# US 2026/0100819 A1 · Encryption key management and transparent decryption

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- Number: US 2026/0100819 A1
- Document ID: US20260100819A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/362,055
- Filed: 2025-10-17
- Published: 2026-04-09
- Earliest claimed: 2023-06-26
- Assignees: ALTR Solutions, Inc.
- Applicants: ALTR Solutions, Inc.
- Inventors: Christopher Edward Struttmann; Ethan Newman; Ami Ikanovic
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260100819A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key}
- G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services}
- G06F 21/6227: {where protection concerns the structure of data, e.g. records, types, queries}
- H04L 9/0866: {involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics}
- H04L 9/0894: {Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage}
- H04L 9/14: using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L 9/40: Network security protocols
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A system and method are provided for encryption key management, transparent decryption, and secure key sharing within a secure distributed storage environment. A master encryption key is generated for a user and encrypted using a wrapper key. Database keys are generated and encrypted using the master key, and then stored at a user-associated storage instance. In response to a query, the encrypted database key is decrypted using the master key and used to decrypt encrypted data. Masking policies may determine whether decrypted or encrypted data is returned to the user. Format-preserving encryption may be applied using a tweak value. Encrypted keys may be securely shared across independent encryption domains by re-encrypting under a temporary session master key. At no point is raw key material exposed to untrusted systems. The techniques improve key lifecycle security, enable policy-based access, and support multi-tenant data environments such as cloud-hosted data warehouses.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A tangible, non-transitory, machine-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, effectuate operations comprising:
generating, by one or more processors, a master encryption key associated with a user of a secure distributed storage comprising a plurality of databases;
encrypting, by one or more processors, the master encryption key with a wrapper key that is stored at a key management system associated with a cybersecurity provider;
generating, by one or more processors, a database key for encrypting and decrypting data stored in one or more databases of the secure distributed storage;
encrypting, by one or more processors, the database key using the master encryption key, thereby generating an encrypted database key; and
storing, by one or more processors, the encrypted database key in association with the user at the secure distributed storage.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the operations further comprise, in response to a query to access encrypted data:
retrieving the encrypted database key from the secure distributed storage and decrypting the encrypted database key using the master encryption key; and
using the decrypted database key to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the secure distributed storage.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The machine-readable medium of claim 2, wherein the operations further comprise:
decrypting the encrypted data using the decrypted database key and returning a plaintext result to the user in response to the query.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The machine-readable medium of claim 2, wherein the operations further comprise:
determining, based on a masking policy evaluated by a policy engine, whether the decrypted data is returned in plaintext or encrypted form.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The machine-readable medium of claim 4, wherein the masking policy is based on at least one of a user identifier, a user role, a data field being accessed, or a resource associated with the user.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the master encryption key is decrypted using the wrapper key prior to decrypting the encrypted database key.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the wrapper key is provided by the user and is stored at a client computing device in a bring-your-own-key (BYOK) configuration.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the database key is generated in response to a function call made through a structured query language (SQL) interface of the secure distributed storage.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The machine-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the function call is executed via an external function interface that transmits a request to the cybersecurity provider.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the database key is used with a format-preserving encryption algorithm to encrypt and decrypt data.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The machine-readable medium of claim 10, wherein the format-preserving encryption algorithm is FF3-1.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10)

The machine-readable medium of claim 10, wherein the operations further comprise:
using a tweak value in conjunction with the database key as input to the format-preserving encryption algorithm.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The machine-readable medium of claim 12, wherein the operations further comprise:
decrypting the tweak value using the master encryption key before using the tweak value as input to the format-preserving encryption algorithm.

### Claim 14 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the database key is associated with a particular type of data selected from the group consisting of social security numbers, credit card numbers, telephone numbers, email addresses, names, and addresses.

### Claim 15 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the database key is associated with data stored across multiple databases or across multiple fields within a database.

### Claim 16 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the encrypted database key is stored in a key store in a user instance associated with the secure distributed storage.

### Claim 17 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the decrypted database key is held only in transient memory of a cybersecurity provider computing device during encryption or decryption operations.

### Claim 18 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the operations further comprise:
in response to a request to share the encrypted database key with a second encryption domain, invoking a first re-encryption operation to re-encrypt the encrypted database key using a session master key associated with a temporary key sharing session;
transmitting the re-encrypted database key to the second encryption domain; and
invoking a second re-encryption operation to re-encrypt the re-encrypted database key using a second master encryption key associated with the second encryption domain.

### Claim 19 (depends on 1)

The machine-readable medium of claim 1, wherein the encrypted data returned to an unauthorized user is in ciphertext but maintains the format of the original data.

### Claim 20

A method, comprising:
generating, by one or more processors, a master encryption key associated with a user of a secure distributed storage comprising a plurality of databases;
encrypting, by one or more processors, the master encryption key with a wrapper key that is stored at a key management system associated with a cybersecurity provider;
generating, by one or more processors, a database key for encrypting and decrypting data stored in one or more databases of the secure distributed storage;
encrypting, by one or more processors, the database key using the master encryption key, thereby generating an encrypted database key; and
storing, by one or more processors, the encrypted database key in association with the user at the secure distributed storage.
