# US 2026/0032111 A1 · Email-based authentication for account login, account creation and security for passwordless transactions

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- Number: US 2026/0032111 A1
- Document ID: US20260032111A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/348,993
- Filed: 2025-10-03
- Published: 2026-01-29
- Earliest claimed: 2017-09-20
- Assignees: Swoop IP Holdings LLC
- Applicants: Swoop IP Holdings LLC
- Inventors: John P. KILLORAN, JR.; Graham BASS
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20260032111A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/313: {using a call-back technique via a telephone network}
- H04L 63/08: {for authentication of entities (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32)}
- G06F 16/245: Query processing
- G06F 16/27: Replication, distribution or synchronisation of data between databases or within a distributed database system; Distributed database system architectures therefor
- G06Q 10/107: Computer-aided management of electronic mailing [e-mailing]
- G06Q 20/12: specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
- G06Q 20/3825: {Use of electronic signatures}
- G06Q 20/3829: {involving key management}
- G06Q 20/385: {using an alias or single-use codes}
- G06Q 20/4014: {Identity check for transactions}
- G06Q 30/0185: {Product, service or business identity fraud}
- G06Q 30/0279: Fundraising management
- G06Q 30/06: Buying, selling or leasing transactions
- G06Q 30/0601: Electronic shopping [e-shopping]
- G06Q 30/0609: {Qualifying participants for shopping transactions (payment transaction verification G06Q20/401)}
- G06Q 30/0641: {utilising user interfaces specially adapted for shopping}
- H04L 9/3239: {involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/50: {using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees}
- H04L 51/42: Mailbox-related aspects, e.g. synchronisation of mailboxes
- H04L 61/4511: using domain name system [DNS]
- H04L 63/102: {Entity profiles}
- H04L 63/18: {using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths H04L9/0827; cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for authentication using a plurality of channels H04L9/3215)}
- H04L 67/141: Setup of application sessions (admission control or resource allocation in data switching networks H04L47/70)
- H04L 69/329: in the application layer [OSI layer 7]
- H04L 2463/082: applying multi-factor authentication
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06Q: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR

## Abstract

A system and method is disclosed for providing vendors an alternative to a password-based security system. The system and method also allows vendors to manage secure transactions by leveraging various message authentication techniques while allowing the vendor full control over related processes such as payment processing and fulfillment. The system and method also monitors message requests from customers for the vendor to guarantee that the communication has not been compromised. Consolidating the authentication of users to their messaging minimizes the need for each individual vendor to maintain their own password for access to a customer account. This eliminates the requirement that customers generate a password thus increasing convenience and decreasing security risks associated with the use of passwords. This decreases risk not only for customer and vendor but also decreases the risk exposure across the internet—as the system scales.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computer-implemented method of controlling a secure action, comprising:
receiving a message that requests performance of a secure action;
extracting, the message, a DKIM-Signature field comprising at least a signing domain tag d= and selector tag s=;
retrieving, from a Domain Name System (DNS) record specified by the d and s tags, a public herkey associated with the signing domain;
computing, from at least headers and a body of the message, a body hash and a signature verification value according to DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM);
validating the DKIM-Signature using the retrieved public key to determine whether the message was cryptographically signed by the signing domain and has not been tampered with in transit; and
on a condition that the DKIM-Signature is validated, causing a vendor system to grant the secure action for a user associated with the message, and on a condition that the DKIM-Signature is not validated, causing the vendor system to deny the secure action.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the DKIM-Signature field includes a bh tag comprising a body hash and a b tag comprising a digital signature, and validating the DKIM-Signature comprises comparing a locally computed body hash to the bh tag and verifying the b tag using the public key.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein retrieving the public key comprises performing a DNS TXT record query at a name formed from the selector s and domain d values.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein validating the DKIM-Signature comprises applying SHA-256 hashing and RSA public-key cryptography.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising recording a result of the DKIM validation in an Authentication-Results header for use by downstream components.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising, when the DKIM-Signature is not validated, performing at least one of a Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) policy check or a Sender Policy Framework (SPF) path verification prior to denying the secure action.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising monitoring fidelity of DNS records associated with the signing domain and adjusting whether to grant the secure action based on detected changes.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising extracting a unique identifier from the message and granting the secure action only when the DKIM-Signature is validated and the unique identifier is validated.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein a session for a secure webpage is established and determined based on the unique identifier.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein causing the vendor system to grant the secure action includes establishing a secure channel utilizing WebSockets.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the message is generated responsive to a user selecting a mailto link or a URL that, when selected, causes generation of the message.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising writing an indication of the DKIM validation result to a blockchain ledger used to record authentication events.

### Claim 13

A system comprising a communication interface, a memory, and a processor configured to:
receive an email that requests performance of a secure action;
validate a DKIM-Signature of the message by retrieving a public key from a DNS record based on d and s tag values and verifying a signature over at least a header and a body of the message; and
responsive to successful validation, cause a vendor system to grant the secure action and, otherwise, to deny the secure action.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein the processor verifies the DKIM-Signature using RSA and SHA-256.

### Claim 15 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein the processor generates an Authentication-Results header indicating a DKIM validation outcome.

### Claim 16 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein, when the DKIM-Signature is not validated, the processor additionally performs at least one of DMARC evaluation and SPF path verification before denying the secure action.

### Claim 17 (depends on 13)

The system of claim 13, wherein the processor validates a unique identifier contained in the message and causes a session to be determined based on the unique identifier.

### Claim 18 (depends on 1)

A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions that, when executed, cause a processor to perform the method of claim 1.
