# US 2024/0205198 A1 · Secure key management for service mesh deployments

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- Number: US 2024/0205198 A1
- Document ID: US20240205198A1
- Status: Published application
- Kind: A1
- Application number: 18/288,955
- Filed: 2022-03-25
- Published: 2024-06-20
- Earliest claimed: 2021-10-28
- Assignees: Intel Corporation
- Applicants: Intel Corporation
- Inventors: Kapil Sood; Srinivasa Addepalli; Dong Guo; Sakari Poussa; Kailun Qin; Ismo Puustinen; Veronika Karperko
- Web page: https://patentgrep.com/patent/US20240205198A1

## CPC

- H04L 63/0428: {wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload}
- G06F 21/53: by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
- G06F 21/606: {by securing the transmission between two devices or processes}
- G06F 21/64: Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
- H04L 9/0822: {using key encryption key}
- H04L 9/0825: {using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates}
- H04L 9/0897: {involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB}
- H04L 9/3247: {involving digital signatures}
- H04L 9/3268: {using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]}
- H04L 63/0442: {wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30)}
- H04L 63/062: {for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819)}
- H04L 63/0823: {using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263)}
- H04W 12/03: Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W 12/043: using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04L 63/0272: {Virtual private networks}
- H04L 63/166: {at the transport layer}
- H04W 12/009: {specially adapted for networks, e.g. wireless sensor networks, ad-hoc networks, RFID networks or cloud networks}
- H04L: TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION (arrangements common to telegraphic and telephonic communication H04M)
- G06F: ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING (computer systems based on specific computational models G06N)
- H04W: WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (broadcast communication H04H; communication systems using wireless links for non-selective communication, e.g. wireless extensions H04M1/72)

## Abstract

Various methods, systems, and use cases for securely managing, generating, and controlling access to keys in a service mesh are discussed herein. In various examples, key protection operations include service mesh signing key protection and service mesh communication key protection, for a secure transport session between services such as conducted with mutual transport layer security (mTLS). For instance, such key protection operations may be used to establish communications between the service host and another entity within the service mesh, in a secure transport session, based on use of a private key (secured using a confidential computing technology) in a secure enclave or other secure compute environment to sign one or more keys for the secure transport session.

## Claims

### Claim at position 1

-25. (canceled)

### Claim 26

A device providing a service host of a service mesh, the service host comprising:
network communication circuitry;
secure storage to provide a secure enclave;
processing circuitry; and
a storage medium including instructions embodied thereon, wherein the instructions, which when executed by the processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to:
receive a private key at the service host, via the network communication circuitry, the private key generated according to a confidential computing technology;
store the private key in the secure enclave, the secure enclave operated according to the confidential computing technology;
access the private key within the secure enclave of the secure storage, for use in establishing a secure transport session within the service mesh; and
perform communications between the service host and another entity within the service mesh, in the secure transport session via the network communication circuitry, based on use of the private key in the secure enclave to sign one or more keys for the secure transport session.

### Claim 27 (depends on 26)

The device of claim 26, wherein the communications are established between a proxy of the service host and a proxy of the another entity, wherein the another entity is another service host of the service mesh.

### Claim 28 (depends on 27)

The device of claim 27, wherein the service host and the another service host operate respective microservices, and wherein the communications are used to exchange data between the respective microservices.

### Claim 29 (depends on 26)

The device of claim 26, wherein the secure transport session is performed for at least one application of a data plane of the service mesh, and wherein the private key is obtained at the service host from an operator in a control plane of the service mesh.

### Claim 30 (depends on 29)

The device of claim 29, wherein the operator is established in the control plane using another secure enclave established according to the confidential computing technology, wherein the operator is to:
request attestation of the another secure enclave, from an attestation server, using the confidential computing technology; and
receive a certificate authority encrypted private key at the operator, in response to the attestation, the certificate authority encrypted private key received from a key server.

### Claim 31 (depends on 30)

The device of claim 30, wherein the key server is established in a management and security plane of the service mesh, wherein the key server operates using the confidential computing technology.

### Claim 32 (depends on 30)

The device of claim 30, wherein the control plane is managed by a service manager, and wherein the control plane includes a certificate authority manager, an authentication policy manager, and an authorization policy manager, and wherein the service manager is connected to a plurality of service entities including the service host via a control plane interface.

### Claim 33 (depends on 26)

The device of claim 26, wherein the secure transport session is a mutual transport layer security (mTLS) session, and wherein one or more public and private keys used for conducting the mTLS session are based on the private key.

### Claim 34 (depends on 26)

The device of claim 26, wherein the secure enclave is provided on the device using secure processing operations, and wherein the confidential computing technology is established using one or more components compliant with one of: Intel Software Guard Extensions, Intel Trust Domain Extensions, AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization, an ARM Confidential Compute Architecture, or an Apple Secure Enclave architecture.

### Claim 35 (depends on 26)

The device of claim 26, wherein the service mesh is configured to provide a plurality of communication services associated with a 5G Service-Based Architecture (5G SBA), the 5G SBA providing control plane functions within a 5G telecommunications network accessed by a plurality of user equipment.

### Claim 36

A method for operating a service host in a service mesh, the method comprising:
receiving a private key at the service host, the private key generated according to a confidential computing technology;
maintaining the private key in a secure enclave accessible to the service host, the secure enclave operated according to the confidential computing technology;
accessing the private key within the secure enclave, for use in establishing a secure transport session within the service mesh; and
performing communications between the service host and another entity within the service mesh, via the secure transport session, based on use of the private key in the secure enclave to sign one or more keys for the secure transport session.

### Claim 37 (depends on 36)

The method of claim 36, wherein the communications are established between a proxy of the service host and a proxy of the another entity, wherein the another entity is another service host of the service mesh.

### Claim 38 (depends on 37)

The method of claim 37, wherein the service host and the another service host operate respective microservices, and wherein the communications are used to exchange data between the respective microservices.

### Claim 39 (depends on 36)

The method of claim 36, wherein the secure transport session is performed for at least one application of a data plane of the service mesh, and wherein the private key is obtained at the service host from an operator in a control plane of the service mesh.

### Claim 40 (depends on 39)

The method of claim 39, wherein the operator is established in the control plane using another secure enclave established according to the confidential computing technology, wherein the operator is to:
request attestation of the another secure enclave, from an attestation server, using the confidential computing technology; and
receive a certificate authority encrypted private key at the operator, in response to the attestation, the certificate authority encrypted private key received from a key server;
wherein the key server is established in a management and security plane of the service mesh, and wherein the key server operates using the confidential computing technology.

### Claim 41 (depends on 40)

The method of claim 40, wherein the control plane is managed by a service manager, and wherein the control plane includes a certificate authority manager, an authentication policy manager, and an authorization policy manager, and wherein the service manager is connected to a plurality of service entities including the service host via a control plane interface.

### Claim 42 (depends on 36)

The method of claim 36, wherein the secure transport session is a mutual transport layer security (mTLS) session, and wherein one or more public and private keys used for conducting the mTLS session are based on the private key.

### Claim 43 (depends on 36)

The method of claim 36, wherein the secure enclave is provided using secure processing operations, wherein the confidential computing technology is established using one or more components compliant with one of: Intel Software Guard Extensions, Intel Trust Domain Extensions, AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization, an ARM Confidential Compute Architecture, or an Apple Secure Enclave architecture.

### Claim 44 (depends on 36)

The method of claim 36, wherein the service mesh is configured to provide a plurality of communication services associated with a 5G Service-Based Architecture (5G SBA), the 5G SBA providing control plane functions within a 5G telecommunications network accessed by a plurality of user equipment.

### Claim 45

At least one machine-readable storage device comprising instructions stored thereupon, which when executed by processing circuitry of a service mesh computing system, cause the processing circuitry to operate a service host in a service mesh, with operations to:
receive a private key at the service host, the private key generated according to a confidential computing technology;
store the private key in a secure enclave, the secure enclave operated according to the confidential computing technology;
access the private key within the secure enclave, for use in establishing a secure transport session within the service mesh; and
perform communications between the service host and another entity within the service mesh, in the secure transport session, based on use of the private key in the secure enclave to sign one or more keys for the secure transport session.
