# US 2025/0168177 A1 · Can communication security method for detecting can bus attacks, recording medium and can communication device for performing the same

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 2025/0168177 A1
- Document ID: US20250168177A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/949,177
- Filed: 2024-11-15
- Published: 2025-05-22
- Earliest claimed: 2023-11-16
- Assignees: Foundation of Soongsil University-Industry Cooperation
- Applicants: Foundation of Soongsil University-Industry Cooperation
- Inventors: Seong Soo LEE; Hyung Chul IM
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250168177A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/1416: {Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection}
- H04L 63/0227: {Filtering policies (mail message filtering H04L51/212)}
- H04L 63/1425: {Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection}
- H04L 63/1466: {Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

A Controller Area Network (CAN) communication security method in a CAN communication security apparatus for detecting a CAN bus attack by monitoring a CAN data frame through a CAN bus, which includes receiving a CAN data frame; analyzing the CAN data frame through a pre-learned intrusion detection systems (IDS) model to classify an attack type of the CAN bus; and filtering the classified attack type based on a pre-established rule. The efficiency of intrusion detection in IDS can be improved by reanalyzing the intrusion detection results in IDS based on rule-based filters that utilize actual attack patterns that can be observed in CAN bus traffic.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A CAN (Controller Area Network) communication security method in a CAN communication security apparatus for detecting a CAN bus attack by monitoring a CAN data frame through a CAN bus, comprising:
receiving a CAN data frame;
analyzing the CAN data frame through a pre-learned intrusion detection systems (IDS) model to classify an attack-type of the CAN bus; and
filtering the classified attack type based on a pre-established rule.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the attack type comprises at least one of a DOS (Denial-of-Service) attack, a spoofing attack, and a fuzzy attack.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the filtering comprises accumulatively counting the number of attacks by message ID of the corresponding CAN data frame whenever the classified attack type is the DOS attack.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein the filtering comprises, even if the CAN data frame is classified as normal in the classifying, if the number of attacks of the corresponding CAN data frame exceeds a preset threshold value, finally determining the attack type of the corresponding CAN data frame as the DOS attack.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The method of claim 3, wherein the filtering comprises, even if the number of attacks of the CAN data frame classified as the DOS attack in the classifying exceeds a preset threshold value, if the message ID value of the corresponding CAN data frame is greater than a preset ID threshold value based on a message ID value of a normal CAN data frame, finally determining the attack type of the corresponding CAN data frame as normal.

### Claim 6 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the filtering comprises accumulatively counting the number of attacks by message ID and payload data of the corresponding CAN data frame whenever the classified attack type is the spoofing attack.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the filtering comprises, even if the CAN data frame is classified as normal in the classifying, if the number of attacks corresponding to the message ID and payload data of the corresponding CAN data frame exceeds a preset threshold value, finally determining the attack type of the corresponding CAN data frame as the spoofing attack.

### Claim 8 (depends on 6)

The method of claim 6, wherein the filtering comprises, if the number of attacks corresponding to the message ID of the CAN data frame classified as the spoofing attack in the classifying exceeds a preset threshold value, if the number of attacks corresponding to the payload data of the corresponding CAN data frame is less than or equal to a preset threshold value, finally determining the attack type of the corresponding CAN data frame as normal.

### Claim 9 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the filtering comprises, even if the CAN data frame is classified as normal in the classifying, if the message ID of the corresponding CAN data frame is not included in a message ID set of normal data prepared in advance for real-time control of a vehicle, finally determining the attack type of the corresponding CAN data frame as a fuzzy attack.

### Claim 10 (depends on 2)

The method of claim 2, wherein the filtering comprises, even if the CAN data frame is classified as normal in the classifying, if a distance between payload data of current and previous CAN data frames having the message ID of the corresponding CAN data frame and the number of ‘1’ bits in the payload data bytes of the corresponding CAN data frame all satisfy a preset condition, finally determining the attack type of the corresponding CAN data frame as a fuzzy attack.

### Claim 11 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, wherein the distance between the payload data satisfies the preset condition is a case, in which the distance between the payload data of the current and previous CAN data frames is greater than a distance threshold value set based on distance between consecutive normal CAN data frames having the same message ID in the normal data set used to learn the IDS model.

### Claim 12 (depends on 10)

The method of claim 10, wherein the number of ‘1’ bits satisfies the preset condition is a case, in which when the number of ‘1’ bits of more than half of the payload data bytes of the corresponding CAN data frame is greater than the maximum number of ‘1’ bits of payload data bytes of a normal CAN data frame of a normal data set used to learn the IDS model at the same byte position.

### Claim 13 (depends on 1)

A computer-readable recording medium having recorded thereon a computer program for performing the method of claim 1.

### Claim 14

A CAN (Controller Area Network) communication security apparatus for detecting a CAN bus attack by monitoring a CAN data frame through a CAN bus, comprising:
a communication unit that receives the CAN data frame;
an attack-type classification unit that analyzes the CAN data frame through a pre-learned intrusion detection systems (IDS) model to classify an attack-type of the CAN bus; and
a filtering unit that filters the classified attack type based on a pre-established rule.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The apparatus of claim 14, wherein the attack type comprises at least one of a DOS (Denial-Of-Service) attack, a spoofing attack, and a fuzzy attack.
