# US 2025/0148082 A1 · Information processing device and method for controlling information processing device

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- Number: US 2025/0148082 A1
- Document ID: US20250148082A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 19/017,057
- Filed: 2025-01-10
- Published: 2025-05-08
- Earliest claimed: 2022-09-27
- Assignees: Panasonic Automotive Systems Co., Ltd.
- Applicants: Panasonic Automotive Systems Co., Ltd.
- Inventors: Nobutaka KAWAGUCHI; Kaoru YOKOTA; Yuishi TORISAKI; Takumaru NAGAI
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250148082A1

## CPC

- G06F 21/566: {Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities}
- G06F 11/07: Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F 21/53: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
- G06F 2221/034: Test or assess a computer or a system
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

An information processing device includes: a plurality of HIDS; a plurality of individual monitors each of which monitors an associated one of the plurality of HIDS; an integrated monitor that monitors each of the plurality of individual monitors; and a root monitor that monitors the integrated monitor. When the integrated monitor is compromised, the root monitor changes a monitoring target thereof from the integrated monitor to any of the plurality of individual monitors based on total monitoring information. When the integrated monitor is compromised, each of the plurality of individual monitors adds, to a monitoring target thereof, another individual monitor than the individual monitor based on the total monitoring information.

## Claims

### Claim 1

An information processing device comprising:
a plurality of anomaly detectors each of which detects an anomaly in the information processing device;
a plurality of first monitors each of which monitors an associated one of the plurality of anomaly detectors;
a second monitor that monitors each of the plurality of first monitors; and
a third monitor that monitors the second monitor, the third monitor being implemented in an execution environment that is more secure than an execution environment in which each of the plurality of anomaly detectors, the plurality of first monitors, and the second monitor is implemented, wherein
when the second monitor is compromised, the third monitor changes a monitoring target thereof from the second monitor to any of the plurality of first monitors based on monitoring information that indicates information about the plurality of first monitors, and
when the second monitor is compromised, each of the plurality of first monitors adds, to a monitoring target thereof, another first monitor than the first monitor based on the monitoring information.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The information processing device according to claim 1, wherein
the monitoring information is information that indicates an association between each of the plurality of first monitors and a priority,
when the second monitor is compromised, the third monitor changes the monitoring target thereof from the second monitor to a first monitor having a highest priority among the plurality of first monitors based on the monitoring information, and
when the second monitor is compromised, each of at least one of the plurality of first monitors adds, to the monitoring target thereof, a first monitor having a one-rank lower priority than the first monitor based on the monitoring information.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The information processing device according to claim 2, wherein
when the second monitor is compromised, the third monitor determines, based on the monitoring information, whether or not the first monitor having the highest priority is compromised, and (i) when the first monitor having the highest priority is not compromised, the third monitor changes the monitoring target thereof from the second monitor to the first monitor having the highest priority, and (ii) when the first monitor having the highest priority is compromised, the third monitor changes, based on the monitoring information, the monitoring target thereof from the second monitor to the first monitor having a second highest priority among the plurality of first monitors.

### Claim 4 (depends on 2)

The information processing device according to claim 2, wherein
when the second monitor is compromised, each of at least one of the plurality of first monitors determines, based on the monitoring information, whether or not a first monitor having a one-rank lower priority than the first monitor is compromised, and (i) when the first monitor having a one-rank lower priority than the first monitor is not compromised, the first monitor adds, to the monitoring target thereof, the first monitor having a one-rank lower priority than the first monitor, and (ii) when the first monitor having a one-rank lower priority than the first monitor is compromised, the first monitor adds, to the monitoring target thereof, a first monitor having a two-rank lower priority than the first monitor based on the monitoring information.

### Claim 5 (depends on 2)

The information processing device according to claim 2, wherein
when the second monitor is compromised, a first monitor having a lowest priority among the plurality of first monitors adds, to a monitoring target thereof, the first monitor having the highest priority among the plurality of first monitors based on the monitoring information.

### Claim 6

A method for controlling an information processing device,
the information processing device including:
a plurality of anomaly detectors each of which detects an anomaly in the information processing device;
a plurality of first monitors each of which monitors an associated one of the plurality of anomaly detectors;
a second monitor that monitors each of the plurality of first monitors; and
a third monitor that monitors the second monitor, the third monitor being implemented in an execution environment that is more secure than an execution environment in which each of the plurality of anomaly detectors, the plurality of first monitors, and the second monitor is implemented,
the method comprising:
when the second monitor is compromised, changing, by the third monitor, a monitoring target thereof from the second monitor to any of the plurality of first monitors based on monitoring information that indicates information about the plurality of first monitors; and
when the second monitor is compromised, adding, by each of the plurality of first monitors, to a monitoring target thereof, another first monitor than the first monitor based on the monitoring information.
