# US 2026/0087177 A1 · Apparatus, a method and a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium

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- Number: US 2026/0087177 A1
- Document ID: US20260087177A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/895,482
- Filed: 2024-09-25
- Published: 2026-03-26
- Earliest claimed: 2024-09-25
- Inventors: Bin XING; Ned M. SMITH; Vincent R. SCARLATA
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260087177A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/64: Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
- G06F 21/54: by adding security routines or objects to programs
- G06F 21/552: {involving long-term monitoring or reporting}
- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

It is provided an apparatus comprising interface circuitry, machine-readable instructions, and processing circuitry to execute the machine-readable instructions. The machine-readable instructions include instructions to record an entry into a virtual integrity register. The entry is based on a measurement of a module. The module is a part of a confidential computing environment. The machine-readable instructions further include instructions to load the module into a memory. The memory is accessible by the confidential computing environment. The machine-readable instructions further include instructions to record an entry of a log. The log comprises a load history. The entry comprises information about the loading of the module. The machine-readable instructions further include instructions to record an entry into an integrity measurement register. The entry being based on the recorded virtual integrity register entry.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An apparatus comprising interface circuitry, machine-readable instructions and processing circuitry to execute the machine-readable instructions to:
record an entry into a virtual integrity register, the entry being based on a measurement of a module, the module being a part of a confidential computing environment;
load the module into a memory, the memory being accessible by the confidential computing environment;
record an entry of a log, the log comprising a load history, the entry comprising information about the loading of the module;
record an entry into an integrity measurement register, the entry being based on the recorded virtual integrity register entry.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the recorded entry in the integrity measurement register is based on a plurality of virtual integrity register entries.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further to execute the machine-readable instructions to generate a hash tree based on a plurality of entries of the virtual integrity register.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further to execute the machine-readable instructions to sign one or more entries of the integrity measurement register with a cryptographic key.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further to execute the machine-readable instructions to transmit an attestation evidence, which is based on one or more recorded entries of the integrity measurement register, and the log to an attestation verifier, the verifier being configured to evaluate the integrity of the module based on attestation evidence and the log.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further to execute the machine-readable instructions to store an integrity measurement register report based on one or more entries of the integrity measurement register in a memory accessible by the confidential computing environment.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further to execute the machine-readable instructions to reset the integrity measurement register.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further to execute the machine-readable instructions to generate the virtual integrity register, wherein virtual integrity register resides in a memory accessible by the confidential computing environment.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the module is at least one of a runtime environment, a library and a workload.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the module is a workload performing one or more transactions with another party.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the measurement of the module is obtained before loading the module into the memory.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the measurement of the module is obtained after loading the module into the memory.

### Claim 13 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further to execute the machine-readable instructions to generate a digest of the log; and
write the digest into the integrity measurement register.

### Claim 14 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the information about the loading of the module comprises at least one of a time step of the loading of the module, a position within a sequence of modules that are loaded and an identifier of the module.

### Claim 15 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the integrity measurement register is a non-volatile memory that is physically separated from other memory and storage accessible by the confidential computing environment.

### Claim 16 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the module is executed in an execution environment of the confidential computing environment.

### Claim 17

A method comprising:
recording an entry into a virtual integrity register, the entry being based on a measurement of a module, the module being a part of a confidential computing environment;
loading the module into a memory, the memory being accessible by the confidential computing environment;
recording an entry of a log, the log comprising a load history, the entry comprising information about the loading of the module;
recording an entry into an integrity measurement register, the entry being based on the recorded virtual integrity register entry.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The method according to claim 17, wherein the recorded entry in the integrity measurement register is based on a plurality of virtual integrity register entries.

### Claim 19 (depends on 17)

The method according to claim 17, further comprising resetting the integrity measurement register.

### Claim 20 (depends on 17)

A non-transitory machine-readable storage medium including program code, when executed, to cause a machine to perform the method of claim 17.
