# US 2026/0087169 A1 · Detecting Secrets in Deleted Software Development Platform Repositories

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- Number: US 2026/0087169 A1
- Document ID: US20260087169A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/253,007
- Filed: 2025-06-27
- Published: 2026-03-26
- Earliest claimed: 2024-09-23
- Assignees: Zscaler, Inc.
- Applicants: Zscaler, Inc.
- Inventors: Shoham Danino
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260087169A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/6245: {Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes}
- G06F 8/77: Software metrics
- G06F 21/577: {Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Systems and methods for detecting secrets in deleted software development platforms (SDP) are disclosed herein, including querying an SDP for account and repository data, the querying being based on a customer name, identifying previously existing content that is no long present in a current version of the SDP, reconstructing the previously existing content, analyzing the reconstructed content for one or more indicators of sensitive information, and generating a report based on the analysis.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method implemented by a cloud-based system, the method comprising steps of:
querying a Software Development Platform (SDP) for account and repository data, the querying being based on a customer name;
identifying previously existing content that is no longer present in a current version of the SDP;
reconstructing the previously existing content;
analyzing the reconstructed content for one or more indicators of sensitive information; and
generating a report based on the analyzing.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising collecting target repositories by identifying repositories associated with a customer.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, further comprising cloning each target repository into an isolated processing environment and distributing the repositories across a plurality of compute nodes.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising analyzing a difference between one or more commits to detect any of deleted or moved files.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising restoring file snapshots and recovering unreachable content.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising applying a set of regular expression rules to detect specific types of secrets.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprises calculating a score for segments of the content.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising applying one or more machine learning models trained to identify user-defined or anomalous secret-related identifiers.

### Claim 9 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the report defines metadata including at least one of: a file path, a commit identifier, a type of secret, and a risk classification.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising integrating with external communication systems to notify users of detected secrets in near real-time.

### Claim 11

A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions that, when executed, cause one or more processors to perform steps of:
querying a Software Development Platform (SDP) for account and repository data, the querying being based on a customer name;
identifying previously existing content that is no longer present in a current version of the SDP;
reconstructing the previously existing content;
analyzing the reconstructed content for one or more indicators of sensitive information; and
generating a report based on the analyzing.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, further comprising collecting target repositories by identifying repositories associated with a customer.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 12, further comprising cloning each target repository into an isolated processing environment and distributing the repositories across a plurality of compute nodes.

### Claim 14 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, further comprising analyzing a difference between one or more commits to detect any of deleted or moved files.

### Claim 15 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, further comprising restoring file snapshots and recovering unreachable content.

### Claim 16 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, further comprising applying a set of regular expression rules to detect specific types of secrets.

### Claim 17 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, further comprises calculating a score for segments of the content.

### Claim 18 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, further comprising applying one or more machine learning models trained to identify user-defined or anomalous secret-related identifiers.

### Claim 19 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, wherein the report defines metadata including at least one of: a file path, a commit identifier, a type of secret, and a risk classification.

### Claim 20 (depends on 11)

The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, further comprising integrating with external communication systems to notify users of detected secrets in near real-time.
