# US 2025/0156533 A1 · Information processing device and method for controlling information processing device

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- Number: US 2025/0156533 A1
- Document ID: US20250156533A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/025,371
- Filed: 2025-01-16
- Published: 2025-05-15
- Earliest claimed: 2022-09-27
- Assignees: Panasonic Automotive Systems Co., Ltd.
- Applicants: Panasonic Automotive Systems Co., Ltd.
- Inventors: Hiroyuki WADA; Kaoru YOKOTA; Yuishi TORISAKI; Takumaru NAGAI; Nobutaka KAWAGUCHI
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250156533A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/552: {involving long-term monitoring or reporting}
- G06F 11/34: Recording or statistical evaluation of computer activity, e.g. of down time, of input/output operation {; Recording or statistical evaluation of user activity, e.g. usability assessment}
- G06F 21/55: Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F 21/554: {involving event detection and direct action}
- G06F 2221/034: Test or assess a computer or a system
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

An information processing device includes: a log storage that stores a monitoring log; a log transmitter that transmits a monitoring log stored in the log storage to an SOC at a first timing; a first anomaly detector that detects a presence or absence of an anomaly in the information processing device; an integrated monitor that verifies an integrity of each of the log transmitter and the first anomaly detector; a root monitor that verifies an integrity of the integrated monitor; a determiner that determines an intrusion depth based on a monitoring log stored in the log storage when an anomaly due to an attack occurs; and a transmission controller that changes, based on the intrusion depth, a timing of transmission of a monitoring log by the log transmitter from the first timing to a second timing that is earlier than the first timing.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An information processing device comprising:
a storage that stores a monitoring log generated in the information processing device;
a transmitter that is capable of communicating with an external device and transmits a monitoring log stored in the storage to the external device at a first timing;
an anomaly detector that detects a presence or absence of an anomaly in the information processing device and generates a monitoring log that indicates a detection result;
a first monitor that verifies an integrity of each of the transmitter and the anomaly detector and generates a monitoring log that indicates a verification result;
a second monitor that verifies an integrity of the first monitor and generates a monitoring log that indicates a verification result;
a determiner that determines an intrusion depth that indicates a degree of progress of an attack based on a monitoring log stored in the storage when an anomaly due to the attack occurs in at least one of the anomaly detector or the first monitor; and
a transmission controller that changes, based on the intrusion depth, a timing of transmission of a monitoring log by the transmitter from the first timing to a second timing that is earlier than the first timing when the anomaly due to the attack occurs in at least one of the anomaly detector or the first monitor.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The information processing device according to claim 1, wherein
the transmitter transmits the monitoring log to the external device with a first period, and
when the anomaly due to the attack occurs in at least one of the anomaly detector or the first monitor, the transmission controller changes, based on the intrusion depth, a period of transmission of a monitoring log by the transmitter from the first period to a second period that is shorter than the first period.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The information processing device according to claim 2, wherein
the transmission controller sets the second period to make the second period shorter as the intrusion depth is deeper.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The information processing device according to claim 2, wherein
when the anomaly due to the attack occurs in at least one of the anomaly detector or the first monitor, the determiner further determines an effective path that is a path that has not been subjected to attack intrusion, and
when the anomaly due to the attack occurs in at least one of the anomaly detector or the first monitor, the transmission controller further extracts, as a transmission target of the transmitter, a particular monitoring log generated on the effective path from among one or more monitoring logs stored in the storage based on the effective path.

### Claim 5

A method for controlling an information processing device,
the information processing device including:
a storage that stores a monitoring log generated in the information processing device;
a transmitter that is capable of communicating with an external device and transmits a monitoring log stored in the storage to the external device at a first timing;
an anomaly detector that detects a presence or absence of an anomaly in the information processing device and generates a monitoring log that indicates a detection result;
a first monitor that verifies an integrity of each of the transmitter and the anomaly detector and generates a monitoring log that indicates a verification result; and
a second monitor that verifies an integrity of the first monitor and generates a monitoring log that indicates a verification result,
the method comprising:
determining an intrusion depth that indicates a degree of progress of an attack based on a monitoring log stored in the storage when an anomaly due to the attack occurs in at least one of the anomaly detector or the first monitor; and
changing, based on the intrusion depth, a timing of transmission of a monitoring log by the transmitter from the first timing to a second timing that is earlier than the first timing when the anomaly due to the attack occurs in at least one of the anomaly detector or the first monitor.
