# US 2025/0167987 A1 · Method for hiding the identity of communication devices in a continuous group key agreement

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- Number: US 2025/0167987 A1
- Document ID: US20250167987A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/033,305
- Filed: 2025-01-21
- Published: 2025-05-22
- Earliest claimed: 2022-07-22
- Applicants: PQShield Ltd
- Inventors: Keitaro HASHIMOTO; Shuichi KATSUMATA; Thomas PREST
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250167987A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0833: {involving conference or group key (network architectures or network communication protocols for key management in group communication in a packet data network H04L63/065)}
- H04L 9/0838: {Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these (network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061)}
- H04L 9/0844: {with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys}
- H04L 9/085: {Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes}
- H04L 9/0866: {involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics}
- H04L 9/16: the keys or algorithms being changed during operation
- H04L 9/3221: {interactive zero-knowledge proofs}
- H04L 9/3242: {involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3255: {using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures}
- H04L 9/3271: {using challenge-response}
- H04L 9/40: Network security protocols
- H04L 2209/42: Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Methods for hiding the identity of communications devices in a continuous group key agreement are provided. A group member making a request relating to changing a group state provides a signed challenge value to a server, which signed challenge value has been signed using a group signature key. The server checks the signed challenge value to determine if the group member is in possession of the group signature key and is therefore a member of the group. As the group signature key is used, the server cannot determine the identity of the group member making the request.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for hiding the identity of two or more communication devices in a group communicating using a continuous group key agreement, wherein the two or more communication devices may communicate with each other within the group via a server, wherein the continuous group key agreement protocol comprises:
generating, by one or more of the communication devices of the group, one or more proposals for updating a group state and causing the one or more proposals to be stored on the server;
committing, by a committing communication device of the group, a function of zero or more of the one or more proposals stored on the server, wherein the committing communication device updates a group state stored at the committing communication device based on the committed function of zero or more proposals and, as a result of committing the function of zero or more proposals, a commit relating to the function of zero or more proposals is stored on the server, and wherein committing the function of zero or more proposals starts a new epoch for the group;
downloading, by one or more downloading communication devices that are members of the group other than the committing communication device, the commit and updating a group state at each of the one or more downloading communications device based on the commit; and
determining, by each of the one or more downloading communication devices, a group secret for the new epoch based on the downloaded commit to allow the one or more downloading communication devices and the committing communication device within the group to generate a common secret key for the epoch;
the method for hiding the identity of the two or more communications devices comprising:
a requesting communication device sending a signed challenge value to the server in connection with a request for an operation, the signed challenge value having been generated by signing a challenge value with a group signature key, wherein the requested operation comprises one of: storing one or more proposals at the server, storing a commit relating to the function of zero or more proposals at the server, and downloading the commit;
the server checking the signed challenge value using a group verification key stored at the server and the challenge value; and
the server performing the requested operation if the signed challenge value shows that the requesting communication device is in possession of the group signature key and does not perform the requested operation if the signed challenge value does not confirm that the requesting communication device is in possession of the group signature key.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

A method according to claim 1, wherein the requesting communication device sends the request for an operation to the server and, in response to the request, the server sends a challenge value to the communication device,
the requesting communication device receives the challenge value and signs the challenge value using a group signature key for that epoch to generate a signed challenge value.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

A method according to claim 1, wherein the challenge value is derived from at least one of: contents of a proposal message being sent to the server, contents of a commit message being sent to the server, a randomness and other predetermined data.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

A method according to claim 1, wherein the group signature key and group verification keys are derived from the group secret for a current epoch of the group.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

A method according to claim 1, wherein the commit comprises a member-independent commit portion and a plurality of member-dependent commit portions associated with respective members of the group and the step of downloading, by one or more downloading communication devices that are members of the group other than the committing communication device, the commit, comprises each downloading communication device downloading a package comprising the member-independent commit portion and a member-dependent commit portion associated with the downloading communication device.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

A method according to claim 5, wherein the member-dependent commit portions each have a respective position associated with an index or index associated with a different group member and each downloading communication device uses a corresponding index associated with a group member to download a corresponding member-dependent commit portion, wherein the indexes are pseudo-randomly permuted based on a permutation key at each epoch to prevent tracking of the identity of the communication devices downloading the member-dependent commit portions.

### Claim 7 (depends on 6)

A method according to claim 6, wherein the indexes are pseudo-randomly permuted using a shuffling algorithm that takes the permutation key as an input.

### Claim 8 (depends on 6)

A method according to claim 6, wherein each index is assigned a random value using a pseudo-random number generator that takes the permutation key as an input and the indexes are then sorted.

### Claim 9 (depends on 7)

A method according to claim 7, wherein the permutation key is derived from the group secret.

### Claim 10 (depends on 1)

A method according to claim 1, wherein the communication devices communicate with the server by establishing respective client-anonymised communication channels.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

A method according to claim 1 wherein downloading, by one or more downloading communication devices that are members of the group other than the committing communication device, the commit includes downloading the function of zero or more proposals associated with the commit from the server.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

A method according to claim 1, wherein the group signature key and the group verification key are a private/public key pair in a public key signature scheme.

### Claim 13 (depends on 1)

A method according to claim 1, wherein the group signature key and the group verification key are the same key and the signature is a message authentication code.

### Claim 14

A communication device for use in a method for hiding the identity of two or more communication devices in a group communicating using a continuous group key agreement, wherein the two or more communication devices may communicate with each other within the group via a server, wherein the communication device is configured to perform a continuous group key agreement protocol comprising:
generating one or more proposals for updating a group state and causing the one or more proposals to be stored on the server;
committing a function of zero or more of the one or more proposals stored on the server, wherein committing the function of zero or more proposals includes updating a group state stored at the communication device based on the committed function of zero or more proposals and, as a result of committing the function of zero or more proposals, sending a commit related to the function of zero or more proposals for storage on the server, wherein committing the function of zero or more proposals starts a new epoch for the group;
downloading a commit and updating the group state based on the commit; and
determining a group secret for the new epoch based on a downloaded commit to allow the communication device to generate a common secret key for the epoch;
the communication device being further configured to perform a method for hiding the identity of the two or more communications devices comprising:
sending a signed challenge value to the server in connection with a request for an operation, the signed challenge value having been generated by signing a challenge value with a group signature key, wherein the requested operation comprises one of: storing one or more proposals at the server, storing a commit relating to the function of zero or more proposals at the server, and downloading the commit, whereby the server can check the signed challenge value using a group verification key stored at the server and the challenge value, and the server can perform the requested operation if the signed challenge value shows that the communication device is in possession of the group signature key and not perform the requested operation if the signed challenge value does not confirm that the communication device is in possession of the group signature key.

### Claim 15

A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing one or more computer programs that, when executed by two or more communication devices and a server configured so that the two or more communication devices communicate with each other within a group via the server, causes the communication devices and the server to perform a method for hiding the identity of two or more communication devices in a group communicating using a continuous group key agreement, wherein the continuous group key agreement protocol comprises:
generating, by one or more of the communication devices of the group, one or more proposals for updating a group state and causing the one or more proposals to be stored on the server;
committing, by a committing communication device of the group, a function of zero or more of the one or more proposals stored on the server, wherein the committing communication device updates a group state stored at the committing communication device based on the committed function of zero or more proposals and, as a result of committing the function of zero or more proposals, a commit relating to the function of zero or more proposals is stored on the server, and wherein committing the function of zero or more proposals starts a new epoch for the group;
downloading, by one or more downloading communication devices that are members of the group other than the committing communication device, the commit and updating a group state at each of the one or more downloading communications device based on the commit; and
determining, by each of the one or more downloading communication devices, a group secret for the new epoch based on the downloaded commit to allow the one or more downloading communication devices and the committing communication device within the group to generate a common secret key for the epoch;
the method for hiding the identity of the two or more communications devices comprising:
a requesting communication device sending a signed challenge value to the server in connection with a request for an operation, the signed challenge value having been generated by signing a challenge value with a group signature key, wherein the requested operation comprises one of: storing one or more proposals at the server, storing a commit relating to the function of zero or more proposals at the server, and downloading the commit;
the server checking the signed challenge value using a group verification key stored at the server and the challenge value; and
the server performing the requested operation if the signed challenge value shows that the requesting communication device is in possession of the group signature key and does not perform the requested operation if the signed challenge value does not confirm that the requesting communication device is in possession of the group signature key.
