# US 2025/0184739 A1 · Resistance to side-channel attacks on 5g network slices

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- Number: US 2025/0184739 A1
- Document ID: US20250184739A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/044,469
- Filed: 2025-02-03
- Published: 2025-06-05
- Earliest claimed: 2021-09-17
- Assignees: Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC
- Applicants: Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC
- Inventors: Stefan SAROIU; Paramvir BAHL
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250184739A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/556: {involving covert channels, i.e. data leakage between processes (inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation with measures against power attack G06F21/755)}
- H04W 12/122: Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
- G06F 21/53: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
- H04L 9/005: {for timing attacks}
- H04L 41/0806: for initial configuration or provisioning, e.g. plug-and-play
- H04L 47/22: Traffic shaping
- H04W 12/03: Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- G06F 2221/033: Test or assess software
- H04L 2209/80: Wireless
- H04W 84/042: {Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Resistance to vulnerabilities from timing-based side-channel attacks on 5G network slices that share underlying physical infrastructure and resources may be enhanced by selectively imposing time-based constraints on service provisioning and data handling to obscure data-driven time variations that occur during workload execution in a slice that can leak secret information. By preventing timing leakage from the 5G network slices, an attacker cannot observe execution latencies to thereby infer the constituency of workload characteristics. In addition, the attacker cannot create contention for shared resources on its own slice to observe an extent to which the shared resources are utilized by a targeted slice.

## Claims

### Claim 1

One or more hardware-based non-transitory computer-readable memory devices storing computer-executable instructions which, upon execution by one or more processors disposed in a computing device deployed in a 5G (fifth generation) network comprising a plurality of slices, cause the computing device to:
receive a request for a new 5G network slice to support a 5G service;
select a plurality of virtualized network functions to provision the 5G service on the new 5G network slice;
configure each of the plurality of virtualized network functions for the new 5G network slice to operate in constant time, independent of input to the virtualized network function; and
instantiate the new 5G network slice using the plurality of virtualized network functions operating in constant time.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The one or more hardware-based non-transitory computer-readable memory devices of claim 1 in which the virtualized network functions are implemented using code for which code control flow comprises single-entry, single-exit subgraphs and excludes hammock nodes.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The one or more hardware-based non-transitory computer-readable memory devices of claim 1 in which the virtualized network functions are implemented using code having loops that execute a constant fixed number of iterations.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The one or more hardware-based non-transitory computer-readable memory devices of claim 1 in which the virtualized network functions are implemented using code for which sources of variable latency are eliminated.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The one or more hardware-based non-transitory computer-readable memory devices of claim 1 in which the operation of virtualized network functions in constant time prevents timing leakage from the new 5G network slice during support of the 5G service.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The one or more hardware-based non-transitory computer-readable memory devices of claim 1 in which the computer-executable instructions include code for time-padding which, when executed by the one or more processors, further causes the computing device to implement fixed delay to a virtualized network function.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The one or more hardware-based non-transitory computer-readable memory devices of claim 1 in which the computer-executable instructions include code for obfuscation which, when executed by the one or more processors, further cause, the computing device to inject arbitrary operations into a virtualized network function.

### Claim 8

A method for implementation on a computing device deployed in a 5G (fifth generation) network comprising a plurality of slices, comprising:
receiving a request for a new 5G network slice to support a 5G service;
selecting a plurality of virtualized network functions to provision the 5G service on the new 5G network slice;
configuring each of the plurality of virtualized network functions for the new 5G network slice to operate in constant time, independent of input to the virtualized network function; and
instantiating the new 5G network slice using the plurality of virtualized network functions operating in constant time.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8 in which the virtualized network functions are implemented using code for which code control flow comprises single-entry, single-exit subgraphs and excludes hammock nodes.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8 in which the virtualized network functions are implemented using code having loops that execute a constant fixed number of iterations.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8 in which the virtualized network functions are implemented using code for which sources of variable latency are eliminated.

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8 in which the operation of virtualized network functions in constant time prevents timing leakage from the new 5G network slice during support of the 5G service.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8 further including implementing a fixed delay to a virtualized network function.

### Claim 14 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8 further including injecting arbitrary operations into a virtualized network function.

### Claim 15

A computing device operable in a 5G (fifth generation) network, comprising:
at least one processor; and
at least one hardware-based non-transitory computer-readable storage device having computer-executable instructions stored thereon which, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the computing device to receive a request for a new 5G network slice to support a 5G service;
select a plurality of virtualized network functions to provision the 5G service on the new 5G network slice;
configure each of the plurality of virtualized network functions for the new 5G network slice to operate in constant time, independent of input to the virtualized network function; and
instantiate the new 5G network slice using the plurality of virtualized network functions operating in constant time.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The computing device of claim 15 in which the virtualized network functions are implemented using code for which code control flow comprises single-entry, single-exit subgraphs and excludes hammock nodes.

### Claim 17 (depends on 15)

The computing device of claim 15 in which the virtualized network functions are implemented using code having loops that execute a constant fixed number of iterations.

### Claim 18 (depends on 15)

The computing device of claim 15 in which the virtualized network functions are implemented using code for which sources of variable latency are eliminated.

### Claim 19 (depends on 15)

The computing device of claim 15 in which the operation of virtualized network functions in constant time prevents timing leakage from the new 5G network slice during support of the 5G service.

### Claim 20 (depends on 15)

The computing device of claim 15 in which the computer-executable instructions include code for obfuscation which, when executed by the at least one processor further cause the computing device to inject arbitrary operations into a virtualized network function.
