# US 2024/0267219 A1 · Trusted compute environment using a secure element and device identity composition engine (dice)

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- Number: US 2024/0267219 A1
- Document ID: US20240267219A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/431,653
- Filed: 2024-02-02
- Published: 2024-08-08
- Earliest claimed: 2023-02-07
- Assignees: Micron Technology, Inc.
- Applicants: Micron Technology, Inc.
- Inventors: Zhan Liu
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20240267219A1

## CPC

- H04L 9/30: Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L 9/088: {Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms (network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068)}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)

## Abstract

In some aspects, the techniques described herein relate to a system including: a Device Identity Composition Engine (DICE) configured to generate asymmetric key pairs for software layers of a computing system; and a secure element (SE), the secure element configured to receive requests for accessing the software layers and validating a request for a given software layer by: generating a nonce, providing the nonce and an identifier of the given software layer to the DICE, receiving a response from the DICE, and validating the response using a public key corresponding to the given software layer to allow access to the given software layer.

## Claims

### Claim 1

A system comprising:
a Device Identity Composition Engine (DICE); and
a secure element (SE), for:
providing a nonce and an identifier of a software layer to the DICE, and
validating a response from the DICE using a public key corresponding to the software layer to allow access to the software layer.

### Claim 2 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the SE comprises one of a trusted execution environment (TEE), Secure Enclave, or hardware security module (HSM).

### Claim 3 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the SE includes a write-protected storage area storing DICE public keys generated by the DICE, the DICE public keys including the public key corresponding to the software layer.

### Claim 4 (depends on 3)

The system of claim 3, wherein the SE is configured to receive a command to store the DICE public keys from a key management server (KMS), the command signed using a private key of the KMS and verified, by the SE, using a corresponding public key of the KMS, wherein the SE is configured to read the DICE public keys from the DICE to execute the command.

### Claim 5 (depends on 3)

The system of claim 3, wherein validating the response using a public key corresponding to the software layer comprises reading the public key corresponding to the software layer from the write-protected storage area, decrypting a digital signature included in the response to generate a decrypted result, and comparing the decrypted result to the nonce and the identifier of the software layer to validate the response.

### Claim 6 (depends on 5)

The system of claim 5, wherein validating the response using a public key corresponding to the software layer further comprises determining if a received nonce in the response matches the nonce and if a received layer identifier matches the identifier of the software layer prior to decrypting the digital signature.

### Claim 7 (depends on 1)

The system of claim 1, wherein the DICE is configured to receive the nonce and the identifier of the software layer and identify a corresponding private key based on the identifier of the software layer and generating a digital signature using the nonce and the identifier of the software layer as a message for a digital signature algorithm.

### Claim 8

A method comprising:
receiving, by a secure element (SE), a request to access a software layer stored by a computing system;
transmitting, by the SE, a request to a Device Identity Composition Engine (DICE), the request including a nonce and an identifier of the software layer; and
validating, by the SE, a response from the DICE using a public key corresponding to the software layer.

### Claim 9 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein the request to access a software layer comprises a request to access a software layer managed by the DICE.

### Claim 10 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein generating the nonce comprises generating a pseudo-random value.

### Claim 11 (depends on 8)

The method of claim 8, wherein validating the response comprises extracting a received nonce, a received layer identifier, and a digital signature from the response.

### Claim 12 (depends on 11)

The method of claim 11, wherein validating the response comprises determining that the received nonce matches the nonce included in the request.

### Claim 13 (depends on 12)

The method of claim 12, wherein validating the response comprises determining that the received layer identifier matches the identifier of the software layer included in the request.

### Claim 14 (depends on 13)

The method of claim 13, wherein validating the response comprises reading the public key from a write-protected storage area, decrypting the digital signature included in the response to generate a decrypted result, and comparing the decrypted result to the nonce included in the request and the identifier of the software layer included in the request.

### Claim 15 (depends on 14)

The method of claim 14, wherein validating the response using a public key corresponding to the software layer to manage access to the software layer comprises disallowing access to the software layer if:
the received nonce does not match the nonce included in the request;
the received layer identifier does not match the identifier of the software layer included in the request; or
the decrypted result does not match the nonce included in the request and the identifier of the software layer included in the request.

### Claim 16 (depends on 14)

The method of claim 14, wherein validating the response using a public key corresponding to the software layer to manage access to the software layer comprises executing the software layer by a processing device.

### Claim 17

A method comprising:
receiving, at a computing device, a nonce and a layer identifier from a secure element (SE);
generating, by a computing device, a digital signature using a private key corresponding to the layer identifier and the nonce and a layer identifier as a message input; and
returning, by a computing device, the digital signature to the SE.

### Claim 18 (depends on 17)

The method of claim 17, wherein the private key comprises a private key generated by a Device Identity Composition Engine (DICE).

### Claim 19 (depends on 17)

The method of claim 17, wherein the private key is generated on startup of the computing device.

### Claim 20 (depends on 17)

The method of claim 17, further comprising receiving a request from the SE for public keys and returning the public keys to the SE.
