# US 2026/0095442 A1 · Trusted Prober in Cloud-Based Container Orchestration Environments

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- Number: US 2026/0095442 A1
- Document ID: US20260095442A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/901,193
- Filed: 2024-09-30
- Published: 2026-04-02
- Earliest claimed: 2024-09-30
- Assignees: International Business Machines Corporation
- Applicants: International Business Machines Corporation
- Inventors: Qi Feng Huo; Da Li Liu; Yuan Yuan Wang; Lei Li; Yan Song Liu
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260095442A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/0823: {using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263)}
- H04L 9/321: {involving a third party or a trusted authority}
- H04L 9/3263: {involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823)}
- H04L 9/3268: {using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Validating confidential containers running application workloads in trusted execution environments is provided. It is determined whether a probe result is success indicating that a first decrypted digital certificate in a confidential container matches a second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in a trusted prober. In response to determining that the probe result is success indicating that the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container matches the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in the trusted prober, it is determined that the confidential container running an application workload in a trusted execution environment of a host node is a valid confidential container having a valid digital certificate. The confidential container is allowed to run the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node in response to determining that the confidential container is the valid confidential container having the valid digital certificate.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method comprising:
determining whether a probe result is success indicating that a first decrypted digital certificate in a confidential container matches a second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in a trusted prober;
responsive to determining that the probe result is success indicating that the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container matches the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in the trusted prober, determining that the confidential container running an application workload in a trusted execution environment of a host node is a valid confidential container having a valid digital certificate; and
allowing the confidential container to continue running the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node in response to determining that the confidential container is the valid confidential container having the valid digital certificate.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
responsive to determining that the probe result is fail indicating that the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container does not match the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in the trusted prober, determining that the confidential container running the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node is a malicious container having an invalid digital certificate; and
terminating the confidential container in the trusted execution environment of the host node in response to determining that the confidential container is the malicious container having the invalid digital certificate.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
receiving a deployment of the confidential container within the trusted execution environment of the host node to run the application workload based on a container descriptor that includes initialization data and an encrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container; and
starting the confidential container within the trusted execution environment of the host node to run the application workload, the confidential container includes the encrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
retrieving a decryption key from a trusted key broker service; and
decrypting an encrypted digital certificate in the confidential container based on the decryption key retrieved from the trusted key broker service to form the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
starting a trusted prober service in the confidential container running the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node utilizing an additional container within the trusted execution environment of the host node.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
sending a probe request to probe the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container to the trusted prober located in a trusted execution environment of a server; and
receiving the probe of the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container from the trusted prober located in the trusted execution environment of the server via a trusted prober service started in the confidential container by an additional container within the trusted execution environment of the host node, the trusted prober includes the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container for comparison to determine the probe result.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
receiving the probe result as to whether the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container matches the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container from the trusted prober located in a trusted execution environment of a server.

### Claim 8

A computer system comprising:
a processor set;
one or more computer-readable storage media; and
program instructions stored on the one or more computer-readable storage media to cause the processor set to perform operations comprising:
determining whether a probe result is success indicating that a first decrypted digital certificate in a confidential container matches a second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in a trusted prober;
responsive to determining that the probe result is success indicating that the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container matches the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in the trusted prober, determining that the confidential container running an application workload in a trusted execution environment of a host node is a valid confidential container having a valid digital certificate; and
allowing the confidential container to continue running the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node in response to determining that the confidential container is the valid confidential container having the valid digital certificate.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The computer system of claim 8, wherein the operations further comprise:
responsive to determining that the probe result is fail indicating that the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container does not match the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in the trusted prober, determining that the confidential container running the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node is a malicious container having an invalid digital certificate; and
terminating the confidential container in the trusted execution environment of the host node in response to determining that the confidential container is the malicious container having the invalid digital certificate.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The computer system of claim 8, wherein the operations further comprise:
receiving a deployment of the confidential container within the trusted execution environment of the host node to run the application workload based on a container descriptor that includes initialization data and an encrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container; and
starting the confidential container within the trusted execution environment of the host node to run the application workload, the confidential container includes the encrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The computer system of claim 8, wherein the operations further comprise:
retrieving a decryption key from a trusted key broker service; and
decrypting an encrypted digital certificate in the confidential container based on the decryption key retrieved from the trusted key broker service to form the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container.

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The computer system of claim 8, wherein the operations further comprise:
starting a trusted prober service in the confidential container running the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node utilizing an additional container within the trusted execution environment of the host node.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The computer system of claim 8, wherein the operations further comprise:
sending a probe request to probe the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container to the trusted prober located in a trusted execution environment of a server; and
receiving the probe of the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container from the trusted prober located in the trusted execution environment of the server via a trusted prober service started in the confidential container by an additional container within the trusted execution environment of the host node, the trusted prober includes the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container for comparison to determine the probe result.

### Claim 14

A computer program product comprising:
one or more computer-readable storage media; and
program instructions stored on the one or more computer-readable storage media to perform operations comprising:
determining whether a probe result is success indicating that a first decrypted digital certificate in a confidential container matches a second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in a trusted prober;
responsive to determining that the probe result is success indicating that the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container matches the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in the trusted prober, determining that the confidential container running an application workload in a trusted execution environment of a host node is a valid confidential container having a valid digital certificate; and
allowing the confidential container to continue running the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node in response to determining that the confidential container is the valid confidential container having the valid digital certificate.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The computer program product of claim 14, wherein the operations further comprise:
responsive to determining that the probe result is fail indicating that the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container does not match the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container in the trusted prober, determining that the confidential container running the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node is a malicious container having an invalid digital certificate; and
terminating the confidential container in the trusted execution environment of the host node in response to determining that the confidential container is the malicious container having the invalid digital certificate.

### Claim 16 (depends on 14)

The computer program product of claim 14, wherein the operations further comprise:
receiving a deployment of the confidential container within the trusted execution environment of the host node to run the application workload based on a container descriptor that includes initialization data and an encrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container; and
starting the confidential container within the trusted execution environment of the host node to run the application workload, the confidential container includes the encrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container.

### Claim 17 (depends on 14)

The computer program product of claim 14, wherein the operations further comprise:
retrieving a decryption key from a trusted key broker service; and
decrypting an encrypted digital certificate in the confidential container based on the decryption key retrieved from the trusted key broker service to form the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container.

### Claim 18 (depends on 14)

The computer program product of claim 14, wherein the operations further comprise:
starting a trusted prober service in the confidential container running the application workload in the trusted execution environment of the host node utilizing an additional container within the trusted execution environment of the host node.

### Claim 19 (depends on 14)

The computer program product of claim 14, wherein the operations further comprise:
sending a probe request to probe the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container to the trusted prober located in a trusted execution environment of a server; and
receiving the probe of the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container from the trusted prober located in the trusted execution environment of the server via a trusted prober service started in the confidential container by an additional container within the trusted execution environment of the host node, the trusted prober includes the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container for comparison to determine the probe result.

### Claim 20 (depends on 14)

The computer program product of claim 14, wherein the operations further comprise:
receiving the probe result as to whether the first decrypted digital certificate in the confidential container matches the second decrypted digital certificate corresponding to the confidential container from the trusted prober located in a trusted execution environment of a server.
