# US 2026/0093308 A1 · Techniques to detect and mitigate a frequency throttling side-channel attack

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- Number: US 2026/0093308 A1
- Document ID: US20260093308A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/899,893
- Filed: 2024-09-27
- Published: 2026-04-02
- Earliest claimed: 2024-09-27
- Assignees: Intel Corporation
- Applicants: Intel Corporation
- Inventors: Chen LIU; Neer ROGGEL; Mo BASHIR; Anders FOGH; Nilanjan PALIT; James G. HERMERDING, II; Lichen WENG; Shriti TANYA
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260093308A1

## CPC

- G06F 1/324: by lowering clock frequency
- G06F 1/3206: Monitoring of events, devices or parameters that trigger a change in power modality
- G06F 1/3296: by lowering the supply or operating voltage
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Examples include techniques to detect and mitigate a frequency throttling side-channel attack. The examples include monitoring power information associated with execution of a workload and detecting changes to the power information to indicate an attempt to obtain secret information. The examples also include, responsive to detecting changes to the power information, inserting random noise to cause a fluctuation of a power level limit that can cause a dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) algorithm to fluctuate or change determined maximum allowed operating frequencies for at least one core of a multi-core processor that is executing the workload.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A processor comprising:
a plurality of cores;
a plurality of control registers to maintain power information associated with workload execution by the plurality of cores; and
a power management unit to include circuitry configured to:
monitor changes in the power information;
detect at least one change to the power information that indicates an attempt to obtain secret information used when a workload is executed by at least one of the plurality of cores; and
insert, in response to detecting the at least one change to the power information, random noise to cause a fluctuation of a power level limit over a period of time, wherein the fluctuation of the power level limit is to cause a dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) algorithm to change determined maximum allowed operating frequencies for the at least one of the plurality of cores to execute the workload over the period of time.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The processor of claim 1, wherein insertion of the random noise is based, at least in part, on a jitter factor and the period of time is a jitter interval, the jitter factor to cause the power level limit to fluctuate at each jitter interval by a percentage of the power level limit.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The processor of claim 1, wherein the power information includes frequency throttling information, reactive limit information, or dynamic capacitance information.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The processor of claim 3, wherein the reactive limit information indicates the power level limit, and wherein the attempt to obtain the secret information is via a frequency throttling side-channel attack initiated by a kernel-space attacker having read or write access to at least one control register from among the plurality of control registers that maintains the power level limit, an indication of the frequency throttling side-channel attack to be based, at least in part, on repeated changes to the power level limit by the kernel-space attacker.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The processor of claim 3, wherein the attempt to obtain the secret information is via a frequency throttling side-channel attack initiated by a user-space attacker, and wherein changes to the dynamic capacitance information indicate the frequency throttling side-channel attack based on the user-space attacker causing repeated frequency throttling.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The processor of claim 1, wherein the workload executed by the at least one of the plurality of cores is for a cryptographic operation and the secret information is a secret key to be used in the cryptographic operation.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The processor of claim 1, wherein the plurality of control registers comprise model-specific registers (MSRs).

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The processor of claim 1, wherein the processor comprises a central processing unit or a graphics processing unit.

### Claim 9

At least one machine readable medium comprising a plurality of instructions that in response to being executed by a power management unit of multi-core processor causes the power management unit to:
monitor power information maintained in at least one control register of the multi-core processor, the power information associated with workload execution by cores of the multi-core processor;
detect at least one change to the power information that indicates an attempt to obtain secret information used when a workload is executed by at least one core of the multi-core processor; and
insert, in response to detecting the at least one change to the power information, random noise that to cause a fluctuation of a power level limit over a period of time, wherein the fluctuation of the power level limit is to cause a dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) algorithm to change determined maximum allowed operating frequencies for the at least one core of the multi-core processor to execute the workload over the period of time.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The at least one machine readable medium of claim 9, wherein insertion of the random noise is based, at least in part, on a jitter factor and the period of time is a jitter interval, the jitter factor to cause the power level limit to fluctuate at each jitter interval by a percentage of the power level limit.

### Claim 11 (depends on 9)

The at least one machine readable medium of claim 9, wherein the power information includes frequency throttling information, reactive limit information, or dynamic capacitance information.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The at least one machine readable medium of claim 11, wherein the reactive limit information indicates the power level limit, and wherein the attempt to obtain the secret information is via a frequency throttling side-channel attack initiated by a kernel-space attacker having read or write access to the at least one control register that maintains the power level limit, an indication of the frequency throttling side-channel attack to be based, at least in part, on repeated changes to the power level limit by the kernel-space attacker.

### Claim 13 (depends on 11)

The at least one machine readable medium of claim 11, wherein the attempt to obtain the secret information is via a frequency throttling side-channel attack initiated by a user-space attacker, and wherein changes to the dynamic capacitance information indicate the frequency throttling side-channel attack based on the user-space attacker causing repeated frequency throttling.

### Claim 14 (depends on 9)

The at least one machine readable medium of claim 9, wherein the workload executed by the at least one core of the multi-core processor is for a cryptographic operation and the secret information is a secret key to be used in the cryptographic operation.

### Claim 15 (depends on 9)

The at least one machine readable medium of claim 9, wherein the at least one control register comprises a model-specific register (MSR).

### Claim 16 (depends on 9)

The at least one machine readable medium of claim 9, wherein the multi-core processor comprises a central processing unit or a graphics processing unit.

### Claim 17

A computing platform comprising:
a memory device arranged to maintain an application to implement a cryptographic operation; and
a multi-core processor configured to couple with the memory device, the multi-core processor to include a plurality of control registers to maintain power information associated with workload execution by cores of the multi-core processor and a power management unit, the power management unit to include circuitry configured to:
monitor changes in the power information;
detect at least one change to the power information that indicates an attempt to obtain secret information used when a workload for the cryptographic operation is executed by at least one core of the multi-core processor; and
insert, in response to detecting the at least one change to the power information, random noise that to cause a fluctuation of a power level limit over a period of time, wherein the fluctuation of the power limit is to cause a dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) algorithm to change determined maximum allowed operating frequencies for the at least one core of the multi-core processor to execute the workload over the period of time.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The computing platform of claim 17, wherein insertion of the random noise is based, at least in part, on a jitter factor and the period of time is a jitter interval, the jitter factor to cause the power level limit to fluctuate at each jitter interval by a percentage of the power level limit.

### Claim 19 (depends on 17)

The computing platform of claim 17, wherein the power information includes frequency throttling information, reactive limit information, or dynamic capacitance information.

### Claim 20 (depends on 19)

The computing platform of claim 19, wherein the reactive limit information indicates the power level limit, and wherein the attempt to obtain the secret information is via a frequency throttling side-channel attack initiated by a kernel-space attacker having read or write access to at least one control register from among the plurality of control registers that maintains the power level limit, an indication of the frequency throttling side-channel attack to be based, at least in part, on repeated changes to the power level limit by the kernel-space attacker.
