# US 2026/0099425 A1 · Automatic injection of weak code to attract or distract malicious actors

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- Number: US 2026/0099425 A1
- Document ID: US20260099425A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/416,350
- Filed: 2025-12-11
- Published: 2026-04-09
- Earliest claimed: 2023-02-07
- Assignees: Arm Limited
- Applicants: Arm Limited
- Inventors: Michael BARTLING; Brendan James MORAN; Andreas Lars SANDBERG
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260099425A1

## CPC

- G06F 11/3612: {by runtime analysis (performance monitoring G06F11/3466)}
- G06F 21/577: {Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security}
- G06F 11/3698: Environments for analysis, debugging or testing of software
- G06F 21/54: by adding security routines or objects to programs
- G06F 21/55: Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F 21/566: {Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

This disclosure describes a computer-readable medium storing instructions for detecting malicious activity by monitoring the execution of intentionally weak code paths embedded within executable code. A monitoring system receives a mapping that associates each injected weak path with a unique identifier, then observes the executable during runtime to determine whether any such abnormal path is taken. Because these paths are designed not to execute during normal operation (implemented through inhibited or dead code reachable only under adversarial manipulation) their activation serves as a signal of potential attack behavior. When the monitoring system detects execution of a mapped intentionally weak code path, it generates a notification within a secure environment, enabling rapid identification of suspicious or unauthorized activity. This technique enhances software security by providing a lightweight, observable mechanism for detecting deviations from expected execution flows.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computer-readable storage medium having instructions stored thereon that when executed perform a method, comprising:
receiving, at a monitoring system, a mapping of an injected intentionally weak code path in an executable code to a particular path identifier corresponding to the injected intentionally weak code path;
during runtime of the executable code, monitoring by the monitoring system the executable code for execution of a path having the particular path identifier corresponding to the injected intentionally weak code path; and
responsive to determining that the injected intentionally weak code path being is executed, generating, by the monitoring system, a notification that the injected intentionally weak code path has been accessed.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the method is performed within a secure environment.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the executable code includes intentionally weak code that is configured not to be executed during normal operation but is designed to be observable if targeted by a malicious actor, and wherein execution of intentionally weak code results in the injected intentionally weak code path being taken, wherein the injected intentionally weak code path represents an abnormal execution that is not intended to occur during the normal operation,
the monitoring system generating the notification responsive to identifying the abnormal execution as a potential attack.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the mapping received at the monitoring system identifies that the injected intentionally weak code path was created by inserting code into the executable code that inhibits the injected intentionally weak code path from being taken during normal execution.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein the mapping received at the monitoring system identifies that the injected intentionally weak code path was created by injecting dead code into the executable code that inhibits the injected intentionally weak code path from being taken during normal execution, and wherein the injected dead code includes a reference to a global variable or a reference to a function parameter.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein monitoring the executable code for execution of the particular path identifier comprises detecting, during execution of the executable code, control-flow information generated by an executing binary of the executable code that indicates whether the injected intentionally weak code path has been taken.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein monitoring the executable code comprises using information contained in the mapping to determine whether execution of the injected intentionally weak code path has occurred.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein monitoring further comprises correlating a plurality of runtime occurrences of the particular path identifier to determine whether the injected intentionally weak code path has been executed more than once during runtime.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein monitoring the executable code comprises observing, during runtime, a value representing an identifier derived from an intermediate representation of the executable code, the identifier encoding control-flow structure such that its occurrence during execution indicates traversal of the injected intentionally weak code path.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The computer-readable storage medium of claim 1, wherein monitoring the executable code comprises determining, during execution of the executable code, whether the injected intentionally weak code path has become reachable in a runtime control flow despite being inhibited during normal operation.
