# US 2025/0093460 A1 · Signal processing device, signal processing method, and computer readable medium

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- Number: US 2025/0093460 A1
- Document ID: US20250093460A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/962,687
- Filed: 2024-11-27
- Published: 2025-03-20
- Earliest claimed: 2022-07-25
- Assignees: Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
- Applicants: Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
- Inventors: Shoei NASHIMOTO
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250093460A1

## CPC

- G01S 7/023: {Interference mitigation, e.g. reducing or avoiding non-intentional interference with other HF-transmitters, base station transmitters for mobile communication or other radar systems, e.g. using electro-magnetic interference [EMI] reduction techniques (auxiliary means for detecting or identifying radar signals or the like G01S7/021; means for anti-jamming G01S7/36)}
- G01S 7/36: Means for anti-jamming {, e.g. ECCM, i.e. electronic counter-counter measures}
- G01S 7/021: {Auxiliary means for detecting or identifying radar signals or the like, e.g. radar jamming signals}
- G01S 7/354: {Extracting wanted echo-signals (Doppler systems G01S13/50)}
- G01S 13/343: {using sawtooth modulation}
- G01S 13/66: Radar-tracking systems; Analogous systems
- G01S 13/72: for two-dimensional [2D] tracking, e.g. combination of angle and range tracking, track-while-scan radar
- G01S: RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES

## Abstract

An attack determination unit (241) determines whether or not an attack using a spoofing signal is present by detecting jitter caused by the attack using the spoofing signal from a beat signal (S8). When the jitter has been detected by the attack determination unit (241), a post-countermeasure information calculation unit (242) calculates tracking information (S11) after removing information on a distance and a velocity that are observed due to the spoofing signal. An information selection unit (243) selects tracking information to be used from the tracking information (S11) and tracking information (S9) generated from the beat signal (S8).

## Claims

### Claim 1

A signal processing device comprising
processing circuitry to:
determine whether or not an attack using a spoofing signal is present by detecting jitter caused by the attack using the spoofing signal from a beat signal; and
calculate, when the jitter has been detected, tracking information after removing information on a distance and a velocity that are observed due to the spoofing signal,
wherein the processing circuitry acknowledges that the jitter has been detected when a slope exceeds a slope threshold, the slope being obtained by representing a frequency peak of each waveform in a range spectrum of the beat signal by a linear function of a waveform number.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The signal processing device according to claim 1,
wherein when the jitter has been detected, the processing circuitry calculates the tracking information after removing information on a distance and a velocity that are observed due to the spoofing signal from a range-Doppler (RD) map generated from the beat signal, or excludes a target object with a distance and a velocity that are observed due to the spoofing signal from tracking information generated from the beat signal.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The signal processing device according to claim 1,
wherein when the jitter has been detected, the processing circuitry calculates the tracking information after removing information on a distance and a velocity that are observed due to the spoofing signal from the beat signal.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The signal processing device according to claim 1,
wherein the processing circuitry refers to a record of tracking information, and selects tracking information to be adopted from tracking information calculated by the processing circuitry and tracking information calculated directly from the beat signal.

### Claim 5 (depends on 4)

The signal processing device according to claim 4,
wherein the processing circuitry selects the tracking information calculated directly from the beat signal when a target object that exists in the record of tracking information does not exist in the tracking information calculated by the processing circuitry.

### Claim 6

A signal processing method comprising:
determining whether or not an attack using a spoofing signal is present by detecting jitter caused by the attack using the spoofing signal from a beat signal;
calculating, when the jitter has been detected, tracking information after removing information on a distance and a velocity that are observed due to the spoofing signal; and
acknowledging that the jitter has been detected when a slope exceeds a slope threshold, the slope being obtained by representing a frequency peak of each waveform in a range spectrum of the beat signal by a linear function of a waveform number.

### Claim 7

A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a signal processing program that causes a computer to function as a signal processing device to perform:
an attack determination process of determining whether or not an attack using a spoofing signal is present by detecting jitter caused by the attack using the spoofing signal from a beat signal; and
a post-countermeasure information calculation process of, when the jitter has been detected by the attack determination process, calculating tracking information after removing information on a distance and a velocity that are observed due to the spoofing signal,
wherein in the attack determination process, it is acknowledged that the jitter has been detected when a slope exceeds a slope threshold, the slope being obtained by representing a frequency peak of each waveform in a range spectrum of the beat signal by a linear function of a waveform number.
