# US 2025/0085996 A1 · Guest admin protection for confidential virtual machines

> Agents: this data is available as JSON from the patentgrep API and MCP server — see https://patentgrep.com/llms.txt

- Number: US 2025/0085996 A1
- Document ID: US20250085996A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/465,148
- Filed: 2023-09-11
- Published: 2025-03-13
- Earliest claimed: 2023-09-11
- Assignees: Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC
- Applicants: Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC
- Inventors: Saket SUMAN; Gangadhara Swamy SHIVAGANGA NAGARAJU; Simran PARKHE; Pushkar V. CHITNIS; Vikas BHATIA; Alec Stephen FERNANDEZ
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250085996A1

## CPC

- G06F 9/45558: {Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects}
- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services}
- G06F 21/6245: {Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes}
- G06F 21/53: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
- G06F 2009/45587: {Isolation or security of virtual machine instances}
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

Example solutions for performing attestation for a confidential virtual machine (CVM) provision a confidential virtual machine within a virtualization platform. The virtualization platform includes confidential computing hardware configured to support encryption services to data while that data is in use on the CVM. A third party with administrative rights is provided to the CVM. The administrative rights allow the third party to modify a configuration of the CVM. After the administrative rights of the third party are removed from the CVM, a measurement is received from the CVM. The measurement is added to a build attestation report for the CVM. The attestation report is transmitted to a primary administrative party of the CVM. Using the confidential computing hardware, the CVM enters operational service with confidential data upon receiving certification user input from the primary administrative party who has reviewed the attestation report.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A confidential compute system comprising:
at least one confidential compute component configured to support a confidential virtual machine (CVM);
a processor; and
a computer-readable medium storing instructions that are operative upon execution by the processor to:
provision a confidential virtual machine (CVM) within the confidential compute system;
provide a third party with administrative rights to the CVM, the administrative rights allowing the third party to install software on the CVM;
capture one or more measurements from the CVM after a build process performed by the third party is complete;
transmit an attestation report to a primary administrative party of the CVM, the attestation report including the one or more measurements; and
cause the CVM to enter operational service with confidential data upon receiving user input from the primary administrative party after review of the attestation report.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The confidential compute system of claim 1, wherein the instructions are further operative to:
identify an operational software policy that identifies the one or more measurements and expected values for the one or more measurements;
transmit an attestation request to an attestation agent being executed by the CVM, the attestation request identifies the one or more measurements to be attested by the attestation agent;
receive an evidence message from the attestation agent of the CVM, the evidence message including current readings for the one or more measurements captured from the CVM; and
verify the current readings against for the one or more measurements using the expected values for the one or more measurements identified in the operational software policy,
wherein causing the CVM to enter operational service includes causing the CVM to enter operational service when the current readings are verified against the expected values.

### Claim 3 (depends on 2)

The confidential compute system of claim 2, wherein the attestation request is a software-based attestation request, wherein the instructions are further operative to transmit a hardware-based attestation request to the at least one confidential compute component supporting the CVM prior to causing the CVM to enter operational service.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The confidential compute system of claim 1, wherein causing the CVM to enter operational service further includes transmitting an attestation decision to a key management service, thereby causing the key management service to transmit a decryption key to the CVM for use in decrypting protected data used during the operational service of the CVM.

### Claim 5 (depends on 1)

The confidential compute system of claim 1, wherein third-party modification of the CVM includes a software installation operation performed on the CVM by the third party, wherein the one or more measurements further includes information about software installed on the CVM.

### Claim 6 (depends on 1)

The confidential compute system of claim 1, wherein the one or more measurements further includes information about administrative accounts currently present on the CVM.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The confidential compute system of claim 1, wherein the one or more measurements further includes a hash of a filesystem of the CVM.

### Claim 8

A computer-implemented method comprising:
provisioning a confidential virtual machine (CVM) within a virtualization platform, the virtualization platform including confidential computing hardware configured to support encryption services to data while that data is in use on the CVM;
providing a third party with administrative rights to the CVM, the administrative rights allowing the third party to modify a configuration of the CVM;
after the administrative rights of the third party are removed from the CVM, receiving one or more measurements from the CVM;
adding the one or more measurements to a build attestation report for the CVM;
transmitting the build attestation report to a primary administrative party of the CVM; and
using the confidential computing hardware, causing the CVM to enter operational service with confidential data upon receiving certification user input from the primary administrative party after review of the attestation report.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, further comprising:
identifying an operational software policy that identifies the one or more measurements and expected values for the one or more measurements;
transmitting an attestation request to an attestation agent being executed by the CVM, the attestation request identifies the one or more measurements to be attested by the attestation agent;
receiving an evidence message from the attestation agent of the CVM, the evidence message including current readings for the one or more measurements captured from the CVM; and
verifying the current readings against for the one or more measurements using the expected values for the one or more measurements identified in the operational software policy,
wherein causing the CVM to enter operational service includes causing the CVM to enter operational service when the current readings are verified against the expected values.

### Claim 10 (depends on 9)

The method of claim 9, further comprising providing a hardware-based attestation verification of at least one component of the confidential computing hardware supporting the CVM prior to causing the CVM to enter operational service.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein causing the CVM to enter operational service further includes transmitting an attestation decision to a key management service, thereby causing the key management service to transmit a decryption key to the CVM for use in decrypting protected data used during the operational service of the CVM.

### Claim 12 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein third party modification of the CVM includes a software installation operation performed on the CVM by the third party, wherein the one or more measurements further includes information about software installed on the CVM.

### Claim 13 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the one or more measurements further includes information about administrative accounts currently present on the CVM.

### Claim 14 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the one or more measurements further includes a hash of a filesystem of the CVM.

### Claim 15

A computer storage device having computer-executable instructions stored thereon, which, on execution by a computer, cause the computer to perform operations comprising:
provisioning a confidential virtual machine (CVM) within a virtualization platform, the virtualization platform including confidential computing hardware configured to support encryption services to data while that data is in use on the CVM;
providing a third party with administrative rights to the CVM, the administrative rights allowing the third party to modify a configuration of the CVM;
after the administrative rights of the third party are removed from the CVM, capturing one or more measurements from the CVM;
adding the one or more measurements to a build attestation report for the CVM;
transmitting the build attestation report to a primary administrative party of the CVM; and
using the confidential computing hardware, causing the CVM to enter operational service with confidential data upon receiving certification user input from the primary administrative party after review of the attestation report.

### Claim 16 (depends on 15)

The computer storage device of claim 15, further comprising:
identifying an operational software policy that identifies the one or more measurements and expected values for the one or more measurements;
transmitting an attestation request to an attestation agent being executed by the CVM, the attestation request identifies the one or more measurements to be attested by the attestation agent;
receiving an evidence message from the attestation agent of the CVM, the evidence message including current readings for the one or more measurements captured from the CVM; and
verifying the current readings against for the one or more measurements using the expected values for the one or more measurements identified in the operational software policy,
wherein causing the CVM to enter operational service includes causing the CVM to enter operational service when the current readings are verified against the expected values.

### Claim 17 (depends on 16)

The computer storage device of claim 16, further comprising providing a hardware-based attestation verification of at least one component of the confidential computing hardware supporting the CVM prior to causing the CVM to enter operational service.

### Claim 18 (depends on 15)

The computer storage device of claim 15, wherein causing the CVM to enter operational service further includes transmitting an attestation decision to a key management service, thereby causing the key management service to transmit a decryption key to the CVM for use in decrypting protected data used during the operational service of the CVM.

### Claim 19 (depends on 15)

The computer storage device of claim 15, wherein third party modification of the CVM includes a software installation operation performed on the CVM by the third party, wherein the one or more measurements further includes information about software installed on the CVM.

### Claim 20 (depends on 15)

The computer storage device of claim 15, wherein the one or more measurements further includes information about administrative accounts currently present on the CVM.
