# US 2026/0095770 A1 · User equipment radio resource control inactive state handling in a radio access network (ran) disaggregated architecture

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- Number: US 2026/0095770 A1
- Document ID: US20260095770A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/110,633
- Filed: 2022-09-13
- Published: 2026-04-02
- Earliest claimed: 2022-09-13
- Assignees: Nokia Technologies Oy
- Applicants: Nokia Technologies Oy
- Inventors: Amaanat ALI; Daniela LASELVA; Tero HENTTONEN; Janne Veikko KAASALAINEN
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260095770A1

## CPC

- H04W 12/0431: Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
- H04W 12/106: Packet or message integrity
- H04W 8/00: Network data management
- H04W 12/041: Key generation or derivation
- H04W 12/10: Integrity
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

In accordance with example embodiments of the invention there is at least a method and an apparatus to perform determining based upon being released to an radio resource control inactive state information comprising at least one of a first integrity key generated by a centralized unit associated with a communication network or a second integrity key generated by a first distributed unit associated with the communication network; and selecting between using the first integrity key or the second integrity key based on at least one of a radio resource control message or a radio resource control state. Further, to perform determining for integrity protection of radio resource control messages an information context of a user equipment, comprising a first integrity key and a second integrity key associated with the apparatus, and selecting between using the first integrity key or the second integrity keys based on the radio resource control message.

## Claims

### Claim at position 1

1-74. (canceled)

### Claim 75

An apparatus comprising:
at least one processor; and
at least one non-transitory memory including computer program code, where the at least one non-transitory memory and the computer program code are configured, with the at least one processor, to cause the apparatus to at least:
determine information comprising at least one of a first integrity key or a second integrity key associated with a communication network; and
select between using the first integrity key or the second integrity key based on at least one of a radio resource control message or a radio resource control state.

### Claim 76 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the at least one non-transitory memory and the computer program code are configured with the at least one processor to cause the apparatus to:
select the second integrity key for at least a radio resource control resume request message, and use the selected integrity key to generate an integrity token for at least the radio resource control resume request message.

### Claim 77 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the at least one non-transitory memory and the computer program code are configured with the at least one processor to cause the apparatus to: select the second integrity key for at least a radio resource control release message, and use the selected integrity key to generate an integrity token to verify the integrity token validity of the radio resource control release message received from the network.

### Claim 78 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the determined at least one of the first integrity key or the second integrity key is based upon being released out of a connected state.

### Claim 79 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the at least one of a first integrity key or a second integrity key is generated by at least one of a first distributed unit or a centralized unit associated with the communication network.

### Claim 80 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein generating the second integrity key is based on keying material received from the network.

### Claim 81 (depends on 80)

The apparatus of claim 80, wherein the keying material is received upon the user equipment being dispatched to the radio resource control inactive state.

### Claim 82 (depends on 80)

The apparatus of claim 80, wherein the keying material is received together with a user equipment identifier to be used in the radio resource control inactive state.

### Claim 83 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the at least the first integrity key and the second integrity key is one of predetermined by the user equipment or derived by the user equipment.

### Claim 84 (depends on 80)

The apparatus of claim 80, wherein the keying material comprises at least one of an indication of an integrity protection algorithm and an indication of an algorithm identifier.

### Claim 85 (depends on 76)

The apparatus of claim 76, wherein the integrity token comprises a resumeMAC-I.

### Claim 86 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the first integrity key is the KRRCint key, and the user equipment is using the first integrity key to apply integrity protection for all radio resource control messages but at least one of a radio resource control resume request message or a radio resource control release message.

### Claim 87 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the selected integrity key comprises the second integrity key.

### Claim 88 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the keying material comprises an integrity protection algorithm and algorithm identifier which can be fed in to a key derivation algorithm by the user equipment to generate the integrity token for the radio resource control resume request message by the user equipment.

### Claim 89 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the information comprises a security context including a KRRCint_resume key for the user equipment.

### Claim 90 (depends on 89)

The apparatus of claim 89, wherein the KRRCint_resume key is used to verify the MAC-I validity when the user equipment receives a radio resource control release message from the network.

### Claim 91 (depends on 75)

The apparatus of claim 75, wherein the the at least one non-transitory memory and the computer program code are configured with the at least one processor to cause the apparatus to: store the information comprising the at least one of a first integrity key or a second integrity key, and wherein the storing is based on a validity timer, wherein at expiration of the validity timer the information context is discarded.

### Claim 92

A method, comprising:
determining at least one of a first integrity key or a second integrity key associated with the communication network; and
selecting between using the first integrity key or the second integrity key based on at least one of a radio resource control message or a radio resource control state.

### Claim 93 (depends on 92)

The method of claim 92, where the at least one non-transitory memory and the computer program code are configured with the at least one processor to cause the apparatus to:
select the second integrity key for at least a radio resource control resume request message, and use the selected integrity key to generate an integrity token for at least the radio resource control resume request message.

### Claim 94 (depends on 92)

The method of claim 92, comprising:
selecting the second integrity key for at least a radio resource control release message, and using the selected integrity key to generate an integrity token to verify the integrity token validity of the radio resource control release message received from the network.

### Claim 95

An apparatus comprising:
at least one processor; and
at least one non-transitory memory including computer program code, where the at least one non-transitory memory and the computer program code are configured, with the at least one processor, to cause the apparatus to at least:
determine for integrity protection of radio resource control messages an information context of a user equipment, comprising a first integrity key and a second integrity key associated with the apparatus, and
select between using the first integrity key or the second integrity keys based on the radio resource control message.

### Claim 96 (depends on 95)

The apparatus of claim 95, wherein the information context comprising the first integrity key and the second integrity key is determined one of before or after identifying that a radio resource control configuration with the user equipment is to be released and the user equipment is to be dispatched to a radio resource control inactive state.

### Claim 97

A method, comprising:
determining for integrity protection of radio resource control messages an information context of a user equipment, information comprising a first integrity key and a second integrity key associated with the apparatus, and
selecting between using the first integrity key or the second integrity keys based on the radio resource control message.

### Claim 98 (depends on 97)

The method of claim 97, wherein the first integrity key and the second integrity key are determined one of before or after identifying that a radio resource control configuration with the user equipment is to be released and the user equipment is to be dispatched to a radio resource control inactive state.
