# US 2025/0158972 A1 · Sparse Domains Exploitation for Physical Layer Authentication

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- Number: US 2025/0158972 A1
- Document ID: US20250158972A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/944,151
- Filed: 2024-11-12
- Published: 2025-05-15
- Earliest claimed: 2023-11-13
- Assignees: Vestel Elektronik Sanyi ve Ticaret A. S.
- Applicants: Vestel Elektronik Sanyi ve Ticaret A. S.
- Inventors: Haji Muhammad Furqan Ahmed Madni; Liza Afeef Omar Shehab El Din; Amira Bendami; Hüseyin Arslan
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250158972A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/08: {for authentication of entities (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32)}
- H04W 12/069: using certificates or pre-shared keys
- H04L 63/16: {Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer}
- H04L 9/0875: {based on channel impulse response [CIR]}
- H04W 12/79: Radio fingerprint
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

Techniques and methods are described to perform physical layer authentication, using a received signal transmitted from a communication device that has been already authenticated previously. To identify a potential attacker, a current value of a plurality of physical layer L1 parameters of the wireless channel is determined, with said L1 parameters describe for a sparse channel. A value of the plurality of L1 parameters that have been stored at the previous authentication are obtained from a storage. Based on the current value and the stored value of the plurality of L1 parameters, the communication device is authenticated. In this way, the physical layer authentication may provide for a robust and reliable authentication of communication devices in sparse communication channels, including static and dynamic wireless environments.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An apparatus for physical layer authentication, the apparatus comprising:
a receiver configured to:
receive, over a wireless channel, a signal from a communication device after a previous authentication; and
processing circuitry configured to:
determine, based on the received signal, current value of a plurality of physical-layer, L1, parameters of the wireless channel descriptive for a sparse channel;
obtain, from a storage, value of the plurality of L1 parameters stored at the previous authentication; and
perform authentication of the communication device based on the current value(s) of the plurality of L1 parameters and the value(s) of the plurality of L1 parameters stored,
wherein
the plurality of L1 parameters define a signature vector within a sparse domain being any of a Doppler domain, a delay-Doppler domain, and a delay-Doppler-angle domain;
the signature vector having distance, azimuth angle, and elevation angle, each being determined from the plurality of L1 parameters; and
the performing of the authentication is based on one or more of the distance, the azimuth angle, and the elevation angle.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to update the value of the plurality of L1 parameters stored in the storage.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is configured to select, among L1 parameters, said plurality of parameters of the wireless channel that are descriptive for a sparse channel.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein an L1 parameter of the wireless channel descriptive for a sparse channel is an L1 parameter of which a value range determined for said wireless channel is lower than a total value range of the L1 parameter.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The apparatus according to claim 4, wherein the L1 parameter of the wireless channel descriptive for a sparse channel is an L1 parameter for which a ratio of the value range determined for said wireless channel and the total value range of the L1 parameter is lower than a predefined value.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the plurality of L1 parameters comprise one or more of distance, azimuth angle, and/or elevation angle.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the performing of authentication of the communication device comprises:
comparing the current value of the plurality of L1 parameters with the stored value of the plurality of L1 parameters;
determining the authentication of the communication device as successful, in case a predefined condition is fulfilled; and
determining the authentication of the communication device as not successful, in case the predefined condition is not fulfilled.

### Claim 8 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to update the stored value based on the current value when the authentication of the communication device is successful.

### Claim 9 (depends on 2)

The apparatus according to claim 2, wherein:
the determining of the current value of the plurality of L1 parameters;
the performing of authentication of the communication device; and
the updating of a database
is repeatedly executed with a predefined repetition period.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The apparatus according to claim 8, wherein the stored value is updated when a difference between the current value of the plurality of L1 parameters and the stored value of the plurality of L1 parameters is equal to or smaller than a predetermined threshold.

### Claim 11 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the previous authentication is an authentication performed by an upper layer.

### Claim 12 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to perform an authentication by an upper layer when said authentication of the communication device is not successful.

### Claim 13 (depends on 1)

The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the wireless channel is modeled as being associated with an n-th transmission antenna with integer n=0,1,2, . . . , NA and with an m-th reception antenna with integer m=0,1,2, . . . , NB as:
h
m
,
n
,
l
(
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=
∑
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=
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p
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(
f
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T
s
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f
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sin
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m
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sin
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s
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where r is a time index, LP is a number of dominant propagation paths, Ts is a system sampling interval, denotes an index along a delay domain, d is an antenna spacing, c is the speed of light, fc is a carrier frequency, αi is a complex path gain, τi is a path delay, vi is a Doppler frequency, δ(.) denotes the Dirac delta function, θi is an angle of departure at the i-th path, and ϕi is an angle of arrival at the i-th path; wherein the plurality of L1 parameters comprise at least one of the τi, LP, θi, vi, and ϕi.

### Claim 14

A method for physical layer authentication, comprising:
receiving, over a wireless channel, a signal from a communication device after a previous authentication;
determining, based on the received signal, current value of a plurality of physical-layer, L1, parameters of the wireless channel descriptive for a sparse channel;
obtaining, from a storage, value of the plurality of L1 parameters stored at the previous authentication; and
performing authentication of the communication device based on the current value of the plurality of L1 parameters and the value of the plurality of L1 parameters stored,
wherein
the plurality of L1 parameters define a signature vector within a sparse domain being any of a Doppler domain, a delay-Doppler domain, and a delay-Doppler-angle domain;
the signature vector having distance, azimuth angle, and elevation angle, each being determined from the plurality of L1 parameters; and
the performing of the authentication is based on one or more of the distance, the azimuth angle, and/or the elevation angle.
