# US 2025/0062895 A1 · Computer system and key exchange method

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- Number: US 2025/0062895 A1
- Document ID: US20250062895A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/721,318
- Filed: 2022-10-14
- Published: 2025-02-20
- Earliest claimed: 2022-01-17
- Assignees: Hitachi, Ltd.
- Applicants: Hitachi, Ltd.
- Inventors: Narumi NAITO; Hideyuki TAKA; Keiichi SATO; Yu ONODERA
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20250062895A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/0841: {involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols}
- G06F 21/57: Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F 21/602: {Providing cryptographic facilities or services}
- H04L 9/0825: {using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates}
- H04L 9/0861: {Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords}
- H04L 9/0897: {involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB}
- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/3226: {using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083)}
- H04L 63/061: {for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838)}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)

## Abstract

A data management server manages a database storing confidential data, and stores public information and first secret information in a trust zone. A client terminal holds the public information and second secret information. The data management server generates a first public key by using the public information and the first secret information; and transmits the first public key. The client terminal generates the user secret key by using the public information, the second secret information, and the first public key; generates a second public key by using the public information and the second secret information; and transmits the second public key. The data management server generates the user secret key in the trust zone by using the public information, the first secret information, and the second public key; and generate, in the trust zone, key management data for managing the user secret key; and record the key management data.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A computer system, comprising:
a data management server; and
a client terminal,
the data management server including an arithmetic device and a storage device,
the data management server being configured to manage a database configured to store confidential data encrypted based on a probabilistic encryption method using a master secret key,
the arithmetic device having a function for generating a trust zone which is secure and logically isolated in the storage device,
the trust zone storing the master secret key as well as public information and first secret information to be used in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol,
the client terminal being configured to hold the public information and second secret information to be used in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol,
the data management server being configured to:
generate, in a case where a request to generate a user secret key to be used to access the confidential data managed by the data management server is received from the client terminal, a first public key by using the public information and the first secret information; and
transmit the first public key to the client terminal,
the client terminal being configured to:
generate the user secret key by using the public information, the second secret information, and the first public key;
generate a second public key by using the public information and the second secret information; and
transmit the second public key to the data management server,
the data management server being configured to:
store the second public key in the trust zone;
generate the user secret key in the trust zone by using the public information, the first secret information, and the second public key;
generate, in the trust zone, key management data for managing the user secret key; and
record the key management data as information for use in comparison processing for determining whether the user secret key is valid.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The computer system according to claim 1, wherein the data management server is configured to delete the user secret key from the trust zone after the key management data is recorded.

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The computer system according to claim 1, wherein the user secret key is a key which is valid only once.

### Claim 4 (depends on 1)

The computer system according to claim 1,
wherein the client terminal is configured to:
receive, from a user operating the client terminal, input of registered user management data for checking a validity of the user; and
encrypt the registered user management data and register the encrypted registered user management data in the data management server, and
wherein the data management server is configured to:
receive input of checked user management data in a case where a request to generate the user secret key is received; and
determine whether the user who has requested generation of the user secret key is a valid user based on the encrypted checked user management data and the encrypted registered user management data.

### Claim 5

A key exchange method to be executed in a computer system which includes a data management server and a client terminal,
the data management server including an arithmetic device and a storage device,
the data management server being configured to manage a database configured to store confidential data encrypted based on a probabilistic encryption method using a master secret key,
the arithmetic device having a function for generating a trust zone which is secure and logically isolated in the storage device,
the trust zone storing the master secret key as well as public information and first secret information to be used in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol,
the client terminal being configured to hold the public information and second secret information to be used in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol,
the key exchange method including:
a first step of generating, by the data management server, in a case where a request to generate a user secret key to be used to access the confidential data managed by the data management server is received from the client terminal, a first public key by using the public information and the first secret information;
a second step of transmitting, by the data management server, the first public key to the client terminal;
a third step of generating, by the client terminal, the user secret key by using the public information, the second secret information, and the first public key;
a fourth step of generating, by the client terminal, a second public key by using the public information and the second secret information;
a fifth step of transmitting, by the client terminal, the second public key to the data management server;
a sixth step of storing, by the data management server, the second public key in the trust zone;
a seventh step of generating, by the data management server, the user secret key in the trust zone by using the public information, the first secret information, and the second public key;
an eighth step of generating, by the data management server, in the trust zone, key management data for managing the user secret key; and
a ninth step of recording, by the data management server, the key management data as information for use in comparison processing for determining whether the user secret key is valid.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The key exchange method according to claim 5, wherein the seventh step includes a step of deleting, by the data management server, the user secret key from the trust zone after the key management data is recorded.

### Claim 7 (depends on 5)

The key exchange method according to claim 5, wherein the user secret key is a key which is valid only once.

### Claim 8 (depends on 5)

The key exchange method according to claim 5, further including the steps of:
receiving, by the client terminal, from a user operating the client terminal, input of registered user management data for checking a validity of the user; and
encrypting, by the client terminal, the registered user management data and registering the encrypted registered user management data in the data management server,
wherein the first step includes the steps of:
receiving, by the data management server, input of checked user management data; and
determining, by the data management server, whether the user who has requested generation of the user secret key is a valid user based on the encrypted checked user management data and the encrypted registered user management data.
