# US 2025/0168018 A1 · Techniques to implement confidential computing with a remote device via use of trust domains

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- Number: US 2025/0168018 A1
- Document ID: US20250168018A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/832,459
- Filed: 2022-03-30
- Published: 2025-05-22
- Earliest claimed: 2022-03-30
- Assignees: Intel Corporation
- Applicants: Intel Corporation
- Inventors: Ravi SAHITA; Jiewen YAO; Utkarsh Y. KAKAIYA
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250168018A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/3268: {using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]}
- H04L 9/40: Network security protocols
- G06F 21/53: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
- G06F 21/6245: {Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes}
- H04L 63/02: {for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls}
- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- H04L 63/0823: {using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263)}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Examples include techniques to implement confidential computing with a remote device via use of trust domains. Examples are described of establishing secure communication sessions between a trust domain supported by a hardware processor core on a first host platform and an input/output (I/O) device resident on a second host platform.

## Claims

### Claim at position 1

1-21. (canceled)

### Claim 22

An apparatus comprising:
a first hardware processor core resident on a first host platform, the first hardware processor core to include a first trust domain manager to manage a hardware isolated virtual machine as a local trust domain, wherein the local trust domain is to:
establish a secure communication session with a device interface for an input/output (I/O) device resident on a second host platform to enable memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) between the local trust domain and the I/O device; and
cause a secure remote direct memory access (RDMA) session over a network communication link to be set up between a first network interface card (NIC) resident on the first host platform and a second NIC resident on the second host platform to enable direct memory access (DMA) between the local trust domain and the I/O device.

### Claim 23 (depends on 22)

The apparatus of claim 22, wherein the secure communication session with the device interface is established according to a Secure Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) specification.

### Claim 24 (depends on 22)

The apparatus of claim 22, wherein to establish the secure communication session with the device interface further comprises the local trust domain to:
receive a first message that includes a device interface handle for the I/O device;
establish the secure communication session via receipt of a certificate measurement from the device interface to validate the device interface in order to receive a report that indicates capabilities of the device interface; and
accept the capabilities of the device interface to enable MMIO between the local trust domain and the I/O device.

### Claim 25 (depends on 22)

The apparatus of claim 22, wherein the secure RDMA session includes RDMA over Converged Ethernet (RoCE) and use of at least one of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocols or iWARP protocols to at least one of encrypt or decrypt DMA messages between the local trust domain and the I/O device.

### Claim 26 (depends on 22)

The apparatus of claim 22, wherein to cause the secure RDMA session over a network communication link to be set up between the first NIC and the second NIC further comprises the local trust domain to:
accept a device service trust domain for the I/O device, the device service trust domain managed by a second trust domain manager included in a second hardware processor core resident on the second host platform, the second trust domain manager to manage a hardware isolation of the device service trust domain;
establish a secure communication session with the device service trust domain;
exchange an RDMA key with the device service trust domain via the secure communication session with the device service trust domain; and
provide the RDMA key to the first NIC, for the first NIC to encrypt or decrypt DMA messages received via the secure RDMA session, wherein the device service trust domain is to provide the RDMA key to the second NIC, for the first NIC to encrypt or decrypt DMA messages received via the secure RDMA session.

### Claim 27 (depends on 26)

The apparatus of claim 26, wherein the secure communication session with the device service trust domain is established according to a Secure Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) specification.

### Claim 28 (depends on 22)

The apparatus of claim 22, wherein the I/O device comprises an accelerator device, a memory device or a storage device.

### Claim 29

A method implemented by a local trust domain managed by a trust domain manager included in a hardware processor core resident on a host platform, the method comprising:
establishing a secure communication session with a device interface for an input/output (I/O) device resident on a remote host platform to enable memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) between the local trust domain and the I/O device; and
causing a secure remote direct memory access (RDMA) session over a network communication link to be set up between a first network interface card (NIC) resident on the host platform and a second NIC resident on the remote host platform to enable direct memory access (DMA) between the local trust domain and the I/O device.

### Claim 30 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29, wherein establishing the secure communication session with the device interface comprises establishing the secure communication session according to a Secure Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) specification.

### Claim 31 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29, wherein establishing the secure communication session with the device interface further comprises:
receiving a first message that includes a device interface handle for the I/O device;
establishing the secure communication session via receipt of a certificate measurement from the device interface to validate the device interface in order to receive a report that indicates capabilities of the device interface; and
accepting the capabilities of the device interface to enable MMIO between the local trust domain and the I/O device.

### Claim 32 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29, wherein the secure RDMA session includes RDMA over Converged Ethernet (RoCE) and use of at least one of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocols or iWARP protocols to at least one of encrypt or decrypt DMA messages between the local trust domain and the I/O device.

### Claim 33 (depends on 29)

The method of claim 29, wherein causing the secure RDMA session over a network communication link to be set up between the first NIC and the second NIC further comprises:
accepting a device service trust domain for the I/O device, the device service trust domain managed by a second trust domain manager included in a second hardware processor core resident on the remote host platform, the second trust domain manager to manage a hardware isolation of the device service trust domain;
establishing a secure communication session with the device service trust domain;
exchanging an RDMA key with the device service trust domain via the secure communication session with the device service trust domain; and
providing the RDMA key to the first NIC, for the first NIC to encrypt or decrypt DMA messages received via the secure RDMA session, wherein the device service trust domain is to provide the RDMA key to the second NIC, for the first NIC to encrypt or decrypt DMA messages received via the secure RDMA session.

### Claim 34 (depends on 33)

The method of claim 33, wherein establishing the secure communication session with the device service trust domain comprises establishing according to a Secure Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) specification.

### Claim 35

At least one non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed by a local trust domain managed by a trust domain manager included in a hardware processor core resident on a first host platform, enable the local trust domain to:
establish a secure communication session with a device interface for an input/output (I/O) device resident on a second host platform to enable memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) between the local trust domain; and
cause a secure remote direct memory access (RDMA) session over a network communication link to be set up between a first network interface card (NIC) resident on the first host platform and a second NIC resident on the second host platform to enable direct memory access (DMA) between the local trust domain and the I/O device.

### Claim 36 (depends on 35)

The least one non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 35, wherein the secure communication session with the device interface is established according to a Secure Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) specification.

### Claim 37 (depends on 35)

The least one non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 35, wherein to establish the secure communication session with the device interface further comprises the instructions to cause the local trust domain to:
receive a first message that includes a device interface handle for the I/O device;
establish the secure communication session via receipt of a certificate measurement from the device interface to validate the device interface in order to receive a report that indicates capabilities of the device interface; and
accept the capabilities of the device interface to enable MMIO between the local trust domain and the I/O device.

### Claim 38 (depends on 35)

The least one non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 35, wherein the secure RDMA session includes RDMA over Converged Ethernet (RoCE) and use of at least one of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocols or iWARP protocols to at least one of encrypt or decrypt DMA messages between the local trust domain and the I/O device.

### Claim 39 (depends on 35)

The least one non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 35, wherein to cause the secure RDMA session over a network communication link to be set up between the first NIC and the second NIC further comprises the instructions to cause the local trust domain to:
accept a device service trust domain for the I/O device, the device service trust domain managed by a second trust domain manager included in a second hardware processor core resident on the second host platform, the second trust domain manager to manage a hardware isolation of the device service trust domain;
establish a secure communication session with the device service trust domain;
exchange an RDMA key with the device service trust domain via the secure communication session with the device service trust domain; and
provide the RDMA key to the first NIC, for the first NIC to encrypt or decrypt DMA messages received via the secure RDMA session, wherein the device service trust domain is to provide the RDMA key to the second NIC, for the first NIC to encrypt or decrypt DMA messages received via the secure RDMA session.

### Claim 40 (depends on 39)

The least one non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 39, wherein the secure communication session with the device service trust domain is established according to a Secure Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) specification.

### Claim 41 (depends on 35)

The least one non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 35, wherein the I/O device comprises an accelerator device, a memory device or a storage device.
