# US 2025/0158810 A1 · Verifier generated common reference string for zero-knowledge proofs

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- Number: US 2025/0158810 A1
- Document ID: US20250158810A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/388,774
- Filed: 2023-11-10
- Published: 2025-05-15
- Earliest claimed: 2023-11-10
- Assignees: Coinbase, Inc.
- Applicants: Coinbase, Inc.
- Inventors: Samuel Ranellucci; Iffach Hautner
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250158810A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0869: {involving random numbers or seeds}
- H04L 9/3218: {using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs}
- H04L 9/3239: {involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3255: {using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures}
- H04L 9/50: {using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees}
- H04L 2209/46: Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

Methods, systems, and devices for data management are described. A verifier node may generate a common reference string (CRS) using a random value. The verifier node may transmit a message including the CRS to a prover node. The prover node may execute a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) using the CRS and transmit, to the verifier node, a commitment of an output of the ZKP. The commitment of the output may be configured to hide the output from the verifier node until the output is revealed to the verifier node. The verifier node may transmit the random value. The prover node may determine whether the CRS is generated using the random value from the verifier node and either abort the cryptographic operation or reveal the commitment. The verifier node may verify that the output is a valid ZKP if the prover node reveals the commitment.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A method for management of a cryptographic operation, comprising:
generating, at a verifier node, a common reference string using a random value:
transmitting, to a prover node, a message comprising the common reference string:
receiving, from the prover node, a commitment of an output of a zero-knowledge proof executed by the prover node, the commitment of the output configured to hide the output from the verifier node until the output is revealed to the verifier node:
transmitting, after receiving the commitment, the random value that is used for generating the common reference string:
receiving, from the prover node, an indication that the commitment is revealed; and
verifying, after receiving the indication that the commitment is revealed, that the output is a valid zero-knowledge proof.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
receiving an execution request to execute the cryptographic operation, wherein the common reference string is generated and the message is transmitted in response to receiving the execution request.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein transmitting the message comprises:
transmitting, to a plurality of multi-party computation (MPC) nodes including the prover node, a request to execute the cryptographic operation, wherein the request includes the common reference string.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic operation is a distributed signature to be executed by a plurality of MPC nodes including the prover node.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, further comprising:
verifying a result of execution of the cryptographic operation based at least in part on verifying execution of the zero-knowledge proof by a threshold quantity of MPC nodes including the prover node.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the output is a result of execution of the zero-knowledge proof by the prover node.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The method of claim 1, wherein the zero-knowledge proof is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.

### Claim 8

A method for performing a cryptographic operation, comprising:
receiving, from a verifier node and at a prover node, a message comprising a common reference string:
executing a zero-knowledge proof using the common reference string:
transmitting, to the verifier node, a commitment of an output of the zero-knowledge proof, the commitment of the output configured to hide the output from the verifier node until the output is revealed to the verifier node:
receiving, after transmitting the commitment and from the verifier node, a random value associated with the common reference string:
determining whether the common reference string is generated using the random value received from the verifier node: and
aborting the cryptographic operation or revealing the commitment based at least in part on a result of the determining.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
aborting the cryptographic operation based at least part on determining that the random value results in a value other than the common reference string.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
revealing the commitment for the verifier node based at least in part on determining that the common reference string is generated using the random value.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein transmitting the commitment comprises:
committing, as the output, a result of execution of the zero-knowledge proof.

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the prover node is multi-party computation (MPC) node and the cryptographic operation is a distributed signature to be executed by a plurality of MPC nodes including the prover node.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein the distributed signature comprises a threshold quantity of partial signatures by the plurality of MPC nodes.

### Claim 14 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein executing the zero-knowledge proof comprises:
executing a partial signature using a key share associated with the prover node.

### Claim 15 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the zero-knowledge proof is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.

### Claim 16

An apparatus for management of a cryptographic operation, comprising:
one or more memories storing processor-executable code; and
one or more processors coupled with the one or more memories and individually or collectively operable to execute the code to cause the apparatus to:
generate, at a verifier node, a common reference string using a random value:
transmit, to a prover node, a message comprising the common reference string:
receive, from the prover node, a commitment of an output of a zero-knowledge proof executed by the prover node, the commitment of the output configured to hide the output from the verifier node until the output is revealed to the verifier node:
transmit, after receiving the commitment, the random value that is used for generating the common reference string:
receive, from the prover node, an indication that the commitment is revealed: and
verify, after receiving the indication that the commitment is revealed, that the output is a valid zero-knowledge proof.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The apparatus of claim 16, wherein the one or more processors are individually or collectively further operable to execute the code to cause the apparatus to:
receive an execution request to execute the cryptographic operation, wherein the common reference string is generated and the message is transmitted in response to receiving the execution request.

### Claim 18 (depends on 16)

The apparatus of claim 16, wherein, to transmit the message, the one or more processors are individually or collectively operable to execute the code to cause the apparatus to:
transmit, to a plurality of multi-party computation (MPC) nodes including the prover node, a request to execute the cryptographic operation, wherein the request includes the common reference string.

### Claim 19 (depends on 16)

The apparatus of claim 16, wherein the cryptographic operation is a distributed signature to be executed by a plurality of MPC nodes including the prover node.

### Claim 20 (depends on 16)

The apparatus of claim 16, wherein the one or more processors are individually or collectively further operable to execute the code to cause the apparatus to:
verify a result of execution of the cryptographic operation based at least in part on verifying execution of the zero-knowledge proof by a threshold quantity of MPC nodes including the prover node.
