponding to a policy predicate and an outer proof corresponding to knowledge of a valid inner proof and to a signature on an inner verification key.

### Claim 19 (depends on 18)

The computing system of claim 18, wherein the inner verification key can be changed with no change to an outer verification key, such that the verification service is unaware of the change to the inner verification key.

### Claim 20

A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions stored thereon that when executed by at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:
receive a verification request for verifying a user account, the verification request being received from an account service stored on a client device, the verification request comprising a zero-knowledge proof, a public verification key, and a message, and wherein the zero-knowledge proof is generated by a proof services of the client device based on a policy, and on a secret proving key, the message, and auxiliary data;
verify, by a verification service, the user account based on a public verification key, the message, and the zero-knowledge proof; and
output, by the verification service to a client device, an indication of successful verification of the user account to allow the user account to transact with a third-party service.
